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Signed in as:

Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2, IIC 1769 (2021), 20th September 2021

From: Investment Claims (http://oxia.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved.  Subscriber: null; date: 08 June 2023

Parties:
Lion Mexico Consolidated LP (Canada [ca])
Mexico
Judges/Arbitrators:
Juan Fernández-Armesto (President); David JA Cairns (Claimant appointment); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (Respondent appointment)
Counsel for Party One:
Robert J Kriss (Mayer Brown LLP, 71 S Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606, United States); Dany Khayat (Mayer Brown LLP, 10 avenue Hoche, 75008 Paris, France); Alejandro Lopez Ortiz (Mayer Brown LLP, 10 avenue Hoche, 75008 Paris, France); Jose J Caicedo (Mayer Brown LLP, 10 avenue Hoche, 75008 Paris, France); Patricia Ugalde Revilla (Mayer Brown LLP, 10 avenue Hoche, 75008 Paris, France)
Counsel for Party Two:
Orlando Pérez Garate (Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Comercio Internacional, Secretaría de Economía, Calle Pachuca número 189, Piso 19, Colonia Condesa, Demarcación Territorial Cuauhtémoc, C.P. 06140, Mexico City, Mexico); Cindy Rayo Zapata (Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Comercio Internacional, Secretaría de Economía, Calle Pachuca número 189, Piso 19, Colonia Condesa, Demarcación Territorial Cuauhtémoc, C.P. 06140, Mexico City, Mexico); Aristeo López Sánchez (Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Comercio Internacional, Secretaría de Economía, Calle Pachuca número 189, Piso 19, Colonia Condesa, Demarcación Territorial Cuauhtémoc, C.P. 06140, Mexico City, Mexico); Geovanni Hernández Salvador (Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Comercio Internacional, Secretaría de Economía, Calle Pachuca número 189, Piso 19, Colonia Condesa, Demarcación Territorial Cuauhtémoc, C.P. 06140, Mexico City, Mexico); Rafael Arteaga Farfán (Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Comercio Internacional, Secretaría de Economía, Calle Pachuca número 189, Piso 19, Colonia Condesa, Demarcación Territorial Cuauhtémoc, C.P. 06140, Mexico City, Mexico); J Cameron Mowatt (Tereposky & DeRose LLP, Suite 1000, 81 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1P 6K7); Vincent DeRose (Tereposky & DeRose LLP, Suite 1000, 81 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1P 6K7); Jennifer Radford (Tereposky & DeRose LLP, Suite 1000, 81 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1P 6K7); Alejandro Barragan (Tereposky & DeRose LLP, Suite 1000, 81 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1P 6K7); Ximena Iturriaga (Tereposky & DeRose LLP, Suite 1000, 81 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1P 6K7); Stephan E Becker (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, 1200 Seventeenth Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, United States)
Procedural Stage:
Award
Previous Procedural Stage(s):
Procedural order no 1; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 954 (2016), 14 October 2016Procedural order no 2; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2, 24 November 2016Decision on the respondent’s preliminary objection under Article 45(6) of the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 909 (2016), 12 December 2016Decision on birfurcation; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 955 (2017), 29 May 2017Procedural order no 3; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 978 (2017), 30 June 2017Procedural order no 4; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 1322 (2018), 23 January 2018Procedural order no 5; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 1323 (2018), 2 March 2018Procedural order no 6; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2, 3 September 2018Procedural order no 7; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2, 11 October 2018Procedural order no 8; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 1513 (2019), 3 January 2019Procedural order no 9; Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/15/2; IIC 1580 (2019), 26 June 2019
Governing Law:
North American Free Trade Agreement (17 December 1992) US Gov’t Printing Office (1992); (1993) 32 ILM 289, 605, entered into force 1 January 1994
International law
Subject(s):
Denial of justice — Fair and equitable treatment standard — Valuation

Oxford Reports on International Investment Claims is edited by:

Ian Laird, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC

Cases cited in the full text of this decision:

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes

Amco Asia Corporation and others v Indonesia, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, 20 November 1984

Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/97/2; IIC 22 (1999), 1 November 1999

Metalclad Corporation v Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1; IIC 161 (2000), 30 August 2000

Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co v Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/99/6; IIC 169 (2002), 12 April 2002

Mondev International Ltd v United States, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2; IIC 173 (2002), 11 October 2002

ADF Group Incorporated v United States, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/1; IIC 2 (2003), 9 January 2003

Loewen Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United States, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3; IIC 254 (2003), 26 June 2003

Waste Management v Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3; IIC 270 (2004), 30 April 2004

MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v Chile, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7; IIC 174 (2004), 25 May 2004

CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8; IIC 65 (2005), 12 May 2005

Azurix Corp v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12; IIC 24 (2006), 14 July 2006

ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Hungary, Final award on jurisdiction, merits and damages, ICSID Case No ARB/03/16; IIC 1 (2006), 2 October 2006

Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3; IIC 307 (2007), 20 August 2007

Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v Chile, Final Award, ICSID Case No ARB/98/2; IIC 324 (2008), 8 May 2008

Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil SA v Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/04/19; IIC 333 (2008), 18 August 2008

Jan de Nul NV v Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/04/13; IIC 356 (2008), 6 November 2008

Saipem SpA v Bangladesh, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/05/07; IIC 378 (2009), 30 June 2009

Pantechniki SA Contractors & Engineers v Albania, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/07/21; IIC 383 (2009), 30 July 2009

Al-Bahloul v Tajikistan, Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, SCC Case No 064/2008; IIC 474 (2009), 2 September 2009

Toto Construzioni Generali SpA v Lebanon, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/07/12; IIC 391 (2009), 11 September 2009

ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v Jordan, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/08/2: IIC 430 (2010), 18 May 2010

Ambiente Ufficio SpA and ors v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICSID Case No ARB/08/9; IIC 576 (2013), 8 February 2013

Renée Rose Levy de Levi v Peru, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/10/17; IIC 728 (2014), 26 February 2014

Flughafen Zürich AG and Gestión e Ingenería IDC SA v Venezuela, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/10/19; IIC 664 (2014), 18 November 2014

OI European Group BV v Venezuela, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/11/25; IIC 678 (2015), 10 March 2015

Dan Cake SA v Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ICSID Case No ARB/12/9; IIC 1418 (2015), 24 August 2015

Corona Materials LLC v Dominican Republic, Award on the Respondent’s Expedited Preliminary Objections in Accordance with Article 10.20.5 of the DR-CAFTA, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/14/3; IIC 981 (2016), 31 May 2016

Philip Morris Brands Sarl, Philip Morris Products SA and ABAL Hermanos SA v Uruguay, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7; IIC 844 (2016), 8 July 2016

Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v Indonesia, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/12/14 and 12/40; IIC 911 (2016), 6 December 2016

Eli Lilly and Company v Canada, Final Award, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2; IIC 930 (2017), 16 March 2017

Krederi Ltd v Ukraine, Excerpts of Award, ICSID Case No ARB/14/17; IIC 1636 (2018), 2 July 2018

To access full citation information for this document, see the Oxford Law Citator record

Decision - full text

Original Source PDF

Representation of the Parties

Representing Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P.:

  • Ms. Onay Payne, Managing Director
  • 230 Park Avenue
  • New York, NY 10169
  • United States of America
  • and
  • Mr. Robert J. Kriss
  • Mayer Brown LLP
  • 71 S. Wacker Drive
  • Chicago, Illinois 60606
  • United States of America
  • and
  • Mr. Dany Khayat
  • Mr. Alejandro Lopez Ortiz
  • Mr. Jose J. Caicedo
  • Ms. Patricia Ugalde Revilla
  • Mayer Brown LLP
  • 10, avenue Hoche
  • 75008 Paris
  • France

Representing the United Mexican States:

  • Mr. Orlando Pérez Garate
  • Ms. Cindy Rayo Zapata
  • Mr. Aristeo López Sánchez
  • Mr. Geovanni Hernández Salvador
  • Mr. Rafael Arteaga Farfán
  • Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Comercio Internacional
  • Secretaría de Economía
  • Calle Pachuca número 189, Piso 19
  • Colonia Condesa
  • Demarcación Territorial Cuauhtémoc,
  • C.P. 06140, Mexico City
  • United Mexican States
  • and
  • Mr. J. Cameron Mowatt
  • Mr. Vincent DeRose
  • Ms. Jennifer Radford
  • Mr. Alejandro Barragan
  • Ms. Ximena Iturriaga
  • Tereposky & DeRose LLP
  • Suite 1000, 81 Metcalfe Street
  • Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
  • K1P 6K7
  • and
  • Mr. Stephan E. Becker
  • Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
  • 1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
  • Washington, DC 20036
  • United States of America

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

  • Américas I

    One of the two high-end mixed-use skyscrapers planned under the Guadalajara Project to be built in the city of Guadalajara, State of Jalisco

  • Américas II

    One of the two high-end mixed-use skyscrapers planned under the Guadalajara Project to be built in the city of Guadalajara, State of Jalisco

  • Arechederra

    Witness statement of Jose Arechederra

  • Canada Submission

    Non-Disputing Party Submission of the Government of Canada submitted on June 21, 2019

  • CM

    Claimant’s Memorial dated March 13, 2017

  • CR

    Claimant’s Reply on the Merits dated February 21, 2019

  • CPHB

    Claimant’s Post-Hearing Brief dated October 1, 2019

  • CC Jalisco

    Civil Code of Jalisco

  • CC Nayarit

    Civil Code of Nayarit

  • C&C Capital

    C&C Capital, S.A. de C.V., a company owned or controlled by Sr. Cárdenas

  • C&C Ingeniería

    C&C Ingeniería y Proyectos, S.A. de C.V., a company owned or controlled by Sr. Cárdenas

  • Clarion

    Clarion Partners, L.P., a real estate investment management company founded in New York in 1982, which manages real estate investments for institutional investors

  • Commercial Code [of Mexico]

    Commercial Code of Mexico of 1889, with amendments, as under exhibit Zamora I-3

  • Costs of the Proceeding

    The fees and expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the expenses and charges of the Secretariat

  • CPC Jalisco

    Civil Procedure Code of Jalisco

  • Credit Agreements

    Three contracts signed by Lion with companies owned or controlled by Sr. Cárdenas in February, June and September 2007, making and governing the Loans

  • Debtors

    Two Mexican companies, Inmobiliaria Bains, S.A. de C.V and C&C Capital, S.A. de C.V., the borrowing party in three loans made by Lion

  • Defense Expenses

    The expenses incurred by the Parties in connection with the proceeding

  • First Loan

    Loan, in the form of a “Credit Agreement”, between Lion (as Lender), Inmobiliaria Bains (as Borrower) and C&C Ingeniería, another company of Sr. Cárdenas (as joint and several obligor). It was signed on February 27, 2007, for the amount of US $15,000,000 plus interest

  • First Note

    Note issued by Inmobiliaria Bains in favor of Lion for US $15,000,000 on February 28, 2007

  • Juez de lo Civil

    The 39th Civil Court in Mexico City, before which the Foreclosing Proceedings were initiated

  • Foreclosure Proceedings

    Juicio Hipotecario; Foreclosure proceedings initiated on 3 April 2012 by Lion against the Debtors, to enforce the Nayarit Mortgage

  • Guadalajara Mortgage 1

    Mortgage securing the Second Loan, granted by C&C Capital in favor of Lion over one of the properties pertaining to the Guadalajara Project on June 13, 2007

  • Guadalajara Mortgage 2

    Mortgage securing the Third loan, granted by C&C Capital in favor of Lion over one of the properties pertaining to the Guadalajara Project on September 26, 2007

  • Guadalajara Project

    Real estate project that consisted of two high-end mixed-use skyscrapers (Américas I and Américas II), which were to be built by Sr. Cárdenas’s companies in Guadalajara, State of Jalisco

  • Guadalajara Properties

    Real estate covered by the two Guadalajara Mortgages, where the Guadalajara Project was intended to be developed

  • Hearing

    The hearing on the Merits held at the World Bank Headquarters in Washington D.C. on July 22–14, 2019

  • Hendricks

    Witness statement of James Hendricks

  • HT

    Transcripts of the Merits Hearing

  • ICSID

    International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

  • ICSID AF Rules

    International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes Additionally Facility Rules

  • Inmobilaria Bains

    Inmobiliaria Bains, S.A. de C.V. a company owned or controlled by Cárdenas

  • Lion/ Claimant

    Claimant. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P. is a partnership constituted under the laws of Quebec (Canada), with its main place of business in Texas (USA)

  • H1

    Lion’s Opening Statement Presentation of July 22, 2019

  • Loans

    Three loans that Lion made in 2007 to two Mexican companies owned or controlled by Sr. Cárdenas, for a principal amount of approximately US $32.8 million. The Loans were secured by the three Mortgages and the issue of three Notes

  • Mexico/Respondent

    United Mexican States

  • Mortgages

    Mortgages that secured the three Loans given by Lion in 2007, signed before a public notary in the Spanish language and subject to Mexican Law, namely the laws of the States of Jalisco and Nayarit

  • NAFTA

    North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, which entered into force in January 1, 1994

  • Nayarit Project

    Real estate project to be developed by Sr. Cárdenas’s companies in Bahía de Banderas, State of Nayarit, Mexico

  • Nayarit Property

    Real estate covered by the Nayarit Mortgage, where the Nayarit Project was intended to be developed

  • Nayarit Mortgage

    Mortgage granted by Inmobiliaria Bains in favor of Lion over the Nayarit Project property on April 2, 2008

  • Notes

    Notes formalizing the three Loans made by Lion in 2007, issued under Mexican law, and submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Mexico D.F.

  • Paparinskis

    M. Paparinskis, “The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment”, Oxford Monographies in International Law, 2013

  • Paulsson Lecture

    J. Paulsson, "Issues Arising from Finding of Denial of Justice," Recueil des cours / Collected Courses 405 (2020): [i]-74.

  • Payne I

    First witness statement of Onay Payne

  • Payne II

    Second witness statement of Onay Payne

  • Parties

    The Claimant and the Respondent together

  • PO

    Procedural Order

  • Properties

    The Nayarit Property and the Guadalajara Properties, together

  • RCM

    Respondent’s Counter Memorial dated October 26, 2018

  • RfA

    Request for Arbitration submitted by Lion against Mexico and dated December 11, 2015

  • RPHB

    Respondent’s Post-Hearing Brief dated October 1, 2019

  • RR

    Respondent’s Rejoinder dated June 3, 2019

  • Second Loan

    Loan, in the form of a “Credit Agreement”, between Lion (as Lender), C&C Capital (as Borrower) and Inmobiliaria Bains (as joint and several obligor). It was signed on June 13, 2007, for the amount of US $12,450,000 plus interest

  • Second Note

    Noted issued by C&C Capital in favor of Lion for US $12,450,000 on June 14, 2007

  • Third Loan

    Loan, in the form of a “Credit Agreement”, between Lion (as Lender), C&C Capital (as Borrower) and Inmobiliaria Bains (as joint and several obligor). It was signed on September 26, 2007, for the amount of US $5,355,479 plus interest

  • Third Note

    Note issued by C&C Capital in favor of Lion for US $5,355,479 on September 29, 2007

  • USA Submission

    Non-Disputing Party Submission of the United States of America submitted on June 21, 2019

  • VCLT

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 23 May 1969 and opened for signature on 23 May 1969

  • Zamora Hearing Presentation

    Claimant’s expert report presentation by Mr. Rodrigo Zamora Etcharren at the Merits Hearing

  • Zamora I

    Claimant’s expert report prepared by Mr. Rodrigo Zamora Etcharren dated March 6, 2017

  • Zamora II

    Claimant’s expert report prepared by Mr. Rodrigo Zamora Etcharren dated October 23, 2017

  • Zamora III

    Claimant’s expert report prepared by Mr. Rodrigo Zamora Etcharren dated January 18, 2018

  • Zamora IV

    Claimant’s expert report prepared by Mr. Rodrigo Zamora Etcharren dated February 2, 2019

List of Cases

  • ADC

    ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award (27 September 2006), Exhibit CLA-212

  • ADF

    ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award (9 January 2003)

  • Al-Bahloul

    Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. The Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (2 September 2009), Exhibit CLA-220

  • Ambatielos

    The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award (6 March 1956), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 83 at 119, Exhibit CLA-249

  • Ambiente Ufficio

    Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (8 February 2013), Exhibit CLA-291

  • Amco Asia II

    Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award (20 November 1984), Exhibit CLA-213

  • Apotex

    Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (June 14, 2013), Exhibit RL-061

  • ATA Construction

    ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (18 May 2010)

  • Azinian

    Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (1 November 1999), Exhibit CLA-187

  • Azurix

    Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006)

  • Ballistini

    Ballistini case, French-Venezuelan Commission (1902), Award (1905), 10 U.N.RI.A.A. 18 at 20, Exhibit CLA-253 (Unofficial Translation from French)

  • Barcelona Traction

    Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment (Merits) (5 February 1970), I.C.J. Reports 3 (1970); Exhibit CLA 235

  • Chattin

    B. E. Chattin (United States.) v. United Mexican States, General Claims Commission, Award (23 July 1927), 4 U.N.R.I.A.A. 282, Exhibit CLA-250

  • Chemtura

    Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL Award (2 August 2010), Exhibit CLA-139

  • Chevron I

    Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, Partial Award on the Merits (30 March 2010), Exhibit CLA-279

  • Chevron II

    Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador (II), Second Partial Award on Track II dated 30 August 2018

  • CMS

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005)

  • Chorzów Factory

    Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (claim for indemnity) (merits), Judgment (13 September 1928), P.C.I.J. Series A No. 17, Exhibit CLA-180

  • Churchill Mining

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, Exhibit RL-100

  • Corona Materials

    Corona Materials, LLC v Dominican Republic, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/14/3, Award on the Respondent’s Expedited Preliminary Objections in Accordance with Article 10.20.5 of the DR-CAFTA, 31 May 2016, Exhibit RL-067

  • Cotesworth & Powell

    Award Pronounced in the case of Cotesworth and Powell, in H. La Fontaine, Pasicrisie Internationale: Historie Documentaire des Arbitrages Internationaux (1902), Exhibit CLA-239 and RL-103

  • Dan Cake

    Dan Cake S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (24 August 2015), Exhibit CLA-597

  • Diallo

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment (Preliminary Objections) (24 May 2007), I.C.J. REPORTS 582 (2007) at p. 600, Exhibit CLA-285

  • Duke Energy

    Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award of 18 August 2008

  • El Oro Mining

    El Oro Mining and Railway Company (Ltd.) (Great Britain) v. United Mexican States, Great-Britain and Mexico Claims Commission, Award (18 June 1931), 5 U.N.R.I.A.A. p. 191, Exhibit CLA-243

  • Eli Lilly

    Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (16 March 2017), Exhibit CLA-564

  • ELSI

    Elettronica Sicula s.p.a., (ELSI), (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment (20 July 1989), I.C.J. REPORTS (1989), at p. 47, Exhibit CLA-234

  • Fabiani

    Case of Fabiani (France v. Venezuela), Award (30 December 1896), 5 MOORE’S HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 4878, Exhibit CLA-236.

  • Finnish Vessels

    Claim of Finnish shipowners against Great Britain in respect of the use of certain Finnish vessels during the war, Award (9 May 1934), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1479, Exhibit CLA-649

  • Flughafen

    Flughafen Zürich A.G. and Gestión e Ingenería IDC S.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/19, Award (18 November 2014)

  • Gami

    Gami Investments Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award (15 November 2004), Exhibit CLA-616

  • Glamis Gold

    Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, (UNCITRAL) Award (8 June 2009), Exhibit CLA-142

  • Idler

    Jacob Idler v. The United States of Venezuela, Claim No. 2, Award, 14 July 1890, United States and Venezuelan Commission, Opinions, at pp. 155–172, Exhibit CLA-255

  • Interhandel

    Interhandel, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959

  • Jan de Nul

    Jan de Nul N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award (6 November 2008), Exhibit CLA-240

  • Krederi

    Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/17, Excerpts of Award dated 2 July 2018

  • Loewen

    Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (23 June 2003), Exhibit CLA-168.

  • Merrill

    Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v Canada, (UNCITRAL) Award (31 March 2010), Exhibit CLA-615

  • Metalclad

    Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000), Exhibit CLA-149

  • Middle East Cement

    Middle Cement Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award (12 April 2012), Exhibit CLA-211

  • Mondev

    Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 2002), Exhibit CLA-086

  • MTD v. Chile

    MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004, Exhibit RL-085

  • Neer

    L. Fay, H. Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v. United Mexican States, RIAA, Volume IV pp. 60–66, 15 October 1926, Exhibit CLA-277

  • Norwegian Loans

    Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957

  • OI

    OI European Group B.V. v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/11/25, Award, 10 March 2015, Exhibit RL-068

  • Oostergetel

    Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL Final Award (23 April 2012), Exhibit CLA-260.

  • Pantechniki

    Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award (30 July 2009), Exhibit CLA-276

  • Pey Casado

    Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Final Award (8 May 2008), Exhibit CLA-202

  • Philip Morris v. Uruguay

    Philip Morris Brands Salr, Philip Morris Products S.A. and ABAL Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016, Exhibit RL-066

  • Renée Rose Levy

    Renée Rose Levy de Levi v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, 26 February 2014, Exhibit RL-101

  • Joseph F. Rihani

    Joseph F. Rihani, American Mexican Claims Commission, Decision No. 27-C (1942), 1948AM. MEX. CLAIMS REP. 254, Exhibit CLA-251

  • Robert E. Brown

    Robert E. Brown (United States) v. Great Britain, Award (23 November 1923), 6 U.N.R.I.A.A. 120 at 129, Exhibit CLA-294

  • Saluka

    Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 17 March 2006

  • Saipem

    Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award (30 June 2009), Exhibit CLA-185

  • Toto Construzioni

    Toto Construzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (11 September 2009), Exhibit CLA-244

  • Vivendi

    Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (20 August 2007), Exhibit CLA-310

  • Waste Management II

    Waste Management v. Mexico, Case N° ARB(AF)/00/3, (30 April 2004), Exhibit CLA-200

I.  Introduction

1.  On December 11, 2015, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [“ICSID”] received a request for arbitration [the “RfA”] submitted by Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P. [“Lion” or “Claimant”], a company constituted under the laws of Quebec, Canada, against the United Mexican States [“Mexico” or “Respondent”].

2.  The RfA was made pursuant to Arts. 1116, 1120, and 1122 of the North American Free Trade Agreement [“NAFTA”]1. It included a request for approval of access to the Additional Facility of the Centre.

3.  On December 23, 2015, the Secretary-General registered the RfA and approved access to the Additional Facility pursuant to Art. 4 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules [“ICSID AF Rules”].

4.  The Tribunal was officially constituted on July 26, 2016, after all the arbitrators accepted their appointments and the proceedings were deemed to have begun.

5.  At the time of this Award, the Tribunal is composed of three following members:

  • Mr. Juan Fernández-Armesto
  • Chairman — Spanish national
  • Appointed by agreement of the Secretary-General on July 20, 2016.
  • Armesto & Asociados
  • General Pardiñas, 102
  • 28006 Madrid, Spain
  • Tel.: +34 91 562 16 25
  • E-mail: jfa@jfarmesto.com
  • Mr. David J.A. Cairns
  • Co-Arbitrator — British/New Zealand national
  • Appointed by Claimant on March 10, 2016.
  • Int-Arb Arbitrators & Mediators
  • Ponzano 6C
  • Madrid 28003
  • Spain
  • Tel.: +34 91 423 7200
  • E-mail: d.cairns@arbitration.es
  • Prof. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes
  • Co-Arbitrator — French/Swiss national
  • Appointed by Respondent on February 2, 2018.
  • University of Geneva, Faculty of Law
  • 40, boulevard du Pont-d’Arve
  • 1211 Geneva 4 (Switzerland)
  • Tel.: +41 (0) 22 379 85 44
  • E-mail: Laurence.BoissonDeChazournes@unige.ch

II.  The Parties

6.  This arbitration takes place between Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P. (Canada) and the United Mexican States, a sovereign state.

1.  Claimant: Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P.

7.  Claimant is Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P., a partnership incorporated and registered under the laws of the Province of Quebec, Canada. Its main place of business and unified domicile for notifications is the following:

  • 1717 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1900
  • Dallas, Texas 75202
  • United States of America2

8.  Claimant is represented in this arbitration by:

  • Robert J. Kriss
  • Mayer Brown LLP
  • 71 S. Wacker Drive
  • Chicago, Illinois, 60606
  • Tel. +1 312 782 0600
  • Email: rkriss@mayerbrown.com

2.  Respondent: United Mexican States

9.  Respondent is the United Mexican States, a sovereign State.

10.  The Respondent is represented in this arbitration by the following counsel:

  • Secretaría de Economía
  • Av. Paseo de la Reforma 296, piso 25, Colonia
  • Juárez, Delegación Cuauhtémoc, C.P. 06600
  • Ciudad de México, México
  • Aristeo López Sánchez
  • Embajada de México
  • 1911 Pennsylvania Ave NW
  • Washington D.C. 20006
  • Estados Unidos de América
  • Email: alopez@naftamexico.net

11.  Henceforth, Claimant and Respondent will together be referred to as the “Parties”.

III.  Procedural History

12.  On December 11, 2015, Lion submitted to the ICSID a RfA against Mexico pursuant to Art. 36 of the ICSID Convention and on the basis of the NAFTA, between the United States of America, Canada and the United Mexican States, which entered into force on January 1, 1994. On December 23, 2015, the Secretary-General of ICSID registered the RfA and approved access to the Additional Facility pursuant to Art. 4 of the ICSID AF Rules.

13.  The Tribunal was constituted on July 27, 2016, in accordance with Art. 6(3) of the ICSID AF Rules and was originally composed of Juan Fernández-Armesto a national of Spain, President, appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to agreement of the Parties; David J.A. Cairns, a national of Great Britain and New Zealand, appointed by the Claimant; and Ricardo Ramírez Hernández, a national of Mexico, appointed by the Respondent. The Tribunal was reconstituted on February 6, 2018, with the appointment of Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, following the resignation of Ricardo Ramírez Hernández.

14.  In the course of the proceeding, the Tribunal issued a Decision on the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection under Art. 45(6) of the ICSID AF Rules, dated December 12, 2016, a Decision on the Non-Disputing Party’s Application, dated May 23, 2017, a Decision on Bifurcation, dated May 29, 2017, and a Decision on Jurisdiction, dated July 30, 2018. The full procedural history of this case is described in these decisions.

15.  The Decision on Jurisdiction forms part of this Award and is appended as Annex A. In the Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal dismissed Respondent’s jurisdictional objection and declared that3:

  • —  the Mortgages qualify as an investment, and

  • —  the Notes do not qualify as an investment.

16.  The procedural details of this proceeding following the Decision on Jurisdiction are summarized below.

17.  In accordance with section 17.1 of Procedural Order No. 1 [“PO 1”], Mexico submitted a document production schedule. Claimant filed its response and final version of the document production schedule containing both Parties’ arguments, agreements and disagreements and requests the Tribunal to decide on the production of documents.

18.  On September 3, 2018, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 6 deciding on Mexico’s request for production of documents.

19.  On September 5, 2018, the updated procedural calendar (Annex A to PO 1) was transmitted to the Parties.

20.  On October 2, 2018, following the Parties’ document production exchanges, the Respondent informed the Tribunal that, in light of the confidential nature of some of the documents, the Claimant requested a Confidentiality Order for the protection of confidential information. The Parties agreed on the content of such order, which they attached with their communication for the Tribunal’s approval and issuance.

21.  On October 11, 2018, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 7 embodying the Parties’ agreement with regards to the treatment of confidential documents.

22.  On October 26, 2018, following an agreed extension, Mexico submitted its Counter-Memorial on the Merits, attaching 33 factual exhibits4, 60 legal authorities5, one witness statement (Raúl Calva Balderrama), three legal expert reports, prepared by the law firm Sánchez Devanny, Dr. Raúl Plasencia Villanueva and Dr. José Ovalle Favela, and a valuation expert report, prepared by CBRE.

23.  On November 7, 2018, as agreed by the Parties, the Tribunal issued an amended procedural calendar (Annex A to PO 1).

24.  On November 12, 2018, the Claimant submitted a document production request in accordance with section 17.1 of PO 1. On December 13, 2018, Mexico filed its response and final version of the document production schedule containing both Parties’ arguments, agreements and disagreements and requests for the Tribunal to decide on the production of documents.

25.  On January 3, 2019, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 8 deciding on the Claimant’s requests for production of documents. On January 8, 2019, the Claimant submitted a request for the Tribunal to reconsider one of the document requests which was ruled to be overbroad. On January 29, 2019, after receiving comments from Mexico, the Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s request for reconsideration.

26.  On February 7, 2019, as agreed by the Parties, the Tribunal issued an amended procedural calendar (Annex A to PO 1).

27.  On February 21, 2019, the Claimant filed its Reply on the Merits together with 40 factual exhibits6 and 218 legal authorities,7 a second witness statement of Ms. Onay Payne, a fourth legal expert report by Mr. Rodrigo Zamora (which attached 20 legal authorities) and the expert valuation report and rebuttal report of Mr. Richard Marchitelli of Cushman Wakefield.

28.  On May 28, 2019, the United States of America wrote to the Tribunal requesting permission to file a submission on questions of treaty interpretation under NAFTA Art. 1128.

29.  On June 3, 2019, following an agreed extension, the Respondent filed its Rejoinder on the Merits together with 9 factual exhibits8 and 21 legal authorities,9 a second expert report of Dr. José Ovalle Favela, and a second valuation expert report prepared by CBRE.

30.  On June 5, 2019, the ICSID Secretariat transmitted to the Parties a draft Procedural Order No. 9 [“PO 9”] concerning the organization of the hearing and inviting the Parties to confer and agree on the items addressed therein. The Parties were also informed that a pre-hearing conference would take place on June 24, 2019.

31.  On June 11, 2019, the Tribunal informed the United States that it had no objection to the proposal made on May 28, 2019 and therefore their submission should be filed by June 21, 2019.

32.  On June 14, 2019, following an agreed extension, each Party submitted the preliminary list of witnesses and experts for cross-examination at the hearing.

33.  On June 18, 2019, the Parties submitted a joint draft of PO 9 indicating the items on which they agreed and their respective positions regarding the items on which they did not agree. On June 21, 2019, the Tribunal provided the Parties the corresponding agenda of the items to be discussed in the pre-hearing conference.

34.  Also, on June 21, 2019, the United States of America and the Government of Canada each file a written submission as a non-disputing State Party pursuant to Art. 1128 of NAFTA.

35.  On June 24, 2019, the Tribunal held a pre-hearing organizational meeting with the Parties by teleconference.

36.  On June 26, 2019, the Tribunal issued PO 9 concerning the organization of the hearing.

37.  On July 4, 2019, the Claimant informed the Tribunal that it did not wish to cross-examine Dr. Raúl Plascencia (Respondent’s legal expert) and Mr. Raúl Calva (Respondent’s witness). The Tribunal invited Mexico to comment on Claimant’s communication and on July 11, 2019, Mexico informed the Tribunal that it did not have any comments with respect to Claimant’s communication of July 4, 2019. Mexico further stated that it did not wish to cross examine Mr. José Arechederra Tovar (Claimant’s witness) and requested that Mr. Diego Gómez Haro and Mr. Alfonso López Lajud from the law firm Sánchez Devanny be examined by video conference.

38.  On July 15, 2019, Claimant responded to the Tribunal’s invitation regarding the examination of Mr. Gómez Haro and Mr. López Lajud by videoconference and a possibility of amending the timetable for the hearing. Claimant also requested leave to introduce a new document on record.

39.  On July 17, 2019, the Tribunal transmitted to the Parties a modified schedule from Procedural Order No. 9, with regard to interrogation of the witnesses and experts. The Tribunal also informed the Parties that it would decide on Claimant’s request to introduce a new document to the record at the beginning of the hearing, after hearing Respondent’s position on the matter10.

40.  A hearing on the merits was held in Washington, D.C. from July 22, 2019 to July 24, 2019 [the “Hearing”]. The following persons were present at the Hearing:

TRIBUNAL

Prof. Juan Fernández-Armesto

President

Dr. David J.A. Cairns

Arbitrator

Prof. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes

Arbitrator

ASSISTANT TO THE TRIBUNAL

Mr. Luis Fernando Rodríguez

ICSID SECRETARIAT

Ms. Catherine Kettlewell

Legal Counsel

CLAIMANT

Counsel:

Mr. Robert J. Kriss

Mayer Brown

Mr. Dany Khayat

Mayer Brown

Mr. Alejandro López Ortiz

Mayer Brown

Mr. José Caicedo

Mayer Brown

Ms. Patricia Ugalde

Mayer Brown

Mr. Emiliano Represa

Mayer Brown

Mr. Timothy J. Keeler

Mayer Brown

Ms. Elaine Liu

Mayer Brown

Parties:

Ms. Onay Payne

Clarion Partners

Ms. Renee Castro

Clarion Partners

Witnesses:

Ms. Onay Payne

Clarion Partners

Mr. James C. Hendricks

Clarion Partners

Experts:

Mr. Rodrigo Zamora

Galicia Abogados

Mr. Richard Marchitelli

Cushman & Wakefield

Mr. Cory Savik

Cushman & Wakefield

RESPONDENT

Counsel:

Mr. Orlando Pérez Gárate

Secretaría de Economía

Ms. Cindy Rayo Zapata

Secretaría de Economía

Mr. Geovanni Hernández Salvador

Secretaría de Economía

Ms. Blanca del Carmen Martínez Mendoza

Secretaría de Economía

Mr. Aristeo López Sánchez

Secretaría de Economía

Ministro Gerardo Lameda Díaz Pérez

Secretaría de Economía

Mr. Pedro de la Rosa

Embajada de México

Mr. J. Cameron Mowatt

Tereposky & DeRose LLP

Ms. Jennifer Radford

Tereposky & DeRose LLP

Mr. Vincent DeRose

Tereposky & DeRose LLP

Mr. Alejandro Barragan

Tereposky & DeRose LLP

Ms. Ximena Iturriaga

Tereposky & DeRose LLP

Mr. Kun Hui

Tereposky & DeRose LLP

Mr. Stephan E. Becker

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP

Mr. Jorge Vera

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP

Experts:

Mr. José Ovalle Favela

Legal Expert

Mr. Chris G. Maugeri

Damages Expert (CBRE)

Mr. Alfredo Rosas

Damages Expert (CBRE)

NON-DISPUTING PARTIES

Ms. Nicole Thornton

U.S. Department of State

Mr. John Blanck

U.S. Department of State

Mr. Khalil Gharbieh

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Ms. Amanda Blunt

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

INTERPRETERS

Ms. Charles Roberts

English-Spanish Interpreter

Ms. Judith Letendre

English-Spanish Interpreter

Ms. Sonia Berah

English-Spanish Interpreter

COURT REPORTERS

Mr. Dante Rinaldi

Spanish Court Reporter

Mr. Dionisio Rinaldi

Spanish Court Reporter

Ms. Dawn Larson

English Court Reporter

41.  During the Hearing, the following witnesses and experts were examined:

  • On behalf of the Claimant:

    • Ms. Onay Payne

    • Mr. James C. Hendricks

    • Mr. Rodrigo Zamora

    • Mr. Richard Marchitelli (for Cushman Wakefield)

  • On behalf of the Respondent:

    • Mr. José Ovalle Favela

    • Mr. Alfredo Rosas (for CBRE)

42.  On August 1, 2019, the Tribunal invited the Parties to i) agree on a schedule for the next procedural steps; ii) submit electronic copies of the exhibits they agreed to introduce during the hearing; and iii) to confer and agree about the introduction of the two Supreme Court decisions that were addressed in Mr. Zamora’s expert presentation. The Tribunal also posed questions to the Parties to be addressed in their post-hearing briefs.

43.  On August 6, 2019, Mexico confirmed that the electronic versions of the exhibits11 submitted during the Hearing had been uploaded to the Box folder created for this case.

44.  On August 7, 2019, the Parties informed the Tribunal on their agreement for the dates for their post-hearing briefs and statement of costs, their disagreement on the filing of replies on costs and on the introduction of the two Supreme Court decisions.

45.  On August 9, 2019, the Tribunal confirmed the Parties agreed scheduled for the filing of post-hearing briefs and statement of costs, informed them that a second round on costs was not necessary and admitted into the record the decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court and of the Tribunal Colegiado.

46.  On August 12, 2019, the Claimant confirmed that electronic versions of the exhibits12 submitted during the hearing and the Supreme Court decisions had been uploaded to the Box folder created for this case.

47.  The Parties filed simultaneous Post-Hearing Briefs13 on October 1, 2019.

48.  The Parties filed simultaneous Statement of Costs with the corresponding supporting invoices on October 22, 2019.

49.  On November 6, 2019, the Tribunal invited the Respondent to provide answer on the President of the Tribunal’s proposal made during the hearing to render the Award in English, following by a subsequent Spanish translation.

50.  On November 11, 2019, Mexico informed the Tribunal that it wished for the Award to be issued simultaneously in English and Spanish in accordance with section 12.11 of PO 1.

51.  On May 14, 2020, the Centre informed the Parties that during Mr. Francisco’s Grob’s paternity leave, Ms. Catherine Kettlewell, ICSID Legal Counsel, would serve as Secretary of the Tribunal.

52.  On September 25, 2020, Mr. Francisco Grob returned from paternity leave.

53.  On December 11, 2020, Mr. Luis Fernando Rodríguez ceased to serve as the Assistant to the Tribunal and the Tribunal proposed that Mr. Adam Jankowski serve as the new Assistant to the Tribunal. On January 7, 2021 the Parties confirmed the appointment of Mr. Adam Jankowski as the Assistant to the Tribunal.

54.  The proceeding was closed on July 19, 2021.

IV.  Facts

55.  This section describes the factual background of the dispute, which for the most part remains undisputed between the Parties.

1.  Lion’s investment in Mexico

56.  Claimant, Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P., is a limited partnership constituted under the laws of Quebec (Canada), with its main place of business in Texas (USA). Lion was created and is managed by Clarion Partners, L.P. [“Clarion”], a real estate investment management company founded in New York in 1982, which manages real estate investments for institutional investors14.

57.  Lion had been making investments in Mexico for over ten years. Over that period, Lion had provided more than US $800 million of capital to entities doing business in Mexico, to be used in developing a wide array of real estate properties, such as hotels, office buildings, residences, warehouses, and resorts15. Wishing to develop further investment opportunities in Mexico, Clarion engaged a specialized broker, and through this channel Sr. Héctor Cárdenas Curiel [“Sr. Cárdenas”], a Mexican businessman, was introduced16. Sr. Cárdenas was presented as a developer seeking funding for the development of two significant real estate projects: the “Nayarit Project” and the “Guadalajara Project”.

1.1  Sr. Cárdenas’s Projects: Nayarit and Guadalajara

58.  Mr. Hendricks, the managing director at Clarion during the period from 2006 through 2015, confirmed in his Witness Statement that Sr. Cárdenas enjoyed the reputation of a “trusted business partner of respected developers17”. However, the preliminary inquiries did not extend to Cárdenas’s father-in-law, a Sr. Garsin, a person with a “big banking relationship at Bansi Bank18” and apparently a powerful figure in the State of Jalisco, who also became involved in the project.

59.  The Nayarit Project included an ocean-front residential and resort development in Bahía de Banderas, State of Nayarit19. The development plan called for a mixed-use high-end resort to be anchored by a Ritz Carlton hotel, 1,500 luxury residential units, extensive amenity offerings, and two ocean-front golf courses, to be developed on 855 hectares (2,100 acres) with 2.8 miles of ocean frontage20.

60.  The Guadalajara Project21 consisted of two high-end mixed-use skyscrapers, to be built on approximately 15,000 m2 (3.74 acre) in the city of Guadalajara, State of Jalisco22.

61.  Sr. Cárdenas’s plans for the development of the Nayarit and the Guadalajara Projects were preliminary and incomplete at the time he requested capital from Lion to acquire land and begin limited infrastructure development23. Lion was willing to provide capital for the development of these projects subject to certain requirements, accepted by Sr. Cárdenas, including the following:

  • —  The granting of mortgages to Lion over the land acquired by Sr. Cárdenas and on the subsequent improvements made on that land24; and

  • —  The issuance of promissory notes as unconditional commitments to repay the money owed to Lion, with certain procedural privileges under Mexican law25.

1.2  The three sets of transactions

62.  In February, June and September 2007, Lion made three loans for financing the purchase of the properties for the Nayarit Project and the Guadalajara Project [the “Loans”], as well as working capital.

A.  The first set of transactions

63.  The first loan took the form of a “Credit Agreement” between Lion (as Lender), Inmobiliaria Bains, S.A. de C.V. [“Inmobiliaria Bains”] (as Borrower) and C&C Ingeniería, S.A. de C.V. [“C&C Ingeniería”] as joint and several obligor — Inmobiliaria Bains and C&C Ingeniería were two companies owned by Cárdenas. The first loan was signed on February 28, 2007 and had a term of 18 months. Its original due date was August 28, 2008. The loan was for the amount of US $15,000,000, which accrued ordinary interest at a rate of 18% per year, capitalized every three months, and in the event of a default, a default interest rate of 25% [the “First Loan”]26.

64.  The Credit Agreement was written in English and governed by the laws of Mexico27.

65.  The contract provided for the granting of a mortgage (clause four) and the issue of a non-negotiable promissory note (clause two, 2.2(5)) to secure the loan. It enclosed an Exhibit A (with the “Form of Mortgage”) and an Exhibit B (with the “Form of Note”).

The First Note

66.  On the same day, Inmobiliaria Bains issued the first promissory note in favor of Lion for US $15,000,000, plus ordinary interest at a rate of 18% per year, capitalized every three months, and in the event of default, an interest rate of 25% [“First Note”].

67.  The original maturity date of the First Note was August 28, 2008. The First Note was substituted four times, resulting in a final maturity date as of September 30, 200928.

68.  The First Note (as would the other two) was issued under Mexican law, drafted both in English and Spanish (with the Spanish version governing) and submitted to the exclusive and irrevocable jurisdiction of the courts of Mexico City.

The Nayarit Mortgage

69.  About one year after the signing of the Credit Agreement, on April 2, 2008, Inmobiliaria Bains granted in favor of Lion the “Nayarit Mortgage” over the Nayarit Project property, located in the Municipality of Bahía de Banderas29.

70.  The Nayarit Mortgage was drafted in Spanish and subject to the laws of the State of Nayarit30. It was recorded at the Office of the Registro Público de la Propiedad y de Comercio (Public Registry) [“Registro Público”] of Bucerías, Nayarit, on May 19, 200831.

71.  The Nayarit Mortgage in its final form would secure not just the First, but all three Loans, including both principal and interest.

B.  The second set of transactions

72.  The second loan also took the form of a “Credit Agreement”, between Lion (as Lender), C&C Capital, S.A. de C.V. [“C&C Capital”] another company owned by Cárdenas (as Borrower) and Inmobiliaria Bains (as joint and several obligor). It was signed on June 13, 2007, around three months after the first set of transactions, and had a term of 90 calendar days. Its original due date was September 12, 2007. The loan was for the amount of US $12,450,000 which accrued ordinary interest at a rate of 18% per year, capitalized every three months, and in the event of a default, an interest rate of 25% [the “Second Loan”]32.

73.  The contract provided for the granting of a mortgage (clause four) and the issue of a non-negotiable promissory note (clause two, 2.2(2)) to secure the loan. It also enclosed an Exhibit A (with the “Form of Mortgage”) and an Exhibit B (with the “Form of Note”).

74.  The Credit Agreement was again written in English and governed by the laws of Mexico33.

The Second Note

75.  The day after the signing of the Credit Agreement, on June 14, 2007 C&C Capital issued the second note [“Second Note”] in favor of Lion for US$12,450,000 plus ordinary interest at a rate of 18% per year, capitalized every three months, and in the event of default, an interest rate of 25%34.

76.  The original maturity date of the Second Note was September 14, 2007. The Second Note was substituted seven times, leading to a final maturity date of September 30, 200935.

The Guadalajara Mortgage 1

77.  The “Guadalajara Mortgage 1” secured the Second Loan, including both capital and interest. It was granted on June 13, 2007, the date of execution of the Credit Agreement, by Bansi S.A., as trustee, as per the instruction of C&C Capital, as founder and beneficiary of the trust, in favor of Lion, over one of the properties pertaining to the Guadalajara Project36.

78.  The Guadalajara Mortgage 1 was subject to the laws of the State of Jalisco and was recorded at that Registro Público about five months later, on November 23, 2007.

C.  The third set of transactions

79.  The third loan again took the form of a “Credit Agreement” between Lion (as Lender), C&C Capital (as Borrower) and Inmobiliaria Bains (as joint and several obligor). It was signed on September 26, 2007 and had a term of 90 calendar days. Its original due date was December 26, 2007. The loan was for the amount of US $5,355,479, which accrued ordinary interest at a rate of 18% per year, capitalized every three months, and in the event of default, an interest rate of 25% [the “Third Loan”]37.

80.  The contract provided for the granting of a mortgage (clause four) and the issuance of a non-negotiable promissory note (clause two, 2.1(5)) to secure the loan. It was again accompanied by an Exhibit A (the “Form of Mortgage”) and an Exhibit B (the “Form of Note”).

81.  The Credit Agreement was written in English and governed by the laws of Mexico38.

The Third Note

82.  C&C Capital issued the Third Note [“Third Note”] on September 26, 2007, the date of execution of the Credit Agreement, in favor of Lion for US $5,355,479 plus ordinary interest at a rate of 18% per year, capitalized every three months, and in the event of a default, a default interest rate of 25%. Inmobiliaria Bains signed as joint and several obligor39.

83.  The original maturity date of the Third Note was December 25, 2007. The Third Note was substituted six times, resulting in a final maturity as of September 30, 200940.

The Guadalajara Mortgage 2

84.  The “Guadalajara Mortgage 2” secured the Third Loan, including both capital and interest. It was granted on the day of execution of the Credit Agreement, September 26, 2007, by Bansi S.A., as trustee, as per the instruction of C&C Capital, as founder and beneficiary of the trust, in favor of Lion, over one of the properties pertaining to the Guadalajara Project41.

85.  The Guadalajara Mortgage 2 was subject to the law of Jalisco and was recorded at the Registro Público of that State on December 6, 2007.

2.  The defaults

86.  None of the initial deadlines for the repayment of any of the three Loans were met. Sr. Cárdenas requested and obtained a series of time extensions: from March 2008 through July 2009 Lion signed maturity date extensions on the First Loan four times42, on the Second Loan seven times43, and on the Third Loan six times44.

87.  The last payment date on the three transactions was, ultimately, September 30, 2009, and the debtors failed to satisfy the outstanding amounts by that date. All three Loans were declared in default and interest at the default rate began to accrue on October 1, 2009.

88.  Lion sent its first invoice to Sr. Cárdenas for the outstanding principal and interest payments due on April 16, 201045. The amounts due on that invoice, calculated and dated as of March 31, 2010, totaled US $26,618,972 for the Nayarit Project and US $29,649,835 for the Guadalajara Project.

89.  Subsequent invoices were sent on July 14, 201046; October 11, 201047; February 14, 201148; April 12, 201149, and July 29, 201150. The amounts due on the latest invoices sent, calculated and dated as of June 30, 2011, were US $36,041,328.45 for the Nayarit Project and US $40,065,210.38 for the Guadalajara Project51.

90.  According to Lion, no payments were ever made.

3.  The negotiations between Lion And Sr. Cárdenas

91.  Lion initiated negotiations and held meetings with Sr. Cárdenas, trying to find an amicable solution to the breach and to avoid initiating formal foreclosure proceedings52. Between September and December 2011 Lion and a representative of Cárdenas discussed the restructuring of the debt according to a term sheet. Such proposal never contemplated the cancellation of the Mortgages, nor the possibility that Lion become a shareholder in Cárdenas’s companies53. A restructuring term sheet was eventually signed by Sr. Cárdenas in October 2011 on behalf of the borrowers under the three Loan Agreements [the “Debtors”], but was not accepted by Lion, as it did not adhere to all the requirements advocated by Lion in the negotiations54.

92.  The discussions continued until February 2012, without Lion and Sr. Cárdenas reaching an agreement55. On February 17, 2012 Lion took a first step towards the enforcement of the Mortgages: it served the Debtors with a formal request demanding payment of the amounts owed plus interest, under penalty of initiating foreclosure actions56.

4.  The Cancellation Lawsuit

93.  On March 13, 2012, unbeknown to Lion, which was still engaged in bona fide negotiations with Sr. Cárdenas57, the Debtors filed a fraudulent lawsuit [the “Cancellation Lawsuit”, the proceeding will be referred to as the “Cancellation Proceeding”] against Lion before the Juez Noveno de lo Mercantil of the State of Jalisco [the “Juez de lo Mercantil”].

94.  Under the applicable State laws, mortgages registered in the Registro Público can be cancelled through a judgement issued by a competent judge58. The Cancellation Lawsuit was the first step in a complex judicial fraud schemed by Sr. Cárdenas to avoid the imminent foreclosure of the Mortgages. It is clear that Sr. Cárdenas organised this fraudulent scheme because:

  • —  He was the person who controlled the Debtors and the beneficiary of the cancellation of the Mortgages;

  • —  The fraud purported to transfer jurisdiction over the Mortgages from the Courts of Mexico DF to the Courts of Jalisco, precisely where Sr. Cárdenas resided and was well-established;

  • —  The scheme required the designation of a false address for the service of Lion, and the collaboration of a person at the false address; this role was fulfilled by a lawyer called Lic. José Isaac López Medina, who appeared to be an associate of Sr. Cárdenas;

  • —  The fraudulent scheme eventually required the impersonation of a representative of Lion (Sr. José Javier Tovar Arechederra). This was achieved using a copy of Sr. Arechederra’s driving licence on the same date that the driving licence was deposited with security at the venue of the meeting organized by Sr. Cárdenas;

  • —  The Tribunal finally notes that Mexico, while refusing to outright admit that fraud had indeed been perpetrated by the Debtors, argues that the “alleged multilevel fraud” was so complex and sophisticated that its judicial system could not withstand it59.

95.  The objective of the first part of Sr. Cárdenas’s fraudulent scheme was to obtain a judgement, register it in the Registros Públicos, and thus legally extinguish the Mortgages, making any foreclosure impossible. The second part of the fraudulent scheme was then to preclude any possibility for Lion to file an amparo procedure, which would have rectified the previous cancellation of the mortgages. The fraudulent scheme required an impressive knowledge of the intricacies of the Mexican procedural system, suggesting that Sr. Cárdenas was assisted by an experienced legal mastermind.

4.1  Judicial Enforcement of the (false) Términos

96.  As a first step, the Debtors approached their local Juez de lo Mercantil in Jalisco and requested judicial enforcement of a settlement contract, presented only in the form of a photocopy, titled “Términos para pago de los contratos de crédito” [the “Términos”] and allegedly executed four months before, on November 14, 2011, between Lion and the Debtors60.

97.  The Debtors’ prayer for relief in the Cancellation Lawsuit reads as follows:

“PRESTACIONES

  1. A)  Por la DECLARACION JUDICIAL que se haga por parte de su Señoría en el sentido de que la demandada "LION MEXICO CONSOLIDATED, L.P." está obligada al CUMPLIMIENTO CABAL de todas las obligaciones que asumió y que dimanan a su cargo del documento base de la acción que las partes denominamos "TERMINOS PARA PAGO DE LOS CONTRATOS DE CREDITO"” [Emphasis added]

98.  The Debtors were thus seeking a judicial order granting specific enforcement of the obligations purportedly assumed by Lion in the Términos: under what seemed to be the terms of this agreement, Lion had accepted the cancellation of all pending debts against the Debtors, the cancellation of the Mortgages securing such debt in the Registro Público, and the return of the Notes to the Debtors, and in exchange the Debtors had undertaken to issue and to deliver to Lion a participation in Sr. Cárdenas’s companies61.

99.  The Debtors now alleged that Lion had defaulted on the obligations assumed in the Términos and requested the Juez de lo Mercantil to order specific performance, resulting in the cancellation of the Mortgages in the Registro Público.

100.  The Términos included two further important elements of legal engineering:

101.  First, the Términos purported to contain a clause awarding jurisdiction to the Courts of Jalisco. While all the Promissory Notes attributed jurisdiction to the Courts of Mexico City, far away from Sr. Cárdenas’s main place of business, the Términos granted jurisdiction to the Courts of Jalisco62:

  1. 8.  Jurisdicción y Competencia Para la interpretación, cumplimiento y ejecución del presente convenio […] las partes se someten […] a los Tribunales del Primer Partido Judicial del Estado de Jalisco, renunciando a cualquier otro fuero o jurisdicción que por razón de convenio previo o domicilio actual o futuro pudiese corresponderles”.

102.  Second, the Términos included an address for service of process in Jalisco and the name of a process agent. While the Loans provided 3141 Hood Street, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 7521963 as Lion’s address, with a copy to an address in Mexico at Paseo de los Tamarindos 400-B, Piso 8, Bosque de las Lomas, 05120 Mexico, D.F.64, oddly the Términos identified a Jalisco lawyer65 and an address in Jalisco66:

  1. 7.  Domicilio para recibir notificaciones y autorizados [Lion] señala como domicilio para recibir cualquier tipo de comunicación relativa a la presente propuesta y notificaciones el de la finca marcada con el número 95 Despacho 7 de la calle Tomás V. Gómez, Colonia Ladrón de Guevara, en el municipio de Guadalajara, Jalisco y como autorizados para recibirlas y acusar recibo de las mismas a los Licenciados Emilio González de Castilla del Valle y Jose Isaac López Medina”.

4.2  The Términos‎ document is a forgery

103.  The Tribunal is convinced that the Términos are in fact a forgery [and will refer to the document frequently as the “Forged Settlement Agreement” or “Forged Agreement”]. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal finds the following evidence compelling:

  • —  The Forged Agreement purports to have been signed by Lion’s legal representative in Mexico, Mr. James Christian Hendricks67; Mr. Hendricks appeared as a witness in this procedure, and gave sworn evidence that he never signed the document and that the signature appended to the document (shown below) is false68;

  • —  Lic. González de Castilla, the other lawyer allegedly designated by Lion as a person authorized to receive notifications in the Términos, and a well-known and highly respected professional, has declared in the presence of a Public Notary that: (i) he was not authorized by Lion or by any other company to receive any notification in Guadalajara; (ii) he did not know the said address nor the other person allegedly authorized; and (iii) he had no professional dealings in Guadalajara69;

  • —  Since the very moment that Lion obtained knowledge of the existence of the Forged Agreement in mid-December 201270, it has consistently averred that the document is a forgery; Lion has repeated the averment in this procedure71;

  • —  Lion has repeatedly tried to obtain a declaration from the Mexican civil Courts, confirming the forgery of the Términos72; although the Mexican civil Courts have never rendered a judgement confirming the existence of forgery, Claimant says that such refusal is improper and tainted by denial of justice;

  • —  Upon gaining knowledge of the Términos, Lion initiated criminal actions against Sr. Cárdenas73, some of which were ongoing at the time of the filing of Post-Hearing Briefs74.

  • —  The Forged Agreement purports to formalize a settlement, in which Lion agrees to cancel the Loans, the Notes and the Mortgages in exchange for a participation in Sr. Cárdenas’s companies; there is no contemporary evidence proving that in the negotiations between Lion and Sr. Cárdenas such solution was ever discussed; to the contrary, the evidentiary record shows that Lion’s intention during the negotiation was to obtain repayment of the Loans, and if the negotiation failed, to foreclose on the Mortgages75;

  • —  It is unlikely that Lion, a well advised Canadian company, which had insisted that in its previous agreements with Sr. Cárdenas and his companies jurisdiction should lie with the Courts of Mexico City, would accept that the Términos, the settlement agreement finalizing the relationship, be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Jalisco; it is even more unlikely that Lion additionally would have consented to designate an obscure lawyer in Jalisco, related to Cárdenas, and with whom Lion had never had relations, as its process agent, authorized to receive all types of notifications;

  • —  There is a final argument: confronted with Claimant’s averment in the present arbitration that the Forged Settlement indeed is a forgery, Mexico has failed to dispute this statement76.

4.3  Emplazamiento‎ and declaration en rebeldía

104.  Two weeks after the filing of the Cancellation Lawsuit, on April 3, 2012 the actuario (a court officer of the Juez de lo Mercantil) attempted a first service of process [the “emplazamiento”] at the address identified in clause 7 of the Forged Settlement Agreement. The service attempt was done on Lic. José Isaac López Medina77, one of the two lawyers identified in the Forged Agreement78, who apparently had his office at that address.

105.  Confronted by the actuario, Lic. López Medina formally declared that no legal representative of Lion was present in his office in order to receive the emplazamiento. Upon receipt of this representation, the actuario withdrew, announcing that he would return the next day.

106.  At the second visit, which occurred next day, the actuario decided to make the emplazamiento against Lion through a notificación por cédula delivered to the person who was at the address, Lic. López Medina79.

107.  Lic. López Medina accepted the emplazamiento and received a copy of the judicial file (“autos”).

108.  Being unaware that a Court procedure against it was pending before the Juez de lo Mercantil of Jalisco, Lion inevitably failed to appear within the statutory time-limit.

109.  The consequence of this failure was that six weeks thereafter, on May 22, 2012, Lion was declared en rebeldía by the Juez de lo Mercantil through notification via boletín judicial80 (a judicial bulletin)81.

110.  Two weeks after the declaration en rebeldía, on June 6, 2012 the Debtors submitted their evidence before the Juez de lo Mercantil, including the Mortgage deeds and Minutes of the General Shareholders Meeting of C&C Capital. All the evidence marshalled by the Debtors was admitted six days later, on June 12, 201282.

4.4  The Judgment of the Juez de lo Mercantil

111.  Just two weeks after the submission of evidence, on June 27, 2012 the Juez de lo Mercantil, acting solely on the basis of the evidence marshalled by the Debtors, and without any participation of Lion, declared the Loans settled and ordered Lion to cancel the Mortgages and return the Notes [the “Cancellation Judgment”]83. From the filing of the Cancellation Lawsuit to the rendering of the Cancellation Judgment, only 170 days had lapsed.

The Cancellation Judgement causa estado

112.  A few days thereafter, on August 8, 2012, and at the request of the Debtors, the Juez de lo Mercantil, declared that the Cancellation Judgement “causa estado por ministerio de la ley”, i.e. that it has become res iudicata, there being no possibility of submitting a recurso de apelación. The reason given by the Judge for his decision precluding any further appeal was that the amount claimed in the procedure was less than MEX 500,000 (approximately USD 25,000)84.

113.  The decision is difficult to understand, because the principal amount of the Loans settled and Mortgages terminated amounted to tens of millions of dollars. Be that as it may, the decision was highly relevant, because it deprived Lion of any possibility of launching an ordinary appeal against the Cancellation Judgement.

The Cancellation Judgement is enforced

114.  In a subsequent procedural decision, the Juez de lo Mercantil gave Lion a peremptory term of three days to voluntarily comply with the Cancellation Judgement85. Lion, who was still unaware of the Cancellation Proceeding, failed to comply and on August 30, 2012 the Juez de lo Mercantil ordered the Registro Público of Jalisco to cancel the Guadalajara Mortgages86 and that of Nayarit to do the same with the Nayarit Mortgage87.

115.  The Registro Público of Jalisco did so on September 7, 201288. The cancellation of the Nayarit Mortgage was recorded on October 19, 201289. Upon these registrations, all three Mortgages became extinct for all legal purposes.

5.  False Amparo‎ Proceedings

116.  The Debtors’ scheme did not end here.

117.  Having orchestrated the cancellation of the Mortgages, the Debtors wanted to ensure that Lion, upon being appraised of the Cancellation Judgment, would encounter considerable procedural obstacles in seeking to reverse such decision.

118.  Pro memoria: Lion had already been deprived of any possibility of appeal against the Cancellation Judgement, the Juez de lo Mercantil having decided, upon the request of the Debtors, that the amount in dispute was less than MEX 500,000 and that as a consequence thereof the respondent was not entitled to appeal.

119.  The Debtors, well advised on the intricacies of the Mexican procedural system, were aware that the other viable avenue for reversal of the Cancellation Judgment required Lion to initiate an Amparo procedure. As explained by Claimant’s legal expert, a juicio de Amparo is a general challenge procedure governed by the Ley de Amparo, which seeks to revert violations of human rights as afforded to citizens and aliens under Mexico’s Constitution90.

120.  The Debtors developed a further fraudulent scheme to disrupt the eventual Amparo to be filed in due course by Lion. The scheme would develop in two stages, which were to occur before Lion became aware of the Cancellation Judgment (and filed a real Amparo):

  • —  in the first stage, a person falsely alleging to be a legal representative of Lion would present a request for Amparo purporting to act on behalf of Lion; and

  • —  in the second, that person would abandon the Amparo.

121.  The purpose of this scheme was to prevent Lion, when it eventually obtained knowledge of what had happened, from presenting a proper Amparo: Art. 73 of the Ley de Amparo provides a list of eighteen causes for the finding of inadmissibility of an Amparo, including when an Amparo is based on the same facts as a previously abandoned one91. Under this rule, Lion’s proper Amparo would be inadmissible, because a previous Amparo relating to the same facts, had already been submitted and then abandoned. To revert this inadmissibility finding, Lion would have to prove that the person who had submitted and then abandoned the False Amparo, purporting to be a representative of Lion, was in fact not authorized by Lion to act on its behalf — an endeavour fraught with difficulties which in the actual facts proved impossible.

122.  In order to file an Amparo falsely in the name of Lion, the Debtors needed to gain access to a copy of the case file, which in turn could only be obtained by a person holding a power of attorney. Sr. Cárdenas knew from the documents which accompanied one of Lion’s requests for payment, that a certain Sr. José Javier Tovar Arechederra was one of Lion’s representatives in Mexico. All that was needed was to impersonate Sr. Arechederra.

5.1  The impersonation of Sr. Arechederra

123.  On the same day when the Cancellation Judgment was issued, someone impersonating Mr. Arechederra went to a Notary in Jalisco to obtain a copy of the power of attorney granted to the real Mr. Arechederra92.

[Two years later this Notary Public would be arrested on charges of fraud and forgery of documents, subsequently fined and suspended as a Notary Public and eventually permanently disbarred by the State of Jalisco93]

124.  The plan was not yet fully completed. Sr. Cárdenas still required a document confirming the impostor’s identity as Sr. Arechederra. On July 6, 2012, Sr. Cárdenas summoned the real Sr. Arechederra to a meeting in Jalisco (the city where the Juez de lo Mercantil is located)94. Sr. Arechederra left his driver’s license at the security control of the building where the meeting took place95.

125.  On the same day, July 6, 2012, an impostor using the same driver’s license96 to identify himself as Sr. Arechederra, filed with the Juez de lo Mercantil a request for a certified copy of the entire case file97, on behalf of Lion, exhibiting the power of attorney obtained from the Notary98.

126.  With the copy of the case file, on August 7, 2012 an Amparo against the Cancellation Judgment, purportedly signed by Sr. Arechederra on behalf of Lion, was submitted at the Jalisco Courts [the “False Amparo”]99.

5.2  The False Amparo

127.  The Tribunal is convinced that Sr. Arechederra never actually signed the False Amparo on behalf of Lion. In coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal finds the following evidence compelling:

  • —  Sr. Arechederra corroborated by his sworn testimony at the Hearing that he never carried out any of the above actions100;

  • —  Sr. Arechederra’s stamp signature under the False Request for Copies contains a typographical mistake (Arrechedera instead of Arechederra)101 — it is unlikely that the real Sr. Arechederra would be using a stamp signature containing not one but two typos in his name;

  • —  Mr. Arechederra has submitted a voucher from the airport102 confirming that it would have been physically impossible for him to file the request for the certified copy, obtain it, sign its receipt, and make it to the airport within an hour103;

  • —  The False Amparo designated as domicile for notifications to Lion “los estrados del Juzgado que en turno conozca de la presente demanda104”, i.e, the notice board of the competent Court which would judge the False Amparo; and not the address of Lion’s lawyers, as was the case in the Loans105 when an address in Mexico was given for Lion;

  • —  Lastly, Mexico has not denied that the False Amparo was filed by someone else than the real Sr. Arechederra.

128.  The False Amparo was (on purpose) filed with a procedural deficiency: the person submitting the request failed to attach sufficient copies as required under Mexican procedural law106. The Juez in charge of the Amparo notified Lion of this mistake (through the estrados) granting Lion three days to remedy the deficiency107.

[The possibility of amending this procedural deficiency is noteworthy, as it contrasts with the treatment given to the real Lion, when it filed the proper Amparo: it was never granted an opportunity to cure an alleged defect in the power of attorney of the person signing an ampliación de demanda.]

129.  The very purpose of the False Amparo was to be filed and then to be abandoned. Consequently, no copies were ever delivered, and the procedural deficiency was never corrected. Consequently, on August 17, 2012, the Juez dismissed the False Amparo108 and on September 6, 2012 declared this decision to be final and not subject to appeal109.

130.  The effects came to haunt Lion when it eventually filed the proper Amparo.

6.  Lion forecloses on the (soon to be cancelled) Nayarit Mortgage

131.  In the meantime, Lion was still unaware that the Debtors had filed the Cancellation Lawsuit in the local Courts of Jalisco, seeking enforcement of a Forged Settlement Agreement, that the emplazamiento had been delivered to an obscure lawyer in Jalisco, that Lion had been declared en rebeldía and that the Cancellation Judgement had been rendered in favour of the Debtors, cancelling the outstanding Loans and Mortgages.

132.  Lion continued its bona fide negotiations with Cárdenas, but in view of the persistence of the default, on April 3, 2012 Lion finally decided to foreclose, but only on one of the three Mortgages: it initiated a juicio especial hipotecario [the “Juicio Hipotecario”]110 before the Juez Trigésimo Noveno de lo Civil de México D.F. [the “Juez de lo Civil”]111, against the Debtors, seeking to enforce the Nayarit Mortgage. Lion decided not to foreclose on the Guadalajara Mortgage, trying to minimize costs and with the hope that filing one foreclosure proceeding would incentivize Sr. Cárdenas to pay the outstanding amounts112.

Difficulties in the emplazamiento

133.  The attempts to notify the Juicio Hipotecario to the various Debtors commenced on April 26, 2012, but it would take several years until all the mortgagors could be properly served (emplazados)113: Lion requested the Juez de lo Civil to serve Inmobiliaria Bains 13 times, providing nine different addresses in both Jalisco and Nayarit; the courts of Jalisco and Nayarit — acting at the request of the Juez de lo Civil — were unable to notify the company114 and this situation prevented the Juicio Hipotecario from progressing for more than three years115.

Anotación preventiva

134.  While Lion was trying to notify the Juicio Hipotecario to the Debtors, it requested and obtained an order from the Juez de lo Civil in México D.F., instructing the Registro Público in Bucerías to make a preventive annotation in the books setting forth the existence of a foreclosure procedure [the “Anotación Preventiva”]. The Registrar did so on May 3, 2012 and added that this Anotación Preventiva would guarantee the “inmovilidad registral” of the real estate, preventing any future annotation which could disrupt the proper development of the Juicio Hipotecario116:

[L]o anterior para efectos de que dicha inscripción sirva como inmovilidad registral con la finalidad de que no se pueda verificarse (sic) en la finca hipotecada ningún embargo, toma de posesión, diligencia precautoria o cualquier otra que entorpezca el curso del juicio”.

135.  The Anotación Preventiva was made on May 3, 2012, a month and a half before the Cancellation Judgment (dated June 27, 2012), and in theory prevented any future annotation which could disrupt the Juicio Hipotecario.

136.  Notwithstanding this fact, upon rendering the Cancellation Judgement, the Juez de lo Mercantil of Jalisco sent (through a local Court) an oficio to the Registro Público de Bucerías, requesting cancellation of the Mortgage (“solicito a Usted, cancele la hipoteca”)117 The Registrar, disregarding the existence of the previous Anotación Preventiva, registered the cancellation of the Mortgage in the Registro Público on October 16, 2012, the security thus becoming null and void118:

Guadalajara Mortgages

137.  Since Lion had chosen only to enforce the Nayarit Mortgage, but not the Guadalajara Mortgage, no Anotación Preventiva was ever issued in relation to the Guadalajara Mortgages, and the security was cancelled, upon an oficio of the Juez de lo Mercantil of Jalisco of August 30, 2012119.

7.  Lion’s attempts to remedy the cancellation of the Mortgages

138.  In mid-December 2012 Lion was astonished to learn, through informal sources, of the cancellation of the Mortgages120.

139.  Lion immediately turned to trying to undo the cancellation.

140.  Mexican procedural law allows for the institution of Amparo proceedings to overturn judicial decisions. There are two different types of Amparo procedures: Amparo directo and Amparo indirecto. The Amparo directo is most commonly filed against final judgments, and the Amparo indirecto against certain procedural orders, or against actions taken after the case ends or against persons who did not participate in proceedings121.

141.  The Amparo claim has to be filed by the person affected by the act which is challenged (known as the acto reclamado). Other parties to the Amparo procedure are

  • —  the authorities who dictated, promulgated, published, ordered, executed or tried to execute the acto reclamado (autoridades responsables), and

  • —  the affected party’s counterparty in the procedure in which the challenged action was issued or executed (known as the tercero perjudicado)122.

7.1  Lion files an Amparo indirecto

142.  On December 18, 2012 Lion filed an Amparo indirecto lawsuit 123 [“Real Amparo”, also “Amparo claim” and “Amparo lawsuit” (as opposed to the previous False Amparo)] before the Juez de Distrito en Materia Civil in Jalisco [“Juez de Distrito”].

143.  The claim was brought against the Juez de lo Mercantil, against his Secretary and against the officers responsible for the Registros Públicos of Nayarit and Bucerías124. The Debtors were designated in the Amparo claim as terceros perjudicados (aggrieved third parties)125.

144.  The actos reclamados included, among others, the lack of proper notification of Lion in the Cancellation Lawsuit:

La falta de emplazamiento al quejoso y todas y cada una de las actuaciones y resoluciones relativas al juicio Ordinario Mercantil radicado ante el Juzgado Mercantil del Primer Partido Judicial del Estado de Jalisco126.

7.2  Attempts to claim forgery

145.  Initially, Lion started the Amparo indirecto to obtain declaratory relief that it had never been properly served by the Juez de lo Mercantil. It did not include any reference to the Forged Settlement Agreement, because the specific content of the Forged Agreement only became known to Lion when the Juez de lo Mercantil filed an informe as part of the Amparo proceeding127.

The ampliación de demanda

146.  Upon receiving this information, on January 28, 2013 Lion filed an ampliación de la demanda (extension request) of the Amparo lawsuit, explaining that the service made by the Juez de lo Mercantil was based on a forged document and should thus be deemed inexistent 128:

La falta de emplazamiento legal a la hoy quejosa [i.e. Lion] […] debido a que el supuesto emplazamiento […] se hizo en un domicilio que no es de la hoy quejosa […]. Amén de que el supuesto domicilio donde de practicó dicho emplazamiento, fue señalado en un documento que no fue suscrito por mi mandante ni por persona alguna con facultades, ya que la firma que se advierte en el mismo es completamente falsa por no proceder del puño y letra a quien se atribuye.” [Emphasis added]

147.  Lion’s forgery claim was accompanied by, inter alia129:

  • —  a graphological expert report to prove that the signature in the Forged Agreement did not belong to Mr. Hendricks, and

  • —  emails between a broker retained by Lion and Sr. Cárdenas to demonstrate that, after the Forged Agreement was supposedly signed in November 2011, Lion and Cárdenas were still holding discussions on the terms of the repayment of the Loans.

148.  By proveído (procedural decision) of January 30, 2013 [the “Dismissal Proveído”] the Secretario del Juzgado de Distrito [i.e. the clerk of the Juez de Distrito] in Jalisco dismissed the ampliación of the Amparo submitted by Lion, arguing that130

dichos actos ya fueron precisados desde el escrito inicial de demanda”.

149.  Frustrated by this postponement, Lion brought, on February 6, 2013, an “incidente de falsedad de documento” before the Juez de Distrito, claiming again that the Forged Agreement was the result of fraud131.

150.  On April 10, 2013, the Juez de Distrito stated that he would decide in due course on the admissibility of the proposed graphological expertise on the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement132. And on April 19, 2013, the Juez de Distrito once again decided to postpone his decision on the admissibility of the evidence, because of a queja proceeding which was subsequently initiated and which will be dealt with in the next section133.

7.3  The dismissal of evidence on the forgery

151.  While the decision on the admission of evidence was pending before the Juez de Distrito, one of the Debtors, C&C Ingeniería, filed as a tercero perjudicado two quejas134 before the Segundo Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Tercer Circuito [the “Tribunal de Queja”] against the Dismissal Proveído issued by the Secretary of the Court135 and the April 10, 2013 decision of the Juez de Distrito136. C&C Ingeniería argued that Lion’s ampliación de demanda was inadmissible, because it had not been properly signed on Lion’s behalf.

152.  Lion for its part also submitted a queja against the same decision, because it precluded Lion from claiming that the Forged Settlement Agreement was a forgery and the origin of the improper service137.

153.  The Tribunal de Queja dismissed Lion’s queja and sided with C&C Ingeniería: the appeal court ruled that the ampliación de la demanda, which Lion had filed, was inadmissible, because it had not been properly signed on behalf of Lion: it should have been signed by Lion’s legal representative and not by the attorney empowered by Lion to act on its behalf in the Amparo proceedings138.

154.  Lion was not given an opportunity to cure the alleged procedural defect, although the ampliación de demanda aimed at proving that Lion, an alien company operating in Mexico, had been the victim of an elaborate fraud to avoid its proper emplazamiento.

[This stands in stark contrast with the treatment granted to the complainants when the False Amparo was submitted without the requisite copies. In that instance, the Juez accorded the complainants the chance to cure the formalistic deficiency.]

The decisions of the Juez de Distrito

155.  Once the queja had been resolved, the Juez de Distrito resumed his work, and in accordance with the decision of the Tribunal de Queja resolved that all evidence linked to the forgery claim should be dismissed (both the evidence already admitted and the evidence still pending admission)139.

156.  Thereafter the Juez de Distrito rendered a specific ruling on Lion’s separate motion (“incidente de falsedad de documento”). The judge dismissed it on the grounds that the allegedly false document (the Forged Settlement Agreement) was not related to the subject-matter of the Amparo Proceeding140.

Forgery is excluded from the scope of the Amparo

157.  Be that as it may, from that date on, the scope of the Amparo did not include any inquiry into the issue whether the Settlement Agreement had been forged; it was assumed that the Settlement Agreement was valid and binding, having been properly executed by Lion. The scope of the Amparo was reduced to the question whether the emplazamiento had or not been properly executed in accordance with Mexican law. And — congruently with this reduced scope of investigation — all evidence in the file seeking to prove the forgery of the Settlement Agreement was expurgated.

7.4  The Amparo‎ Judgment

158.  On December 4, 2013, the Juez de Distrito delivered his decision denying Lion protection against the Cancellation Judgment [the “Amparo Judgment”]141.

“[…] R E S U E L V E: ÚNICO. LA JUSTICIA DE LA UNIÓN NO AMPARA NI PROTEGE A LION MEXICO CONSOLIDATED, L.P., contra los actos que reclama del JUEZ Y DEL SECRETARIO EJECUTOR, AMBOS ADSCRITOS AL JUZGADO NOVENO DE LO MERCANTIL DEL PRIMER PARTIDO JUDICIAL DEL ESTADO DE JALISCO. […]” [Capitals in the original]

159.  The Amparo Judgement is a 67-page document, which in its “Resultando” summarizes the procedure, and which then reasons the decision in seven “Considerandos”.

Sr. Arechederra’s signature had been forged

160.  As a preliminary question, the Juez de Distrito analyzes Lion’s allegation that on July 6, 2012 Sr. Arechederra’s signature had been forged in the false request for copy before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil — see section 5.1. supra. (The issue was relevant, because if it had been true that on July 6, 2012 Lion had been aware of the Cancellation Judgement, the Amparo would have been inadmissible due to the statute of limitations).

161.  The Amparo Judgement, after weighing the expert evidence marshalled by the parties, concludes that Sr. Arechederra’s signature indeed had been forged, that the request for copy had indeed been false, and that consequently Lion’s request for Amparo was not time barred142.

Sr. Cárdenas is in prison

162.  The Amparo Judgement also acknowledges that Sr. Arechederra and Lion had filed a criminal action against Sr. Cárdenas, accusing him of having forged his signature on various documents, and that on September 26, 2013 the criminal judge had ordered the imprisonment of Sr. Cárdenas for this crime. However, the Amparo Judge accorded little weight to this piece of evidence143.

No discussion of forgery of the Settlement Agreement

163.  Notwithstanding the finding that at least on one occasion Sr. Arechederra’s signature had been forged, and that Sr. Cárdenas was in prison for alleged forgeries of documents, the Amparo judgement does not even discuss Lion’s argument that the Settlement Agreement might also have been forged: since the ampliación de demanda had been dismissed (because it had been signed by Lion’s attorney, but not by a legal representative), any issue relating to the falsehood of the Settlement Agreement was off limits in the Amparo procedure.

164.  The Amparo Judgement consequently assumes that the Settlement Agreement was validly executed on Lion’s behalf. There being a valid Settlement Agreement with a designation of process agent and an address for service of process, the Juez de Distrito dismisses Lion’s argument that the emplazamiento should have been made in Dallas, Texas, USA, and in accordance with the applicable international treaties144.

165.  Instead, the Juez de Distrito discusses at length a minor incident in the way the fraudulent emplazamiento had taken place: in accordance with the Settlement Agreement the notification should have been made at Calle Tomás V. Gómez 95, despacho 7. But in reality, the actuario went to the same address, but to a different office: despacho 5.

166.  The Juez de Distrito finds that this “minor defect” does not invalidate the emplazamiento, because the actuario was able to locate Lic. López Medina, who, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, was the person designated by Lion as process agent145.

7.5  The Recurso de Revisión

167.  Lion was not satisfied with the Amparo Judgement. On December 19, 2013 Lion filed a recurso de revisión [the “Recurso de Revisión”], seeking its revocation, the granting of protection to Lion’s constitutional rights and the finding that the Cancellation Lawsuit and related acts were null and void146.

168.  Among other reasons, Lion explicitly challenged the Amparo Judgment, arguing that the Juez de Distrito had disregarded Lion’s claim that the Settlement Agreement had been forged, using the argument that the falsehood was unrelated to the dispute and that the defendants in the Amparo had not participated in the alleged forgery. Lion explained that the falsehood of the Settlement Agreement was indeed relevant for the Amparo, because Lion’s emplazamiento had been delivered to Lic. López Medina, Lion’s purported process agent designated in the Settlement Agreement. If the Settlement Agreement was a forgery, the designation of Lic. López Medina was false, and the emplazamiento had not been properly made147.

169.  At first, the Recurso de Revisión was assigned to the Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Tercer Circuito148. However, it was later decided that the Recurso de Revisión should instead be heard by the same court that had rejected Lion’s earlier queja regarding the decisión sobre la ampliación (the Segundo Tribunal del Tercer Circuito, referred to in this Award as “Tribunal de Queja”)149.

The False Amparo‎ surfaces

170.  Up to this point, Claimant had undertaken at least four formal attempts requesting that it be authorized to allege in the Amparo that the Settlement Agreement was indeed a forgery, and to marshal evidence proving this allegation. Yet the Tribunal de Queja, once again, decided not to investigate the issue of forgery nor to admit any evidence to prove it — but this time for a different reason.

171.  More than 16 months after the initiation of the Recurso de Revisión, on April 17, 2015, the Tribunal de Queja surprisingly decided to remand the case back to the Juez de Distrito for a totally different purpose: to determine whether Lion’s Amparo proceeding was inadmissible, a different Amparo relating to the same facts having been filed at an earlier date and thereafter abandoned.

172.  Pro memoria: the False Amparo had been fraudulently filed and then abandoned by someone impersonating Sr. Arechederra, Lion’s representative in Mexico — with the purpose of obstructing the real Amparo which Lion was expected to submit in due course.

173.  When the Tribunal de Queja raised the issue of the False Amparo it came as a total surprise:

  • —  For the last 16 months of Amparo proceeding no party and no prior court had ever referred to this admissibility issue150;

  • —  The same Tribunal de Queja had also failed to raise the issue when it first intervened in these proceedings, to adjudicate the appeal against interlocutory decisions of the Juez de Distrito;

  • —  The Tribunal de Queja decided sua sponte, and over a year into the recurso de revisión, to raise the existence of the False Amparo; the only reason given by the Tribunal de Queja to justify its decision was that an unidentified administrative official had informed the Court of the existence of the previous Amparo151.

174.  As regards the remand procedure, the Tribunal de Queja ordered that it should be restricted to adjudicating the admissibility issue, explicitly prohibiting the parties to marshal new evidence regarding the falsehood of the Settlement Agreement152 and instructing the Juez de Distrito not to analyze Lion’s allegation that such Agreement had been forged153.

175.  After three years of judicial battling, Lion still had no decision confirming the falsehood of the Forged Settlement Agreement and now it was fighting to prove that it should not be deprived of Amparo recourse — the only way to overturn the wrongful cancellation of the Mortgages.

7.6  The remand Amparo

176.  The fact that Lion was being tried by the same judge who had already dismissed evidence on the forgery did not discourage Lion from bringing once more a petition to admit evidence on the fraudulent nature of the Forged Settlement Agreement154. And, since Lion had only acquired knowledge of the False Amparo’s existence at this point, it also provided evidence pointing to the inauthenticity of the False Amparo155.

177.  On September 23, 2015 the Juez de Distrito only accepted the graphology expert report and a brief filing on the False Amparo as evidence156. The Juez de Distrito used formalistic reasoning to reject further evidence provided by Lion157.

Lion’s withdrawal

178.  At that point Claimant had spent almost three years in lawsuits before Mexican civil courts trying to undo the fraudulent cancellation of the Mortgages. It had achieved very little:

  • —  Lion had filed an Amparo, but its recurring attempts that the scope of the procedure be extended to cover the forgery of the Settlement Agreement (a fact which Lion only learned after it had filed the Amparo) and that it be authorized to marshal evidence proving the forgery, had been repeatedly dismissed by the first instance Juez de Distrito and in second instance by the Tribunal de Queja, for a purely formalistic reason: the ampliación de la demanda had been signed on behalf of Lion by its attorney and not by its legal representative — a minor procedural defect Lion was never offered the opportunity to remedy;

  • —  Unable to submit that the Settlement Agreement had been forged, Lion’s Amparo had been dismissed by the first instance Juez de Distrito; in the Amparo Judgement the Juez de Distrito assumed the Settlement Agreement to be valid and binding and concluded that Lion’s emplazamiento had been properly served on Lic. López Medina, Lion’s process agent as identified in the Forged Settlement Agreement — an obscure attorney, with whom Lion had never had any relationship and who failed to inform Lion;

  • —  On appeal against the Amparo Judgement, the second instance Tribunal de Queja, whom Lion had asked to review a further time the prohibition to argue the forgery issue, did not take up this question; instead the Tribunal de Queja, in an unexpected move, made sua sponte the decision to remand the procedure back to the first instance Judge, with a strictly limited remit: to review whether the Amparo had been properly admitted, in light of the existence of a previous Amparo (the False Amparo — a decoy procedure filed fraudulently by the Debtors to derail the admissibility of the real Amparo);

  • —  Upon the instructions of the Tribunal de Queja, the Juez de Distrito again denied Lion’s request to expand the scope of the remand, so that the Amparo could encompass the forgery of the Settlement Agreement.

179.  On December 11, 2015 Lion waived the Amparo lawsuit. Lion says that it took this decision, because it believed it was futile to continue:

  • —  On the one hand, had Lion pursued the Remand Amparo, Mexico could have argued in this arbitration that Lion’s expropriation claim under NAFTA Article 1110 would be inadmissible pursuant to NAFTA Article 1121(2), which sets a three-year time limit to bring claims158;

  • —  On the other hand, the circumstances made it clear that further pursuit of Lion’s claims, before the same court that had ruled against it before, on the basis on the same evidence admitted previously, and barring admission of other relevant evidence, was futile;

  • —  Additionally, the graphological evidence that was in fact admitted, with the experts opinions two-to-one in favour of the authenticity of the False Amparo, made it even less likely that the Remand Amparo would make a ruling in favour of Lion159.

8.  Criminal proceedings and the fate of the Nayarit property

180.  At the time of the filing of Post-Hearing Briefs, three criminal proceedings concerning the alleged irregularities of which Lion says it has been a victim were pending resolution:

  • —  A criminal action160 had been brought against Sr. Cárdenas in connection with the Forged Settlement Agreement and the false request for copy; the investigation phase had been completely exhausted; Sr. Cárdenas, in his defense, had initiated Amparos No. 610/2017 and No. 1518/2018; the criminal proceedings were halted until those Amparos were resolved161;

  • —  A criminal action162 had been brought against Sr. Cárdenas concerning the False Amparo; at the time of the filing of the Post-Hearing Briefs, this proceeding was at the initial investigation phase, before the Prosecutor’s Office in Jalisco; the Prosecutor was in the process of analyzing the matter to bring charges formally (the “imputación”)163;

  • —  A criminal164 action had been brought against Sr. Cárdenas for the sale of the Nayarit Property; at the time of the final Party submissions, the proceeding was at the initial investigation phase, before the Prosecutor’s Office in Jalisco165.

181.  Other criminal proceedings initiated by Lion against Sr. Cárdenas had already been finalized at this point, with the Amparo Judgment stating that Sr. Cárdenas was in jail at the time of the rendering of the decision. Implicitly referring to the stature of Sr. Cárdenas’s father-in-law and the apparent leniency of Jalisco courts towards Sr. Cárdenas, Ms. Onay Payne (one of Lion’s representatives) stated at the Hearing that they were able to “get him [Sr. Cárdenas] behind bars”, but “not for long”166.

182.  On July 27, 2016, Inmobiliaria Bains sold the Nayarit Property to “Hotelera los Tules167. This sale operation was recorded by the Registro Público of Bucerías on May 16, 2017. In the course of one of the criminal proceedings against Sr. Cárdenas, the judge issued a freeze order, suspending temporarily the development of the property.

183.  Claimant was not aware of further developments168.

V.  Relief Sought by the Parties

184.  Lion’s requests the following relief in its Post-Hearing Brief169:

“The Claimant respectfully request the Tribunal:

  1. a.  To declare that Mexico has breached its obligations under Articles 1110 and 1105 of NAFTA and international law;

  2. b.  To order Mexico to pay the Claimant the amount of US$81,992,752 as compensation for the loss caused by the cancellation of the Mortgages with interest at the rate mentioned under (e) below;

  3. c.  To order Mexico to pay the Claimant the legal fees incurred in the Mexican court proceedings in a minimum amount of US$2,212,004.53 as a result of the cancellation of the Mortgages with interest at the rate mentioned under (e) below;

  4. d.  To order Mexico to pay the Claimant whatever amount is assessed against LMC by the Mexican courts (currently valued at US$14,853,013.73) as a result of the waiver of the Foreclosure Proceedings as per Article 1121 of NAFTA;

  5. e.  To order Mexico to pay interest on the amounts under (b) to (c) at the Mexican Legal rate provided by Article 362 of the Mexican Commercial Code compounded monthly (i.e., 6%), through the date of full and effective payment of those amounts as from:

    1. (i)  31 March 2015 for the lost value of the Mortgages;

    2. (ii)  31 December 2015 to reimburse LMC for the attorney’s fees and costs it incurred in Mexican court proceedings;

  6. f.  To order Mexico to reimburse Claimants all their reasonable legal costs and fees in connection with this arbitration with interest as of the date of the award at the interest rate mentioned above at (e); and

  7. g.  Any other remedies that the Tribunal consider appropriate in the circumstances given Mexico’s breaches”

185.  Mexico’s request for relief in its Rejoinder is as follows170:

“For all of the foregoing reasons, the Respondent requests:

  • •  an Order dismissing the Claimant’s Claim in its entirety;

  • •  an Order that the Claimant indemnify the Respondent for its costs incurred in this arbitration, including its legal costs and the travel expenses occurred by its legal team, witnesses, and experts; and

  • •  such other relief as the Respondent may request and this Tribunal may deem appropriate.

    1. 635.  In the alternative, in the unlikely event that the Tribunal concludes that the Respondent is internationally liable for a breach of its obligations under NAFTA Article 1110 and/or NAFTA Article 1105, the Respondent requests:

      • •  that the amount of damages be determined on the basis of the CBRE reports and Sanchez Devanny opinion, which put the value of the property, net of foreclosure fees and expenses, at USD $47,060,068.57;

      • •  minus the deduction that the Tribunal finds appropriate to avoid double recovery and to account for the Claimant’s contributory fault;

      • •  plus an award of interest based on a relatively low and risk-free rate applicable to U.S. dollar denominated amounts, such as the U.S. Treasury Bill with annual compounding; and

      • •  any such other relief as the Respondent may request and this Tribunal may deem appropriate”.

186.  In its Post-Hearing Brief Respondent specified that171:

“[…] any damages found must be subject to a deduction for contributory fault of at least 50% and closer to 100% since the Claimant would not have suffered any losses had it not acted negligently and with a lack of due care”.

VI.  Merits

187.  Lion has brought this arbitration against Mexico to address Mexico’s alleged:

  • —  judicial and administrative expropriation of Lion’s investment under NAFTA Art. 1110172;

  • —  alternatively, Mexico’s denial of justice as a failure to provide fair and equitable treatment under NAFTA Art. 1105, and

  • —  alternatively, the failure to grant Lion’s investment full protection and security under NAFTA Art. 1105.

General rule: No judicial expropriation without denial of justice

188.  While expropriation constitutes Claimant’s primary claim173, the Tribunal observes that liability for expropriation under Art. 1110 arising from the decisions of domestic courts requires a finding of a denial of justice.

189.  This is agreed upon by both of the Non-Disputing Parties in their submissions:

  • —  The USA states that174:

    “Decisions of domestic courts acting in the role of neutral and independent arbiters of the legal rights of litigants do not give rise to a claim for expropriation under Article 1110(1). Moreover, the United States has not recognized the concept of “judicial takings” as a matter of domestic law […].”

  • —  Canada in turn asserts that175:

    “A domestic court’s bona fide adjudication as to whether a property right exists under domestic law cannot be recast as an expropriation of that property. A neutral and independent judicial determination that a property right is invalid under domestic law, unless it can be impugned as a denial of justice, does not give rise to separate claim of expropriation under customary international law. International tribunals have followed this approach.”

190.  This position is buttressed by the Loewen tribunal, which stated the following about a judicial expropriation claim presented as an alternative to denial of justice176:

“Claimant’s reliance on Article 1110 adds nothing to the claim based on Article 1105. In the circumstances of this case, a claim alleging an appropriation in violation of Article 1110 can succeed only if Loewen established a denial of justice under 1105”.

191.  A similar view has been expressed by legal scholars, inter alia, by Paparinskis, who in his seminal treatise on the international minimum standard and fair and equitable treatment has opined that

“[w]hile taking of property through the judicial process could be said to constitute expropriation, the rules and criteria to be applied for establishing the breach should come from denial of justice”177.

Exceptions to the rule

192.  There is an exception to the general rule, acknowledged explicitly by both the USA and Canada in their submissions — whenever it can be proved that the courts were not neutral and independent, especially from the other branches of power of the host State.

193.  The USA has opined that178:

“Of course, where a judiciary is not separate from other organs of the State and those organs (executive or legislative) direct or otherwise interfere with a domestic court decision so as to cause an effective expropriation, these executive or legislative acts may form the basis of a separate claim under Article 1110, depending on the circumstances.”

194.  The submission by Canada confirms the exception by stating that “[a] neutral and independent judicial determination […] does not give rise to separate claim of expropriation under customary international law179”, thus implying that such a separate claim could be found valid if the judicial determination under question was not neutral or independent.

195.  In the current case, the Tribunal does not find sufficient proof to apply the above exception:

  • —  No proof has been marshalled as to the interference of the executive or legislative branches of Mexico’s government in the course of the local proceedings;

  • —  Even though Claimant has presented allegations of bias by Mexico’s courts180, these are not substantiated by evidence; and

  • —  The decisions of the courts failed to benefit the Respondent State.

196.  Thus, the Tribunal finds that it must first adjudicate Lion’s claim for denial of justice (VI.1), then it will analyse the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies (VI.2), establish its conclusions (VI.3) and finally devote a short chapter to Claimant’s alternative claims (VI.4).

VI.1.  Denial of Justice

197.  Claimant avers that it was denied justice by the Mexican judicial system.

198.  The Tribunal will first make an introduction (1.), then it will provide a summary of Claimant’s and Respondent’s respective positions (2. and 3.) and finally it shall make a decision (4.).

1.  Overview

199.  Denial of justice, referred to as denegación de justicia in Spanish, is

“a defect in a country’s organization of courts or administration of justice, resulting in the country’s violating its international legal duties to protect aliens”181.

200.  The concept reaches back to the Middle Ages182, when private reprisals were allowed against acts of injustice committed by actors of another State183. It later evolved into diplomatic protection assumed by States184. Traditionally, some authors perceived denial of justice as any internationally illegal treatment of aliens185:

“A denial of justice, in a broad sense, occurs whenever a State, through any department or agency, fails to observe, with respect to an alien, any duty imposed by international law or by treaty with his country”,

201.  However, currently a narrower view prevails, although there is much debate on what specific State actions constitute denial of justice: points of contention include whether the concept encompasses administrative acts, whether manifestly unjust court decisions on the merits can constitute denial of justice, and whether subjective elements, such as bad faith, should be required186.

202.  In 1935, de Visscher famously described denial of justice as “one of the oldest and one of the worst elucidated [concepts] in international law” 187. Despite the passage of nearly a century, de Visscher’s statement still stands true.

203.  Paulsson, one of the most prominent contemporary researchers on the subject, has defined denial of justice as follows188:

“[d]enial of justice arises when proceedings are so faulty as to exclude all reasonable expectation of a fair decision […]”.

204.  Paulsson’s definition puts the emphasis on the active subject (judicial bodies of the host State) and on the wrongdoing (very grave breaches of due process to the detriment of the alien, which preclude the possibility of an unjust decision on the merits be reviewed).

Applicability under the NAFTA

205.  Nowhere in the NAFTA treaty do the words “denial of justice” appear. The same happens in most investment treaties. There is, however, unanimous agreement among the Parties (including the Non-Disputing Parties) that denial of justice is an international wrong which breaches the fair and equitable treatment [“FET”] standard. Case law and doctrine reach the same conclusion189.

206.  Art. 1105 NAFTA delineates the FET standard:

Article 1105:  Minimum Standard of Treatment

  1. 1.  Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”

207.  Art. 1131(2) of the NAFTA states that an interpretation by the Free Trade Commission of a NAFTA provision “shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section”.

208.  One such interpretation was provided on the protections under Art. 1105 of the NAFTA. The Interpretation Note of July 31, 2001 [the “FTC Note”] states as follows:

“[T]he Free Trade Commission hereby adopts the following interpretations of Chapter Eleven in order to clarify and reaffirm the meaning of certain of its provisions: […]

  1. B.  Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law

    1. 1.  Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.

    2. 2.  The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.” [Emphasis added]

209.  In light of the Interpretation Note, the protection to be accorded to investors under the FET and full protection and security standards is set at the level of “customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens”.

210.  Since Claimant has brought a case of denial of justice by the Mexican Courts, the adjudication of this case requires that the Tribunal determine what “customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens” is expected from those Courts. Breach of that standard implies denial of justice.

1.1  Procedural and substantive denial of justice

211.  In its Memorial, Claimant argues that the Minimum Standard of Treatment under Article 1105 (1) of the NAFTA incorporates a threefold protection for investors in their dealings with local Courts. Thus, local Courts are prohibited from:

  • —  incurring unreasonable delay in administering justice190,

  • —  refusing the investors access to justice191, and

  • —  rendering manifestly unjust and erroneous decisions that a competent judge would not have taken192.

212.  In Claimant’s view, denial of justice can thus be subsumed in two great categories: procedural and substantive denial of justice.

213.  Claimant’s Reply provides a more elaborate typology of denial of justice, introducing a two-fold differentiation into “déni de justice” and “défi de justice” proposed by the Institut de Droit International193 and a four-fold one under the Harvard Draft Convention194, which includes substantive denial of justice as one of the categories195:

“A state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial of justice. Denial of justice exists when there is

  1. [i]  a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts,

  2. [ii]  gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial process,

  3. [iii]  failure to provide those guaranties which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or

  4. [iv]  a manifestly unjust judgment. An error of a national court which does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice”.

214.  In differentiating between substantive and procedural denial of justice, Lion finds support in Oostergetel196.

215.  Respondent in turn argues that denial of justice is always procedural197.

216.  Mexico retorts that the artificial distinction made by the Oostergetel tribunal is misleading and that ultimately it did not lead to the application of any other standard for denial of justice than the traditional, very high one198. Respondent also claims that the Harvard Draft Convention and the Institut de Droite International’s Draft Articles are irrelevant, because they lack customary law status199.

The view of the Tribunal

217.  The Tribunal agrees with Respondent, who convincingly argues that there is no “substantive denial of justice”. While the dichotomy between substantive and procedural denial of justice has indeed been adopted (to greater or lower endorsement) by some arbitral tribunals200, this differentiation is not useful. To determine whether a judgment was outrageous or egregious on the merits would require a tribunal to delve into the decision-making process under national law — it is trite to repeat that international tribunals cannot be and do not constitute domestic courts of appeal201.

218.  The Tribunal endorses Paulsson’s view that:

“in modern international law there is no place for substantive denial of justice […] If a judgment is grossly unjust, it is because the victim has not been afforded fair treatment […] Extreme cases should thus be dealt with on the footing that they are so unjustifiable that they could have been only the product of bias or some other violation of the right of due process202

“[…] denial of justice is always procedural203.”

219.  Paulsson adds that manoeuvring the line between what appears to be substantively unjust and what is unjust or erroneous because of gross procedural breaches is “the greatest difficulty of our subject” and explains that204:

“gross or notorious injustice — whatever the words used — is not a denial of justice merely because the conclusion appears to be demonstrably wrong in substance; it must impel the adjudicator to conclude that it could not have been reached by any impartial judicial body worthy of that name”.

1.2  Types

220.  A review of case law and scholarly writings reveal that procedural denial of justice can be classified in subtypes: the right to access justice (A.); the right to be heard and to present one’s case (B.); and the right to obtain a decision without undue delay (C.). These are some of the separate manifestations of denial of justice and, if committed against an alien, constitute international wrongs which can be imputed against the State.

A.  Denying an alien access to justice

221.  The first category of procedural denial of justice is uncontroversial. Prof. Paparinskis writes205:

“The easiest case, accepted as uncontroversially wrongful under the Hague Conference, was a discriminatory denial of access to court, described in the Hague Texts as the situation where ‘the foreigner has been hindered by the judicial authorities in the exercise of his right to pursue judicial remedies”.

222.  He also provides the following examples206:

“[…] a purposeful disruption of the commencement of the proceedings, or even the absence of notification about proceedings that exclude the possibility to challenge them could all result in denial of justice”.

223.  Freeman in turn explains due process under international law in the following words207:

“whenever judicial action is taken without giving the alien a hearing or without properly notifying him in order to prepare a defense; whenever misconduct of the judge in withholding, hiding or destroying papers essential to the foreigner’s cause is prejudicial in effect; whenever he has not been permitted to produce evidence or to summon valuable witnesses”.

224.  Case law supports this view.

225.  The judgment in Ambatielos offers insight into the basic right of foreigners to access local courts in pursuit of justice208:

“Thus, when ‘free access to the Courts’ is covenanted by a State in favour of the subjects or citizens of another State, the covenant is that the foreigner shall enjoy full freedom to appear before the courts for the protection or defence of his rights, whether as plaintiff or defendant; to bring any action provided or authorized by law […]” [Emphasis added].

226.  In Idler the US-Venezuela Commission found that the American claimant, Mr. Idler, was denied justice when the Supreme Court in Caracas gave him notice of an impending hearing without sufficient time for him to physically be able to appear in court209.

227.  The Cotesworth & Powell tribunal described the following facts as an “absolute denial of justice”210:

“Still, a plain violation of the substance of natural justice, as, for example, refusing to hear the party interested, or to allow him opportunity to produce proofs, amounts to the same thing as an absolute denial of justice”.

228.  AI-Bahloul explicitly recognized that due process breaches include not notifying the investor of hearings and that deciding in the investor’s absence amounts to a gross violation of procedural rules 211.

229.  The right to access justice also extends to the right to lodge appeal. This aspect was discussed by the tribunal in Al-Bahloul, where the claimant alleged that his appeals were wrongfully rejected without regard to due process standards212 — the tribunal explicitly acknowledged that the allegations could constitute a denial of due process (but ultimately dismissed the claim because of the limited evidence on the record213).

B.  Denying an alien the right of defense or to present evidence

230.  The violation of an alien’s right of defense or to present evidence as an international wrong amounting to denial of justice has been universally recognized by academia214.

231.  Case law equally supports this view.

232.  This was done by the aforementioned Cotesworth & Powell tribunal215:

“Still, a plain violation of the substance of natural justice, as, for example, refusing to hear the party interested, or to allow him [an] opportunity to produce proofs, amounts to the same thing as an absolute denial of justice”. [Emphasis added]

233.  In the Ambatielos ruling216:

“the covenant is that the foreigner shall enjoy full freedom to […] deliver any pleading by way of defence, set off or counterclaim; to engage Counsel; to adduce evidence, whether documentary or oral or of any other kind; to apply for bail; to lodge appeals and, in short, to use the Courts fully and to avail himself of any procedural remedies or guarantees provided by the law of the land in order that justice may be administered on a footing of equality with nationals of the country.”,

234.  And the Krederi decision:

“[m]ost frequently a denial of justice may result from a serious defect in the adjudicative process, such as a violation of … the right to be heard and to present evidence […]217”.

235.  The US-Mexico General Claims Commission in Chattin found that local courts displayed “a most astonishing lack of seriousness” because there was “no trace of an effort to have the two foremost pieces of evidence explained”, there was no inquiry made into verifying the statement of a key witness in the domestic prosecution proceedings and there was no effort to examine a witness who could have presented important exculpatory evidence218.

236.  In Ballistini, the claimant was denied a crucial piece of evidence necessary to make his case because the judge he accused of arbitrariness deliberately withheld the documents. The French-Venezuelan Commission found a denial of justice

“because the local authorities deprived Mr. Ballistini of the legal means of instituting before the competent tribunals the actions which the laws would authorize him in case he might improperly have been condemned to a criminal judgment.219

237.  In Joseph F. Rihani220, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico reversed the decisions of lower courts in enforcement proceedings because it claimed that critical evidence — that was clearly on the record and discussed by one of the justices — had in fact not been presented before it. The American Mexican Claims Commission found that there was denial of justice as221:

“[I]n the face of the clear and indisputable evidence in the record to the contrary, more particularly in view of the fact that the, attention of the court had been drawn to such evidence by one of its members warrants the conclusion that the said court wilfully disregarded such evidence; that the decision of the court was lacking in good faith and that the same fell so far short of international standards as to amount to a denial of justice” [Emphasis added]

C.  Prohibition of undue delay

238.  The final type of procedural denial of justice concerns undue delay in the rendering of a judgement by the local Courts.

239.  There is unanimous agreement by scholars that undue delay in the exercise of justice is a separate type of denial of justice222.

240.  As early as the Fabiani223 case discussed supra, international tribunals have agreed that “justice delayed is justice denied”. It is widely recognized that undue delay amounts to a denial of due process224.

241.  It is common ground that there is no abstract manner of determining whether a particular period constitutes reasonable delay but each case should be scrutinized under the specific facts225. For example, in Pey Casado226, a period of seven years without rendering a first instance decision by local courts amounted to a denial of justice. In El Oro Mining and Railway Co.227, the Great Britain and Mexico Claims Commission found that the passage of nine years without a hearing in its case for compensation for having provided materials to the government, constituted a denial of justice. However, in Oostergetel, the length of local proceedings of two years was found not to be in breach of the international minimum standard228.

242.  The tribunal in Chevron devised a widely recognized test for denial of justice for undue delay: it found that “some of the factors that may be considered are the complexity of the case, the behaviour of the litigants involved, the significance of the interests at stake in the case, and the behaviour of the Courts themselves” 229.

243.  The Chevron test was followed by the tribunal in Oostergetel230.

244.  Similarly, the more recent Toto Construzioni231 decision, discussed in detail by both Parties in their submissions, has stated that232:

“There is not, under international law, a specific measure by which lapses of time may be condemned as excessive: the lapse is to be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account (i) the complexity of the matter; (ii) the need for celerity of decision; and (iii) the diligence of claimant in prosecuting its case.”

1.3  Standard

245.  The Tribunal has already noted that denial of justice has been conceived by international customary law and that there is no treaty formula under the NAFTA (and most treaties for that matter) which can offer guidance on which judicial actions attributable to States amount to justitia denegata. Additionally, the Tribunal has decided that denial of justice can only be procedural.

246.  The question remains, however: how to differentiate between procedural decisions properly adopted by local Courts, which are contrary to the alien’s interests, and those which amount to an international wrong and engage the responsibility of the State. To clarify this issue the Tribunal shall undertake a brief analysis of some of the major denial of justice cases233 starting with those of the 19th/20th century (A.), then it shall continue with more recent decisions (B.), present the Parties’ positions (C.) and reach a conclusion (D.).

A.  Late 19th and early 20th century cases

247.  At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a proliferation of denial of justice decisions that still today serve as guidance for investment tribunals. On the other hand, certain ideas of the concept of denial of justice developed under these early decisions have been superseded234.

248.  In Cotesworth & Powell, a decision from 1875, the international tribunal found multiple instances of denial of justice. A sentence of classification in bankruptcy proceedings was deemed unjust for illegally excluding claimants as common creditors and failing to notify them of the proceedings235. Additionally, a sentence issued without hearing the claimants in the case as plaintiffs in the suit was also found to constitute denial of justice236. Another denial arose from a one-year delay in notifying an important judicial sentence237. Finally, the tribunal identified a conflict between decisions made by the same courts238.

249.  Idler, a case decided in 1890, concerned the use of an obscure legal remedy from medieval times, which allowed the reversal of any judgments or proceedings detrimental to the government, used by the State to annul previous Court decisions favourable to the alien. The US-Venezuela Commission found that the singular invocation of this ancient remedy by the Supreme Court of Venezuela served to circumvent enforcement of the decisions in favour of the alien and thus constituted a denial of justice239. The Commission also found that the claimant was denied justice because the notice of proceedings he was given made it impossible for him to appear in court240.

250.  In Fabiani, a case from 1896, Venezuela was held responsible for denial of justice, because its courts refused to enforce an arbitral award of a French national against his Venezuelan partners due to strictly procedural arguments, which amounted to a “disguised refusal to rule” (“refus déguisé de statuer241). The arbitrator also found that the claimant was subjected to undue delay242.

251.  In Ballistini243, a decision of the French-Venezuelan Commission of 1902, a Venezuelan judge wrongfully rendered judgment for calumny and injuries against a foreigner. When Mr. Ballistini sued the judge, who apparently had issued an arbitrary decision to arrest him, the same judge withheld the necessary documentary evidence, making it impossible for Mr. Ballistini to make an effective case before local courts. The Commission found that the claimant had been denied justice:

“[b]ecause the local authorities deprived Ballistini of the legal means of instituting before the competent tribunals the actions which the laws would authorize him in case he might improperly have been condemned to a criminal judgment” 244.

252.  In the Chattin case of 1928, the American-Mexican Claims Commission found a denial of justice. Mr. Chattin was arrested illegally and sentenced to two years of jail for embezzlement on the basis of spurious evidence, in a trial in which he was not duly informed regarding the charges brought against him and in which the Court hearings lasted as little as five minutes245. This was a landmark decision regarding basic procedural guarantees to be afforded to foreigners.

The Neer case and the subjective element of denial of justice

253.  One of the traditionally recognized leading cases on denial of justice is the 1926 award of the US-Mexico General Claims Commission in L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer. In its decision, the US-Mexico Commission laid out its standard246:

“[T]he treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency”.

254.  The imprint made by Neer on the concept of denial of justice has been palpable in investment arbitration awards247; however, it appears that the reliance on the case has rightfully declined in the recent years.

255.  The Mondev tribunal was correct in stating that the facts in Neer were centred on a State’s alleged failure to carry out an effective police investigation into a foreigner’s murder, and are not apposite when discussing treatment of aliens under the FET standard248. As the Azurix tribunal found249:

“the traditional Neer formula … reflects the traditional, and not necessarily the contemporary, definition of the customary minimum standard, at least in certain non-investment fields”.

256.  Other tribunals have agreed that the Neer standard may have reflected the minimum standard — but only as of 1927 and not in contemporary times250.

257.  Similarly, Paulsson writes that

“there should be no doubt that, to the extent that customary-law minimum standard has any role to play in the interpretation of investment treaties, the Neer formula is of limited import” 251.

258.  An additional reason why the Neer standard has become less relevant is that it explicitly requires the finding of bad faith252. This notion has been rejected by NAFTA decisions concerning denial of justice253, and authors alike254.

B.  Recent denial of justice decisions

259.  The Parties have not drawn the Tribunal’s attention to any NAFTA decision with a positive finding of denial of justice.

260.  The Tribunal will briefly analyse Mondev and Loewen, the two major cases discussed by the Parties. The Tribunal shall also discuss Dan Cake — a very recent award finding for denial of justice in a non-NAFTA case.

The Mondev case

261.  The Mondev case (2002) concerned a failed investment in the USA by a Canadian construction company and involved a claim that the local authorities prevented the claimant from exercising an option to purchase a certain parcel of land. When the claimant filed a case before US courts, the jury found against the local authorities, a decision which was later overturned on appeal. The claimant then failed to obtain a judgment in its favour from the Massachusetts Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court rejected the case by not granting certiorari. According to the claimant, the Massachusetts Supreme Court deviated from its previous rulings to the extent that it had in effect applied “a new rule”.

262.  The Mondev tribunal did not find that denial of justice had occurred as, in any common law jurisdiction, one may and should expect “new” judge-made law and the decisions taken by the US courts were not “extreme cases” that would amount to a denial of justice.

263.  The Mondev tribunal found that denial of justice would require255:

“a wilful disregard of due process of law, […] which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”.

264.  Its analysis did not end here, however. The tribunal continued to explain that256:

“The Tribunal would stress that the word “surprises” does not occur in isolation. The test is not whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on the one hand that international tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on the other hand that Chapter 11 of NAFTA (like other treaties for the protection of investments) is intended to provide a real measure of protection. In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable treatment. This is admittedly a somewhat open-ended standard, but it may be that in practice no more precise formula can be offered to cover the range of possibilities”. [Emphasis added].

265.  Mondev also determined that the threshold for establishing treatment in violation of the FET standard had evolved in the past century and that currently it does not require subjective elements on the part of the Host State such as bad faith257:

“To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat a foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith […] the content of the minimum standard today cannot be limited to the content of customary international law as recognised in arbitral decisions in the 1920s”.

The Loewen case

266.  In Loewen (2003), the other major case discussed by the Parties, a Canadian funeral home conglomerate challenged a Mississippi State Court jury award of USD 100 M in compensatory damages and USD 400 M in punitive damages on claims that included fraud and violations of Mississippi antitrust law. The claimant argued that, apart from the egregious damages decision by the Mississippi State court, it was also wronged by the application of civil procedure rules requiring it to post USD 625 M to stay execution of the judgment pending appeal.

267.  Interestingly, the investment tribunal appeared to lean towards finding that claimant was indeed denied justice under the facts of the case258:

“After all, we have held that judicial wrongs may in principle be brought home to the State Party under Chapter Eleven, and have criticised the Mississippi proceedings in the strongest terms. There was unfairness here towards the foreign investor”.

268.  The Loewen tribunal used the following test, according to which denial of justice amounts to259:

“[m]anifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety”

269.  Loewen also endorsed the Mondev view that under contemporary international customary law, bad faith or malicious intent is not required for a denial of justice260:

“Neither State practice, the decisions of international tribunals nor the opinion of commentators support the view that bad faith or malicious intention is an essential element of unfair and inequitable treatment or denial of justice amounting to a breach of international justice”.

270.  However, the Loewen tribunal ultimately found that the claimant had failed to exhaust all available local remedies when it decided to reach a settlement rather than pursue its case before the US Supreme Court261.

271.  Apart from the claimant not having exhausted the available local remedies, Loewen’s claims were dismissed for lack of standing, due to claimant’s buyout by a company of the Host State (which led to claimant losing its status as a foreign investor under the NAFTA).

272.  The Parties have dedicated a lengthy discussion to the Mondev and Loewen decisions. The Tribunal observes that these cases may offer assistance regarding the applicable standard of denial of justice in the abstract. The underlying facts of those cases, however, substantially differ from the ones in this case.

The Dan Cake case

273.  In a recent non-NAFTA decision of 2015, the Dan Cake tribunal found denial of justice: under Hungarian law the claimant’s enterprise, that was in liquidation, was entitled to convene a composition hearing in order to seek an agreement with its creditors. Instead of following the established procedure, the Metropolitan Court of Budapest ordered claimant to submit a number of documents not required by law, and which the claimant was unable to provide. The tribunal considered that such order was unnecessary and that it prejudged and denied the claimant’s right to seek an agreement with its creditors262.

274.  Based on these grounds and taking into account that there was no appeal from the Court’s order263, the tribunal found that the Court’s conduct “[did] shock a sense of judicial propriety264” and that thus claimant had been denied justice.

C.  The position of the Parties and the Non-Disputing Parties

275.  The Tribunal shall briefly summarize the positions of Claimant and Respondent on the applicable standard for denial of justice. The Tribunal will also review the Non-Disputing Parties’ observations on this matter in their NAFTA Art. 1128 submissions.

Claimant’s position

276.  Claimant argues that with respect to procedural denial of justice, the Tribunal should follow the Oostergetel tribunal and apply a standard that the procedural irregularities be “severe” and affect the outcome of the dispute and that any undue delay be “excessive”265.

277.  Lion also claims that it is sufficient for it to prove that Mexico’s courts failed to remedy the prior denial of justice, which consisted in the service of process made in a manner inconsistent with the applicable international standards and local law266.

278.  Lion also attacks the Mondev standard proposed by Respondent by stating that the decision was based on an incorrect legal basis: that of arbitrariness rather than denial of justice267.

Mexico’s position

279.  Respondent in turn argues that a single very high standard should apply to all types of denial of justice268. This single standard for the finding of denial of justice should be based on the Mondev case269:

“[…] a wilful disregard of due process of law, … which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety.”

280.  According to Mexico, the Mondev tribunal was not wrong in referring to arbitrariness as part of NAFTA’s Art. 1105 minimum standard of treatment. What the tribunal in Mondev did was to hold the criterion of arbitrariness “useful in the context of denial of justice”270, while fully acknowledging the difference between the two.

281.  Mexico emphasizes that the standard for denial of justice is very high, summarizing its scope in the following words271:

“The threshold to establish denial of justice is very high — e.g. requiring a ‘notoriously unjust’ or ’egregious’ administration of justice ‘which offends a sense of judicial propriety’. It does not suffice to establish that domestic adjudicators have erred, or misapplied or misinterpreted domestic law”.

The USA’s position

282.  In its submission the USA explicitly identifies the denial of justice threshold as high272, due to the principle of judicial independence, the particular nature of judicial action and the unique status of the judiciary in both international and municipal legal systems273. International tribunals should accord deference to domestic courts, whose judgments are presumed to be regular under international law to a higher degree than the actions of a State’s legislative or administrative branch274.

283.  The USA provides examples for denial of justice: an “obstruction of access to courts” or a “failure to provide those guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice275”.

284.  The USA emphasizes the argument that domestic court decisions, or misapplications or misinterpretation of domestic law, do not in themselves constitute a denial of justice under customary international law276.

Canada’s position

285.  Like the USA, Canada advocates for a high standard for denial of justice claims and evokes the traditional standard of Court actions or omissions being “extremely gross” or “egregious” or amounting to “an outrage, bad faith, wilful neglect of duty, or insufficiency of action apparent to any unbiased man”277. The high standard is amplified by the need of international tribunals to defer to local Courts278.

286.  Canada lists as examples of denial of justice instances where there has been

“a refusal to entertain a suit or serious failure to adequately administer justice or if there has been a ‘clear and malicious misapplication of the law’ or if the judgment in question is so patently egregious that ‘it is impossible for a third party to recognize how an impartial judge could have reached the result in question”.279

D.  The Tribunal’s view

287.  The very high standard adopted by Mondev has been endorsed by a multitude of tribunals, NAFTA280 and non-NAFTA281 alike. The Tribunal also notes that the test has been proposed by Respondent282 and endorsed by both Non-Disputing Parties283.

288.  The Tribunal accepts the Mondev standard as a guide to adjudicate Lion’s denial of justice claim. However, some precisions are required in light of the arguments presented by the Parties.

289.  The starting point for the tribunal in Mondev was the ELSI judgement. In this case the ICJ assessed the concept of “arbitrariness” under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the USA and Italy, in the context of a dispute concerning the requisition and forced liquidation of an insolvent Italian company wholly owned by a US corporation. In this setting the ICJ stated that arbitrariness was284:

“a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety”.

290.  The Mondev tribunal replicated the above statement285. Taking this isolated sentence, Mexico has suggested that a finding of denial of justice requires “evidence of intention or malice, collusion, corruption, or flagrant abuse by the Respondent’s judicial system”286.

291.  The Tribunal does not agree with Mexico’s conclusion, which is only the result of an incomplete reading of the Mondev standard.

292.  The Mondev tribunal acknowledge that the ELSI standard was defined in the context of evaluating arbitrariness, but considered it useful in further defining the test for denial of justice287. The tribunal continued stating that for denial of justice288:

“… the test is not whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome…”.

293.  The tribunal continued to frame this test within the standard of FET under Article 1105(1) of NAFTA289:

“In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable treatment”.

294.  In defining the test for denial of justice, nowhere does the Mondev tribunal allude to a subjective element. Moreover, in assessing international liability of the Contracting States under Article 1105(1) of NAFTA, the tribunal explicitly rejected this possibility290:

“To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith” [Emphasis added].

295.  Other NAFTA tribunals have endorsed this view291. For instance, the Glamis Gold tribunal stated292:

“The Tribunal emphasizes that, although bad faith may often be present in such a determination and its presence certainly will be determinative of a violation, a finding of bad faith is not a requirement for a breach of Article 1105(1).

296.  The Tribunal agrees: a wilful and intentional illicit conduct by local Courts may serve as the grounds for a finding of denial of justice. Wilful intent thus, might be an accessory element in discerning whether denial of justice has occurred, but it is not a necessary requirement.

297.  The Loewen tribunal used a similar test, stressing that denial of justice is procedural293:

“[m]anifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety”.

298.  Loewen also endorsed the Mondev view that under contemporary international customary law, bad faith or malicious intent is not required for a denial of justice claim, framed within the Fair and Equitable Treatment of Article 1105(1) NAFTA294:

“Neither State practice, the decisions of international tribunals nor the opinion of commentators support the view that bad faith or malicious intention is an essential element of unfair and inequitable treatment or denial of justice amounting to a breach of international justice”.

299.  In conclusion, the test is an objective one: denial of justice requires a finding of an improper and egregious procedural conduct by the local courts (whether intentional or not), which does not meet the basic internationally accepted standards of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety.

2.  Claimant’s position

300.  Lion says that Mexico breached its duty to treat it in a fair and equitable manner through denying Lion justice in its pursuit of legal remedies against the Debtors: Claimant argues that it was not accorded proper due process rights, since first, it was not granted the opportunity to be heard and then, it was deprived of the legal means to defend its rights (2.1.); Lion also maintains that it suffered undue delay in the local proceedings (2.2.); finally, Lion argues that it complied with the exhaustion of local remedies rule (2.3.).

2.1  Claimant was denied due process

301.  Claimant argues that it was denied justice through the violation of its due process rights by being barred access to justice (A.) and being prevented from presenting its case before local courts and marshalling evidence to support it (B.).

A.  Lion was denied access to justice

302.  Claimant was denied the chance to participate before the Juez de lo Mercantil because it was never properly served.

303.  Under Mexican law, proper notification by a Court is subject to making certain (“cerciorarse”) that the defendant indeed resides in the place where service is made; the service confirmation should explain the reason that led the Court to be certain (“convencimiento”)295. This obligation is enshrined in Arts. 111, 112 and 112 bis, of the Civil Procedure Code of Jalisco [“CPC Jalisco”]296. Additionally, Art. 279 of CPC Jalisco requires the Juez de lo Mercantil to “examine the legality of the service of process” (“examinará la legalidad del emplazamiento”) before declaring Lion in default297.

304.  Lion argues that Mexico clearly failed to comply with these provisions.

305.  First, the Court based the citation address solely on the domicile indicated by the plaintiff, designated in the Forged Settlement Agreement — a document which was not an original and bore no original signatures. This notwithstanding, the Court accepted the false information without further research298.

306.  Second the Court’s actuario failed to “include particular reasons or objective proof”299, and to indicate the means upon which Lion’s domicile was corroborated; apparently, the Court’s actuario only relied on the word of the person served, Lic. José Isaac López Medina, although he provided no indication or proof of his position at Lion nor any evidence that he had representation powers300. According to Claimant, the Juez de lo Mercantil acted erroneously and failed to exercise diligence to ensure that Lion was properly served301.

307.  Third, Lion avers that notification by cédula was inappropriate given the circumstances of the case302. According to Lion, notification by judicial bulletins or boards amounts to fictitious service of process, which is clearly inconsistent with the treatment to be given to a foreign company303. Service on Claimant by the Juez de lo Mercantil was inconsistent with two international treaties to which Mexico is party — the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory (with its Additional Protocol) and the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters304 — personal service to Lion should have been made via an international cooperation mechanism305.

308.  Furthermore, Claimant reinforces its argument by stating that a different standard for service was employed by judicial personnel with regard to the Debtors. For example, Claimant observes that while in average, it took a Court in Mexico 42 days to admit and serve a lawsuit306, the Juez de lo Civil failed to serve the Juicio Hipotecario on Inmobiliaria Bains for more than three years, and at the same time required only 22 days to serve the incorrect emplazamiento on Lion307.

309.  Finally, Lion avers that it was limited in its pursuit of justice before local Courts, because it was barred from bringing an ordinary appeal against the Cancellation Judgment, due to an incorrect decision by the Juez de lo Mercantil granting said Judgment res judicata effect in only 42 days, at the request of the Debtors308.

B.  Claimant was deprived of its right to exercise means of defense

310.  Claimant says that it was not allowed to properly defend itself. Respondent denied it access to justice through its Courts’ continuous failure to scrutinize the authenticity of the forged documents309:

311.  First, the Juez de lo Mercantil should have looked ex officio into the nature of the Forged Settlement Agreement and the documentation indicating that Lion was a foreign company310 before declaring Lion in default311.

312.  Second, Mexico’s Courts have denied Lion the opportunity to prove the forgery. Lion submitted the ampliación de demanda as soon as it gained knowledge of the facts underlying the forgery and cannot be blamed for not having raised the issue ab initio312. In Claimant’s view, lack of service is a breach of such a magnitude under Mexican law that the Juez de Distrito should have allowed all evidence and arguments that are necessary to prove the circumstances of the allegedly illegal service313, yet the Juez de Distrito dismissed any evidence pointing to the falsehood of the emplazamiento314. And then the Juez de Distrito’s decision in the remand Amparo refused to admit Sr. Arechederra’s testimony, thereby depriving Lion of the principal evidence that could prove that the person alleged to have signed the False Amparo did not do so315.

313.  Third, none of Mexico’s Courts seized of Lion’s proceedings ruled on the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement. The Juez de Distrito refused to decide on the issue316; the Tribunal de Queja refused as well 317, ruling that the question should be resolved after the False Amparo issue was decided in the Remand Amparo; and finally the Juez de Distrito refused 318, understanding that the Tribunal de Queja had excluded from the admissible evidence the evidence concerning the falsehood of the Forged Settlement Agreement319. Ultimately, Lion’s Amparo claim was thus frustrated.

2.2  Mexico’s unreasonable delay in administering justice

314.  According to Claimant, Mexico’s Courts failed to decide Lion’s Amparo claim within a reasonable time.

315.  Claimant avers that the time required for the resolution of the Amparo lawsuit was at odds with the usual duration of such proceedings in Mexico. According to the statistics from the Mexican Consejo de la Judicatura Federal, the Amparo lawsuit took almost four times as long as the average for the same year320.

316.  To determine if this delay is unreasonable and amounts to a denial of justice, international tribunals consider three features321:

  • —  The complexity of the matter: Claimant maintains that the claim submitted to the Juez de Distrito and the Tribunal de Queja was not complex; given that the service was performed at the address and to the person mentioned in the Forged Settlement Agreement, there was only one issue to be decided by the Courts in order to determine whether Lion was properly served — was the Forged Settlement Agreement authentic?322 Claimant states that under normal circumstances, the authenticity of a document is a factual issue that is disposed of preliminarily as a procedural incident323.

  • —  The procedural diligence of the interested parties: Claimant did not cause any undue delay through its actions during the Real Amparo proceedings324; as soon as it learned of the existence of the Forged Settlement Agreement, it filed a petition to challenge its authenticity325.

  • —  Whether celerity is especially warranted to avoid harm generated in the legal situation of the person involved in the process: Lion submits that celerity was essential because the Amparo claim, as a remedy to ultimately prevent the cancellation of the Mortgages, would become ineffective as time went by326.

317.  On a separate note, Claimant compares the delay in its claims with the unusual speed of the Cancellation Judgment, which deprived it of its investment in Mexico327.

2.3  Claimant complied with the exhaustion of local remedies rule

318.  Claimant begins by stating that under international law, the State arguing that a party has failed to exhaust local remedies has the burden to prove the existence, availability and adequacy of such remedies328, and Mexico has failed to discharge this duty.

319.  According to Lion, it fully complied with the exhaustion requirement as it did pursue all adequate remedies available to it329 (A.)

320.  Notwithstanding, Lion was not required to exhaust all local remedies because:

  • —  The remedies available were inadequate, ineffective and their exhaustion unreasonable330 (B.), and

  • —  A denial of justice for undue delay claim is not subject to the exhaustion requirement331 (C.).

A.  Lion’s claims did not require further action before Mexico’s courts

321.  Lion argues that the exhaustion of local remedies rule applies to those domestic recourses that are likely to be successful. In the case at hand, the remedies to be exhausted would be those which could reinstate the Mortgages to Lion; and Lion did pursue them332. Lion was not required to initiate any proceedings other than the Amparo as it was not feasible for it to launch the juicio de nulidad, which offered inferior protection to the Amparo route. The criminal proceedings did not offer appropriate protection either.

322.  Claimant elaborates on the concept of ‘original judicial misconduct’333 and distinguishes between the initial wrong, the denial of justice and the exhaustion of local remedies, which requires the exhaustion of all adequate available remedies334. Following this threefold concept, Claimant avers that in the present case:

  • —  The initial wrong would be the Debtors’ fraudulent actions;

  • —  The denial of justice would be the breach of Lion’s right to be heard by the Juez de lo Mercantil and

  • —  What followed after the Cancellation Proceeding (i.e., the Amparo Proceeding, the Revision Appeal Proceeding and the Remanded Proceeding) is the exhaustion of local remedies, where the “system” failed to correct the initial miscarriage of justice335.

323.  Lion argues that, since all three elements were met, it did in fact exhaust the adequate available local remedies, thus complying with the exhaustion rule under international law336.

B.  Lion was exempted from exhausting available local remedies

324.  In any event, Claimant states that, under international law, it was exempted from the exhaustion rule as the local remedies were inadequate, ineffective and their exhaustion unreasonable337.

325.  Lion uses the Loewen standard, stating that only “remedies which are effective and adequate and are reasonably available to the complainant in the circumstances in which it is situated” must be exhausted338.

326.  According to Claimant, the rule provides that only effective remedies, i.e., those providing a reasonable possibility of an effective remedy, must be exhausted and such effectiveness is to be assessed in light of the circumstances in advance of resorting to the remedy (ex ante), rather than in light of the actual outcome of the case and in light of the nature of the violation the remedy is aimed at correcting339.

327.  Secondly, only those remedies which can reasonably be demanded from the investor are to be exhausted. In the present arbitration, the remedies available to Lion were neither effective nor reasonable340:

  • —  Lion’s secured returns on its investments were declining every day and Lion would never be made whole because the Debtors’ indebtedness continued to grow and exceeded the value of the collateral;

  • —  Pursuing the Remand Amparo would have been unreasonably inefficient and would likely have taken more than three additional years.

C.  Denial of justice for undue delay does not require exhaustion

328.  Claimant invokes the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection to state that under customary international law, local remedies do not need to be exhausted when there is undue delay in obtaining justice and this delay may be attributed to the Host State341.

329.  Lion therefore submits that its denial of justice for undue delay claim is exempted from the exhaustion requirement342.

3.  Mexico’s position

330.  Mexico avers that Lion was not denied access to justice as it was given proper opportunity to be heard and to exercise its right of defense (2.1.). Additionally, there was no unreasonable delay in the Courts’ proceedings (2.2.). Even if the Tribunal finds that Lion was denied justice, its claim should fail as it did not comply with the exhaustion of local remedies requirement (2.3.). Finally, Mexico presents a list of preliminary objections to Lion’s claims (2.4.).

3.1  Respondent fully accorded claimant procedural due process

331.  Respondent argues that Lion was neither denied access to justice (A.) nor barred from defending its case and presenting documents to support it (B.).

A.  Mexico’s judiciary did not deny Claimant the opportunity to be heard

332.  According to Mexico, Claimant’s allegations that the Juez de lo Mercantil failed to properly serve it are mistaken343:

333.  First, Mexico is also a victim of the Forged Settlement Agreement344. The actuario had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement. Under Mexican law, a Judge has the obligation to verify that the document that serves as the basis for the legal action is compliant, but the Judge lacks power to question its authenticity345. According to Respondent, Claimant has provided no evidence to suggest that the Juez knew or should have known that the contact information was false346. Claimant also ignores the fact that the Juez had no prima facie reason not to rely on the documentation before him347.

334.  Second, the actuario’s duty is limited to making sure “that service takes place at the domicile provided by the claimant”348. In this case:

  • —  The actuario performed service at the address identified by the plaintiff; this service was directed at the legal representative of Lion, as confirmed by the actuario349.

  • —  On the first attempt of service, dated 3 April, 2012, the actuario left a citation with Lic. López Medina ordering the legal representative to be present at a specified date and time to facilitate service; given the legal representative’s absence, the emplazamiento could be effectuated upon any individual present at the time — in this case, it was Lic. López Medina, who was also identified in the Settlement Agreement as authorized to receive notification on behalf of Claimant350.

335.  The emplazamiento was correct: according to the Supreme Court, the emplazamiento has to be performed with the legal representative351 and, if this is not possible, the actuario simply has to ask for the legal representative before performing service upon any other person present at the moment352.

B.  Claimant was accorded the right to exercise means of defense

336.  First, if anyone is to be blamed for the Forged Settlement Agreement never being scrutinized by the judicial system in Mexico, it is Lion, whose negligence was the reason why the Courts could not admit the additional evidence353: Claimant should have included references to the alleged fraud in its original Amparo claim, rather than seeking to introduce them through the ampliación de demanda 354.

337.  Having failed to include fraud issues, the Juez de Distrito followed the law when it adjudicated a claim for improper notification (“falta de emplazamiento”) rather than a claim for forgery355. Therefore, the Juez de Distrito was bound to deliver the judgment that it did and Lion cannot claim a denial of justice due to its own negligence in pursuing its claims.

338.  In its decision to dismiss the ampliación de demanda, the Secretario del Juzgado de Distrito acted in accordance with local law, which did not require him to grant Lion an opportunity to cure its procedural defects356. It was Lion who failed to demonstrate the necessary link between its claim and the Forged Settlement Agreement357.

339.  When Claimant disagreed with the Juez de Distrito’s decision, it exercised its right to challenge it through a review proceeding, but lost358 due to one more failure to follow procedural law: the ampliación de demanda must be signed either by the aggrieved party or by its legal representative359. Lion does not appear to contest the fact that it filed its ampliación de demanda improperly360. Therefore, it was not denied the right to present evidence and defend its case.

340.  Second, the Juez de Distrito in the Remand Amparo did not dismiss all of Lion’s evidence, but rather explained that some of it was already on the Court’s record361; in any event, the Juez de Distrito was not empowered to admit new evidence in respect of the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement in the Remand Amparo and acted in complete accordance with applicable procedural rules362.

341.  In conclusion, Claimant cannot claim that the decisions to dismiss the additional evidence were the result of an idiosyncratic or arbitrary decision363. By failing to follow the applicable procedural rules, Lion and not Mexico is responsible for Lion’s inability to present evidence and defend its case before Mexico’s Courts.

3.2  Mexico’s courts decided Lion’s claims within a reasonable time

342.  Respondent claims that the duration of each of the stages of the Amparo Proceeding was reasonable364:

  • —  First, the Amparo Proceedings took one year to complete, which constitutes an appropriate time given its multiple complexities365;

  • —  Second, the proceedings before the Tribunal de Queja took 16 months to complete, which once again was a justifiable time given the extraordinary complexities involved in it366;

  • —  Third, the Juez de Distrito had only started analysing the Remand Amparo and cannot be blamed for not delivering a decision due to Claimant’s premature withdrawal from the proceedings367.

343.  Mexico avers that Claimant still had one or two years of litigation ahead had it chosen to continue, which would not constitute an unusual time given the complexity of the case368. Additionally, Lion is equally responsible for any delay as it waited for four years to initiate the Juicio Hipotecario369.

344.  There is nothing in the duration of the proceedings that amounts to a wilful disregard of due process of law, which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety. Thus, the duration of the local proceedings does not meet the threshold of a denial of justice through unreasonable delay370.

3.3  Lion failed to exhaust local remedies

345.  Mexico asserts that Lion did not comply with the requirement of the local remedies rule as it did not exhaust all available remedies (A.) and no futility exception is applicable (B.).

A.  Claimant did not exhaust all available local remedies

346.  Respondent says that Claimant is improperly using the current arbitration as an appeal of the Amparo judgment in lieu of Mexico’s domestic legal system371.

347.  According to Mexico, international law accords the judiciary a greater presumption of regularity and requires a claimant to exhaust local remedies before initiating a denial of justice claim. Otherwise, the host State’s judicial system would not have an opportunity to correct itself372.

348.  Respondent avers that Claimant did not exhaust all available local remedies: it could have and should have initiated a nulidad de juicio concluido proceeding and it has also not exhausted the criminal proceedings373.

349.  Additionally, Respondent emphasizes that a denial of justice may only occur with regard to a State’s entire judicial system and not separate judicial acts374; a claim of denial of justice can only be based on adjudicative measures that are final. Since Claimant has not exhausted all available options of seeking recourse under Mexican law, it is barred from pursuing a denial of justice claim375.

B.  The futility exceptions to the exhaustion rule does not find application in the current case

350.  According to Mexico, the futility standard is high and is not met here376. Instances of ineffectiveness and futility include situations where377:

  • —  the local Courts have no jurisdiction over the dispute;

  • —  the local Courts are notoriously lacking in independence;

  • —  the local Courts do not have the competence to grant an appropriate and adequate remedy; and

  • —  the absence of an adequate system of judicial protection.

351.  There has been no suggestion by Claimant of a lack of jurisdiction or independence or incompetence or inadequate judicial protection. In fact, Claimant was in the process of seeking remedy through the Remand Amparo when it prematurely and unnecessarily withdrew from the proceedings378.

352.  Mexico argues that Lion failed to prove that there was an unavailability of obtaining recourse pursuant to Apotex, and instead simply abandoned local proceedings based on its perceived low likelihood of being granted its desired relief379.

3.4  Lion is barred from bringing its claims

353.  Mexico additionally raises a number of preliminary objections to Lion’s claims. These include:

  • —  Lion is not protected under NAFTA Art. 1105, a rule which, according to Mexico, applies only to investments but not to investors380;

  • —  Lion failed to exercise due diligence and made irrational business decisions when it decided to grant the Loans to the Debtors, when it improvidently extended their maturities and postponed the decision to foreclose, and when it took the erroneous decision not to foreclose on the Guadalajara Mortgages381; and

  • —  Mexico’s Courts were confronted with a sophisticated fraud and acted appropriately. Additionally, Mexico’s Courts should be excused because there is no allegation that its Judges acted with an intention of malice, or that their decisions were impaired by collusion or corruption382.

4.  The Tribunal’s decision

354.  In the following section, the Tribunal will briefly analyse and dismiss Respondent’s preliminary objections (4.1.); then it will establish that Lion was indeed denied justice by Mexico’s judiciary, in breach of NAFTA Art. 1105 (4.2.), and thereafter dismiss Mexico’s counterargument that Lion failed to exhaust available and reasonable local remedies (4.3.).

4.1  Respondent’s preliminary objection

355.  The Tribunal will first address Mexico’s preliminary objections (summarized in section 3.4. supra):

NAFTA Art. 1105 protects investments and investors

356.  Mexico’s first argument is based on a literal reading of Art. 1105 of NAFTA, which provides that Mexico “shall accord to investments of investors” of the other treaty Parties treatment in accordance with international law, including FET and FPS. Respondent says that Art. 1105 only extends protection to investments, but not to investors383.

357.  Contrary to Mexico’s submission, the Tribunal finds that NAFTA Art. 1105 does indeed grant protection to Lion as an investor.

358.  The FTC Interpretation Note equates the standard of protection to be applied under Art. 1105 of the NAFTA with the standard of “customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens”. The reference to “aliens”, in a context of investment protection, can only mean investors. A multitude of NAFTA Tribunals have also construed Art. 1105 as a source of protection for investors rather than solely for their investments384.

Lack of due diligence and irrational business decisions

359.  The Tribunal is also unconvinced by Respondent’s argument that Lion failed to exercise due diligence and made irrational business decisions.

360.  When Lion took the business decision to grant various short-term loans to bridge finance the acquisition of certain real estate Claimant, it was already a seasoned investor in Mexico. To secure its rights, Claimant engaged Mexican counsel and formalized the transaction in the instruments which, under Mexican law, grant creditors the maximum level of legal certainty: pagarés and hipotecas. Mexico has failed to draw the Tribunal’s attention to any other action (bar abstaining from investing in Mexico) which Claimant could have taken to improve its contractual rights and facilitate enforcement through the Courts.

361.  The business decisions impugned by the Respondent were largely prior to the involvement of the Mexican courts. They form part of the factual and legal matrix submitted to the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts, and irrespective of the wisdom of these decisions (when viewed with hindsight) the Claimant was entitled to the protection of its rights by the Mexican courts in accordance with Mexican law.

362.  Claimant cannot be blamed for its decision to negotiate with Sr. Cárdenas before launching a Court action to enforce the Mortgages. It was within Lion’s discretion either, to try to reach an amicable solution with Sr. Cárdenas, or to seek foreclosure on the Guadalajara Properties. The relevant issue in the present case is whether Lion could effectively avail itself of the protection it was entitled to under Mexican law, if it opted to enforce the Mortgages.

363.  The case law invoked by Mexico is inapposite385.

Fraud as an excuse

364.  Finally, Respondent invites the Tribunal to take into account the contextual factors of the case which include386

  • —  the existence of an alleged multi-level sophisticated fraud, and

  • —  the absence of allegation that the Mexican judiciary acted with an intention of malice, collusion, corruption, or flagrant abuse of judicial procedure.

365.  Respondent avers that its Courts acted appropriately in the circumstances they faced387 and that they (like Claimant) also fell victim to Sr. Cárdenas’s fraudulent scheme.

366.  The Tribunal concurs with Mexico that the evidence marshalled in this case supports the conclusion that Sr. Cárdenas and the Debtors engaged in a sophisticated fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of the Mortgages in the Registro Público. But the existence of a fraud, however sophisticated, does not excuse the respondent State from its duty to have a properly functioning judicial system:

  • —  Any proper judicial system must have robust safeguards, which minimize the risk that aliens are not properly notified of procedures filed against them, and that in absentia judgements against aliens are only adopted, when the Court is satisfied that the aliens have been properly notified and are aware that they are being sued;

  • —  A properly functioning judicial system must avoid that false information maliciously provided to the Courts is used, without proper review, to the detriment of an unsuspecting third parties;

  • —  Finally, the judicial system must offer effective solutions for situations when the falsehood of the party-provided information is detected once a judgment to the detriment of the alien has been rendered; in such cases, the system must facilitate that the aggrieved third party can make allegations and present evidence to overturn the wrongful judgement.

367.  The Tribunal’s finding that Lion has indeed suffered a denial of justice is based on the premise that the Mexican judicial system, in particular, the Courts of Jalisco, have failed to function properly, to the detriment of Lion, a protected investor under NAFTA (as will be further discussed in section 4.2. infra).

368.  The Tribunal acknowledges that Lion is not alleging that Mexico’s Courts acted in bad faith to the detriment of an alien, nor that they colluded with the fraudsters nor that the judicial decisions were tainted by corruption. The Tribunal will consequently accept as proven that the Mexican judicial system acted in good faith, without colluding with Sr. Cárdenas or the Debtors, and without any impairment by corruption. That said, the Tribunal has already established that a finding of bad faith, is not required to make an adjudication for denial of justice (see section 1.3D supra).

4.2  Denial of justice

369.  The starting point of any analysis of denial of justice must be an acknowledgement that in this area the Tribunal’s powers are subject to strict limitations: the Tribunal is not a municipal Court of appeal; it should pay deference to decisions as to the merits properly adopted by municipal Courts, and should offer such Courts a wide margin of appreciation before the threshold of denial of justice is trespassed. The Tribunal also identifies with the presumption, set forth in Chevron, that municipal Courts have acted properly unless Claimant proves otherwise388.

370.  In sum, the Tribunal accepts and supports the finding that the standard for a finding of denial of justice is high, and that Claimant must prove, to the Tribunal satisfaction, that the municipal Courts incurred in an improper and egregious procedural conduct which does not meet the basic internationally accepted standards of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety389.

371.  Applying this high standard, the Tribunal is persuaded that Lion was indeed denied procedural justice in three respects:

  • —  Lion was denied access to justice: Lion was, without its fault, never given the opportunity to defend itself in the Cancellation Proceeding (A.);

  • —  Lion was also denied the right to appeal the Cancellation Judgement: the Juez de lo Mercantil, the same authority who had rendered the Cancellation Judgment, adopted a subsequent decision, at the request of the Debtor, giving res iudicata effect (causar estado) to the Cancellation Judgement and preclosing any opportunity of appeal (B.);

  • —  Lion was also denied the right to allege in the Amparo Proceeding that the Forged Settlement Agreement had indeed been forged and to present evidence to prove this claim: three years into the Amparo Proceeding the forgery claim had still not been admitted within the Amparo Proceeding (C.).

A.  Lion was denied access to justice

372.  Lion, a Canadian corporation with corporate domicile in Dallas, Texas390, was never properly notified that it was being sued in the Cancellation Proceeding, which the Debtors had filed before the Juez de lo Mercantil in Jalisco, requesting the cancellation of the Mortgages. Being unaware of these Proceedings, Lion failed to appear before the Juez and failed to submit a defense. As a result, the Juez declared Lion en rebeldía, and without any further effort to ascertain whether Lion was aware of the Proceedings, issued the Cancellation Judgement in absentia, mandating that the Mortgages be forthwith cancelled.

373.  The Cancellation Proceeding was procedurally faulty — Lion was never properly notified; and the consequences of the defective notification were devastating to its case. The conduct of the Juez de lo Mercantil by itself does not amount to a denial of justice. What is relevant, however, is that the Mexican judiciary never corrected this situation, despite multiple opportunities to do so at Lion’s request.

374.  The Tribunal will first summarize the Parties’ positions (a.), the proven facts (b.) and the applicable law (c.) and then analyse why the conduct of the Juez de lo Mercantil is the basis of the denial of justice (d.).

a.  Position of the Parties

375.  Lion claims that it was denied access to justice by Mexico’s courts — it was never notified of the Cancellation Lawsuit and thus never participated in it, and as a consequence was declared en rebeldía without fault.

376.  This was due to the actuario not performing basic diligence in the service391 and the Juez de lo Mercantil sanctioning the faulty emplazamiento despite the applicable law requiring that he examine de oficio y de manera exhaustiva whether the defendant was duly served392.

377.  Mexico responds by stating that nothing in the actuario’s service or the actions of the Juez de lo Mercantil was irregular. Both adhered to the standards prescribed by the applicable State and Federal Mexican law393.

378.  Respondent says the actuario duly confirmed that the address indicated in the basis for the service (citatorio) was the same as the one in the notice of service394. The actuario additionally relied on the representation of Mr. Lopez Medina that the address was Lion’s actual place of business and that he was authorized to receive notice on Lion’s behalf395. These two elements of the actuario’s conduct satisfy the level of scrutiny required by the applicable law396.

379.  In any event, even if the Tribunal were to find irregularities in the emplazamiento or declaración en rebeldía, these would not be sufficient for a finding of denial of justice as recourse from the decision of the Juez de lo Mercantil was available to Claimant, which it did pursue397.

b.  Facts

380.  The Tribunal will summarize the facts that underlie the denial of access to justice to Lion by Mexico’s Courts.

381.  On April 3, 2012 the actuario (a court officer of the Juez de lo Mercantil) attempted a first service of process [the “emplazamiento”] at the address identified in clause 7 of the Forged Settlement Agreement. The service attempt was made on Lic. José Isaac López Medina398, one of the two lawyers identified in the Forged Agreement399, who apparently had his office at that address. There is no evidence that Lion at any time had an office or other type of establishment at that address, or that it had ever had any business or professional relationship with Lic. López Medina.

382.  Confronted by the actuario, Lic. López Medina formally declared that no legal representative of Lion was present in his office in order to receive the emplazamiento (a statement which evidently was true, Lic. López Medina himself never having had any power of attorney to represent Lion and no other director or representative of Lion being present). Upon receipt of this representation, the actuario withdrew, announcing that he would return the next day. There is no evidence that Lic. López Medina ever informed Lion of these facts.

383.  At that second visit, which occurred next day, again no legal representative of Lion was present, since Lion was totally unaware of these occurrences in Jalisco. This being so, the actuario decided to make the emplazamiento against Lion through a notificación por cédula delivered to the person who was at the address, Lic. López Medina400.

384.  Lic. López Medina accepted the emplazamiento and received a copy of the judicial file (“autos”). In the emplazamiento the actuario informed Lion that it had a 15-day period to appear before the Juez de lo Mercantil and submit its defense, and that if it failed to do so it would be held en rebeldía401.

385.  There is no evidence that Lic. López Medina, with whom Lion had no relationship402, ever informed Lion that he had accepted the emplazamiento. Lion never received the emplazamiento403, and being unaware that a Court procedure against it was pending before the Juez de lo Mercantil of Jalisco, it inevitably failed to appear within the statutory time-limit.

386.  The consequence of this failure was that six weeks thereafter, on May 22, 2012, Lion was declared en rebeldía by the Juez de lo Mercantil through notification via boletín judicial404 (a judicial bulletin)405. Since Lion was not in the habit of reviewing the boletines judiciales in Jalisco, nor required to do so, it was completely unaware that it had been declared en rebeldía.

387.  Two weeks after the declaration en rebeldía, on June 6, 2012 the Debtors submitted their evidence before the Juez de lo Mercantil, including the Mortgage deeds and Minutes of the General Shareholders Meeting of C&C Capital. All the evidence marshalled by the Debtors was admitted six days later, on June 12, 2012406.

388.  Although some of these documents mentioned that Lion was a foreign company domiciled in the United States407, this information seems to have been overlooked or disregarded by the Juez de lo Mercantil, because he never made any attempt to notify Lion at any other address. All further communications of the Juez de lo Mercantil — including the final judgment — were simply affixed to the estrados (notice board), and Lion was presumed to have been properly notified408.

389.  Just two weeks after the submission of evidence, on June 27, 2012 the Juez de lo Mercantil, acting solely on the basis of the evidence marshalled by the Debtors, and without any participation of Lion, declared the Loans totalling USD 32.85 M settled and ordered Lion to cancel the Mortgages and return the Notes through the Cancellation Judgment 409. From the filing of the Cancellation Lawsuit to the rendering of the Cancellation Judgment, only 170 days had lapsed.

390.  Both Parties’ legal experts agreed at the Hearing that this constituted an unusually short duration410.

c.  Law

391.  The Tribunal has already made findings on the nature of denial of justice and the standard that needs to be applied to the facts to decide whether a denial of justice occurred.

392.  First, the Tribunal reiterates its view that denial of justice is always procedural411.

393.  Secondly, the Tribunal has also established that denial of access to justice is considered denial of justice in its purest form and is a universally accepted type of this international wrong412. The case law and scholarly writings acknowledge that access to justice is impaired when a party is not notified of a proceeding that involves its rights and it is prevented from being heard by the local Courts.

394.  Paparinskis recalls that413

“[…] the absence of notification about proceedings that exclude the possibility to challenge them could all result in denial of justice”.

395.  The Ambatielos decision also recognizes this basic rule of administration of justice414:

“[…] the foreigner shall enjoy full freedom to appear before the courts for the protection or defence of his rights, whether as plaintiff or defendant; to bring any action provided or authorized by law […]”.

396.  Thirdly, based on the opinions of international scholars and the decisions of investment tribunals, the Tribunal has adopted the prevailing test: a positive finding of denial of justice requires an improper and egregious procedural conduct by the local courts (whether intentional or not), which does not meet the basic international accepted standards of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety.

d.  Discussion

397.  In a judicial proceeding, a basic principle of natural justice requires that the defendant, who is being sued, is properly notified of the terms of the claims, and is afforded the opportunity to appear before the Court, to rebut these claims, to make allegations and to present evidence.

398.  Lion never knew that the Debtors had filed the Cancellation Proceeding against it before the Juez de lo Mercantil in Jalisco, and was denied the opportunity to make allegations or present evidence in that Procedure. It was not the Court, but rather third parties, which informed Lion about the existence of the Cancellation Proceeding, after the Cancellation Judgement had been rendered and had become res iudicata.

A deeply flawed emplazamiento

399.  The emplazamiento performed on behalf of the Juez de lo Mercantil was deeply flawed.

400.  The actuario served Lion por cédula, i.e., via a notification which is not given directly to the respondent, but which can simply be handed to a defendant’s relatives, employees or domestic helper415.

401.  Lion’s expert opines that such service requires a higher degree of certainty than ordinary service, with the actuario having to ascertain that the person served is actually at the defendant’s domicile, and that such person maintains one of the legally established categories of relationship with the defendant416.

402.  Mexico’s expert admits that according to the applicable law, confirmation of service by the actuario should explain the reason that led the Juez to be certain that the defendant factually resides in the place service is to be made417.

403.  The rules to be applied to the emplazamiento of Lion were enshrined in Arts. 112418 and 112 bis419 of the CPC Jalisco420.

404.  The general rule is contained in Art. 112 CPC: The emplazamiento must be done personally on the respondent (“se realiza personalmente con el demandado”); if the respondent is not present when the actuario arrives, a new visit is scheduled for the next day, and if the respondent is still absent, a notificación por cédula is admissible.

405.  Art. 112 bis CPC the regulates the requirements for a valid notificación por cédula. The cédula can be delivered to a relative, an employee or to any person found at the domicile, subject to a specific requirement: the actuario must verify that the defendant has at such domicile its principal place of business (“después de que el notificador se hubiere cerciorado […] de que es el principal asiento de sus negocios”).

406.  The emplazamiento performed on Lic. López Medina by the actuario does not satisfy this legal standard: it is clear from the minutes of service filed by the actuario that he failed to obtain any evidence that could corroborate that the domicile set-forth in the Forged Settlement Agreement (that is, that “número 95, despacho 7, de la calle Tomás V. Gómez, Colonia Ladrón de Guevara (Guadalajara, Jalisco”) was indeed “el principal asiento de los negocios” of Lion LLC, a Canadian incorporated company). It is specially telling that the actuario failed to challenge Lic. López Medina’s authority, and never requested that the lawyer present any evidence linking himself to Lion.

407.  Mexico’s experts argue that the actuario was not obliged to verify the authenticity of the documents serving as the basis for service, and that he did not have the power to do so421. However, another of Mexico’s experts accepted at the Hearing that the actuario has authority to verify the address for the emplazamiento422. Thus, it is clear that the mechanical checking of whether the address matches that in the citatorio is not sufficient to meet the standard required of the actuario under the CPC Jalisco.

408.  Moreover, the citatorio, which served as the basis for the address for notification, contains a discrepancy in the office number, when compared with the address provided in the Forged Settlement Agreement:

  • —  The Forged Settlement Agreement stated that the address was “número 95, despacho 7, de la calle Tomás V. Gómez, Colonia Ladrón de Guevara (Guadalajara, Jalisco)”423.

  • —  The citatorio indicated office (“despacho)” 5, rather than the despacho 7424.

A deeply flawed declaración en rebeldía

409.  But not only the actuario failed to fulfil its task to ascertain that the emplazamiento was proper, so did also the Juez de lo Mercantil, who was required to scrutinize whether the emplazamiento had been completed without irregularities, before declaring Lion en rebeldía.

410.  Under Mexican law, the effects of being en rebeldía are draconian: the procedure continues, without the participation of the person declared in default; furthermore the defendant is declared confeso; i.e. he/she is legally presumed to have accepted the facts as averred in the counterparty’s claim425. Based on such presumption, the Juez de lo Mercantil eventually would accept, without further inquiries, the truthfulness of the Forged Settlement Agreement and order its specific performance, including the cancellation of the Mortgages.

411.  This is the reason why Art. 279 CPC requires the Juez de lo Mercantil to examine the legality of the service of process before issuing the declaración en rebeldía:

“Trascurrido el término del emplazamiento sin haber sido contestada la demanda, se hará la declaración de rebeldía y se observarán las prescripciones del capítulo I del Título Décimo Segundo de este Código. Para hacer la declaración de rebeldía, el juez examinará de oficio y de manera exhaustiva si las citaciones, notificaciones y emplazamientos fueron hechas al demandado en la forma establecida por este código caso contrario, deberá reponer el procedimiento sin esperar al dictado de la sentencia.” [Emphasis added]

412.  The rule could not be clearer: before declaring respondent en rebeldía, the Judge must examine ex officio and exhaustively (“de manera exhaustiva”) whether the emplazamiento has been properly performed.

413.  There is no indication in the case file426, of the Juez de lo Mercantil having performed any scrutiny with regard to the emplazamiento, let alone “examining [it] in an exhaustive manner”. The Juez mechanically corroborated and accepted that the service had been properly completed by his actuario, and did not take any additional measure to verify that the respondent had been properly notified and was actually aware that it was being sued in Jalisco.

414.  The omission is especially shocking, because the Cancellation Proceeding was not a minor case, but rather a complex procedure, which pitched a group of well-known local companies against a US-based corporation, which affected well-known and highly valuable pieces of real estate located within the State of Jalisco and which could result (and indeed resulted) in the cancellation of multi-million USD Mortgages granted in favour of the US creditor. Under these circumstances the Judge should have double-checked “de manera exhaustiva” that the respondent had been properly notified.

415.  With a minimum of diligence, the Juez de lo Mercantil could and should have realized that Lion was a foreign company that needed to be served internationally. The information available to the Juez de lo Mercantil included:

  • —  Lion’s denomination, “LP”, which does not correspond to any incorporation under Mexican law427;

  • —  A certified copy of the Nayarit Mortgage, where the actual domicile of Lion was specified to be in the US428;

  • —  Certified copies of the Guadalajara Mortgages, which state that Lion was a company constituted in conformity with the laws of Quebec, Canada429;

  • —  The mortgages included as attachments to the Loans, which explicitly state that Lion’s domicile is in the US430.

  • —  The Minutes of the Shareholders’ Meeting of C&C Capital and Inmobiliaria Bains, which also stated that Lion was a legal entity constituted pursuant to the laws of Quebec, Canada431

416.  The omission to verify whether the respondent had been properly notified was exacerbated when subsequent procedural steps and decisions were simply notified by means of a noticeboard in the courthouse. No additional effort was ever made, to ascertain whether Lion was aware of the developments within the Cancellation Proceeding432. Lion was kept completely in the dark.

417.  The lack of any diligence reached its zenith, when the Juez de lo Mercantil issued a default judgment, fully accepting the Debtors’ claims. No attempt was made to ascertain that Claimant was duly informed of the decision, and of its right to lodge an appeal.

Case law

418.  The Tribunal observes the similarity of the current facts with those in Cotesworth & Powell, where the tribunal decided that claimants had been denied justice because of the failure of the judge to summon the absent creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding and later also failing to notify them of the sentence of classification433. The net result was the same: the creditors were unable to participate in a proceeding in the same way that Lion was not given the opportunity to appear before the Juez de lo Mercantil.

419.  Similarities may also be drawn between the situation in Idler, where the US-Mexico Claims Commission found a denial of the US plaintiff’s access to justice, when he was notified of the upcoming hearing in Venezuela with insufficient time left for him to make the necessary travel to appear in court434. Lion was likewise given a formalistic notice to appear — on the estrados notice board in the State of Jalisco — which in fact amounted to a lack of effective notification. The end result is the same: an impediment to the aggrieved alien to appear before the local Court and defend its rights.

420.  Finally, Lion’s exclusion from the proceedings was exacerbated by the unusual swiftness of the Cancellation Proceeding. Both Parties’ legal experts agreed at the Hearing that the 170 days that it took from the filing of the Cancellation Lawsuit to the rendering of the Cancellation Judgment constituted an unusually short duration435.

421.  Applying the established legal standard, the Tribunal finds that depriving Lion of its right to appear before the Juez de lo Mercantil through a severely irregular emplazamiento and declaración en rebeldía amounts to an improper and egregious procedural conduct by the local courts, which does not meet the basic international accepted standards of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety.

422.  As will be analysed in the following sections, the Mexican judiciary never corrected this wrong, despite Lion’s numerous requests to the judiciary to do so.

B.  Lion was also denied the right to appeal the Cancellation Judgement

423.  Once the Cancellation Judgement had been rendered, the Debtor approached the Juez de lo Mercantil (the same who had rendered the Cancellation Judgment), and alleging spurious arguments requested that the Juez give res iudicata effect (causar estado) to the Cancellation Judgement. The Juez did so, and barred any possibility of Lion, once it became aware of the Cancellation Judgement, to lodge an appeal.

424.  The decision of the Juez de lo Mercantil, granting res iudicata status to the Cancellation Judgement, also constitutes a denial of justice.

425.  The Tribunal will again apply a fourfold discussion comprising the Party positions (a.), the proven facts (b.) and the applicable law (c.) and an analysis of why the causar estado ruling by the Juez de lo Mercantil is another component of Mexico’s Courts’ actions amounting to denial of justice (d.).

a.  Position of the Parties

426.  Claimant says that, as with the Cancellation Proceeding, it was not properly served with the Cancellation Judgment436. On August 8, 2012 the Juez de lo Mercantil declared that Claimant had no right to appeal the Cancellation Judgment437 and, upon the Debtors request, issued an order to the Public Registries of Nayarit and Jalisco to cancel the Mortgages438.

427.  Respondent does not offer any argumentation purporting to justify the Juez’s decision.

b.  Facts

428.  On June 27, 2012 the Juez de lo Mercantil, acting solely on the basis of the evidence marshalled by the Debtors, and without any participation of Lion, issued the Cancellation Judgement, declaring the Loans settled and ordering Lion to cancel the Mortgages and return the Notes439.

429.  A few weeks thereafter, on August 8, 2012, and at the request of the Debtors, the Juez de lo Mercantil declared that the Cancellation Judgement “causa estado por ministerio de la ley”, i.e. that it has become res iudicata, there being no possibility of submitting a recurso de apelación. The reason given by the Judge for his decision precluding any further appeal was that the amount claimed in the procedure was less than MEX 500,000 (approximately USD 25,000)440.

430.  On August 30, 2012 the Juez de lo Mercantil ordered specific performance of the Cancellation Judgement, and instructed the Registro Público of Jalisco to cancel the Guadalajara Mortgages441 and that of Nayarit to do the same with the Nayarit Mortgage442. The Registro Público of Jalisco did so on September 7, 2012443. The cancellation of the Nayarit Mortgage was recorded on October 19, 2012444. Upon these registrations, all three Mortgages became extinct for all legal purposes.

c.  The law

431.  The Tribunal reiterates that denial of justice is always procedural and the test for denial of justice established by the Tribunal under Section VI.1.1.3D above, which remains applicable for the second analysis of facts: improper and egregious procedural conduct by the local courts (whether intentional or not), which does not meet the basic international accepted standards of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety.

432.  Since the second denial of justice pondered by the Tribunal concerns the arbitrary closing of an avenue of appeal that was otherwise guaranteed to it by the law, the conduct of the Juez de lo Mercantil falls under the same type of wrong as the deeply flawed emplazamiento: denying Lion access to justice.

433.  The Hague Texts similarly remind that an international wrong occurs when445:

“the foreigner has been hindered by the judicial authorities in the exercise of his right to pursue judicial remedies”.

434.  In the same vein, the tribunal in Krederi observed that one of the serious defects in the adjudicative process may take the form of a violation of

“[…] the right to be heard and to present evidence446

435.  In analysing whether Lion was denied access to justice through the causar estado ruling by the Juez de lo Mercantil, the same scholarly writing and case law find application as those cited under Section VI.1.1.2A, supra.

d.  Discussion

436.  The decision of the Juez de lo Mercantil to grant estado to the Cancellation Judgment was deeply flawed.

437.  Under Mexican law, commercial cases of the first instance are subject to appeal. The Commercial Code of Mexico states the following:

Artículo 1336.— 

Se llama apelación el recurso que se interpone para que el tribunal superior confirme, reforme o revoque las resoluciones del inferior que puedan ser impugnadas por la apelación, en los términos que se precisan en los artículos siguientes.

Artículo 1337.— 

Pueden apelar de una sentencia:

  1. I.  El litigante condenado en el fallo, si creyere haber recibido algún agravio […]”

438.  The Commercial Code of Mexico foresees an exception to the general rule, when the value of the dispute is below the threshold of MEX 500,000, adjusted yearly for inflation447:

Artículo 1340. 

La apelación no procede en juicios mercantiles cuando por su monto se ventilen en los juzgados de paz o de cuantía menor, o cuando el monto sea inferior a [MEX 500,000448] por concepto de suerte principal, debiendo actualizarse dicha cantidad en los términos previstos en el artículo 1339.”

439.  The Juez de lo Mercantil offers no reasoning as to how he reached the conclusion that the value of the Cancellation Proceeding equalled less than MEX 500,000.

440.  Instead, he automatically accepted the Debtors’ request, despite two types of evidence before him demonstrating the obviously superior value of the dispute: the Promissory Notes and the Mortgage deeds. The decision is difficult to understand, because the principal amount of the Loans settled and Mortgages terminated amounted to tens of millions of USD.

441.  The First Promissory Note was issued to Lion for USD 15 M449, the Second Note for USD 12.45 M450, and the Third Note for USD 5,355,479451.

442.  The deed for the Nayarit Mortgage, which covered all three Loans, contains explicit reference to all three of the aforementioned amounts452:

443.  The Guadalajara 1 Mortgage, apart from referring to the value of the Second Loan, directly instructed the Juez of the equivalent in pesos, i.e. MEX 131,197,200453.

444.  Finally, the Guadalajara 2 Mortgage deed also contains a reference to the value of the Third Loan at USD 5,355,479.

445.  Even disregarding the value of the Notes (which do not constitute a protected investment), the Judge had before him the Mortgage deeds, which also contain references to the value of the Loans, each of which was made for millions of dollars. The Guadalajara Mortgage 1 deed even contains an equivalent in Mexican pesos, which amounts to MEX 131,197,200 — circa two hundred and fifty times as much as the threshold for the possibility to bring appeal.

446.  The Juez de lo Mercantil was well aware of this information. In its own Cancelation Judgment, the Juez de lo Mercantil acknowledged that the Mortgages had been established to secure the Loans for a total value of USD 32.8 M454.

447.  The Juez de lo Mercantil thus blatantly failed to follow the procedure set out in the Commercial Code of Mexico when it granted res iudicata effect to the Cancellation Judgment. The decision was highly relevant, because Lion was denied the possibility to appeal the Cancellation Judgment, once again being subjected to the closing of a legal avenue before even realizing the existence of the Cancellation Proceeding. The only remaining alternative within the civil Court system was to launch an Amparo.

448.  Applying the relevant test, the Tribunal finds that the decision granting estado effect to the Cancellation Judgment, patently disregarding the amount in dispute in the Cancellation Proceeding, and closing one of Lion’s avenues of accessing justice before local Courts through an otherwise available appeal mechanism, amounts to improper and egregious procedural misconduct by the local courts, which does not meet the basic internationally accepted standards of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety.

C.  Lion was denied the right to allege and prove the forgery of the Forged Settlement Agreement

449.  Lion was also denied justice through the local Courts’ consistent denial for Lion to present material and relevant evidence to effectively defend its case.

450.  The Tribunal will re-apply the previous structure for its reasoning, beginning with the Party positions (a.), moving on to the proven facts (b.) and the applicable law (c.) to finish with an analysis of why Mexico’s Courts deprived Lion of its right to present evidence and defend its case, thus constituting a denial of justice (d.).

a.  Position of the Parties

451.  Lion avers that despite its multiple attempts to do so, Mexican courts barred it from presenting material and relevant evidence to defend its case in the local proceedings455.

452.  Lion argues that Mexico’s Courts have denied it the opportunity to prove the forgery. In Claimant’s view, lack of service is a breach of such a magnitude under Mexican law that the Juez de Distrito should have allowed all evidence and arguments that are necessary to prove the circumstances of the allegedly illegal service456 under the suplencia de la deficiencia de la queja (supplement of the deficiency of the complaint)457, yet the Juez de Distrito dismissed any evidence pointing to the falsehood of the emplazamiento without granting Lion a chance to cure any formal deficiencies458.

453.  Additionally, none of Mexico’s Courts seized of Lion’s proceedings ruled on the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement. The Juez de Distrito refused to decide on the issue459; the Tribunal de Queja also460, ruling that the question should be resolved after the False Amparo issue was decided in the Remand Amparo; and the Juez de Distrito461, understanding that the Tribunal de Queja had excluded from the admissible evidence the evidence concerning the falsehood of the Forged Settlement Agreement462. Ultimately, Lion’s Amparo claim was thus frustrated.

454.  Mexico responds by arguing that Lion was not denied the right to present evidence and that all prejudice it allegedly suffered is attributable to its own negligent actions.

455.  If anyone is to be blamed for the Forged Settlement Agreement never being scrutinized by the judicial system in Mexico, it is Lion, whose negligence was the reason why the Courts could not admit the additional evidence463: Claimant should have included references to the alleged fraud in its original Amparo claim, rather than seeking to introduce them through the ampliación de demanda 464.

456.  As Lion failed to include allegations of fraud, the Juez de Distrito followed the law when it adjudicated a claim for improper notification (“falta de emplazamiento”) rather than a claim for forgery465. Therefore, the Juez de Distrito was bound to deliver the judgment that it did and Lion cannot claim a denial of justice due to its own negligence in pursuing its claims.

457.  In its decision to dismiss the ampliación de demanda, the Secretario del Juzgado de Distrito acted in accordance with local law, which did not require him to grant Lion an opportunity to cure its procedural defects466. It was Lion who failed to demonstrate the necessary link between its claim and the Forged Settlement Agreement467.

458.  When Claimant disagreed with the Juez de Distrito’s decision, it exercised its right to challenge it through a review proceeding, but lost468 due to one more failure to follow procedural law: an ampliación de demanda must be signed either by the aggrieved party or by its legal representative469. Lion does not appear to contest the fact that it filed its ampliación de demanda improperly470. Therefore, it was not denied the right to present evidence.

459.  Additionally, the Juez de Distrito in the Remand Amparo did not dismiss all of Lion’s evidence, but rather explained that some of it was already on the Court’s record471; in any event, the Juez de Distrito was not empowered to admit new evidence in respect of the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement in the Remand Amparo and acted in complete accordance with applicable procedural rules472.

460.  According to Mexico, Lion cannot claim that the decisions to dismiss the additional evidence were the result of an idiosyncratic or arbitrary decision473. By failing to follow the applicable procedural rules, Lion is responsible for barring itself from presenting evidence to defend its case. Therefore, the claim that the Mexican judiciary failed to grant Claimant the right to defend itself and to present evidence should be rejected.

b.  Facts

461.  In the course of the local proceedings, Lion tried on multiple occasions to bring relevant evidence that could easily prove the illegality of service and justify the annulment of the Cancellation Judgment. However, the municipal Courts repeatedly denied Lion the possibility to do so.

Failed ampliación de demanda

462.  In the Cancellation Judgment of June 27, 2012, the Juez de lo Mercantil, without Lion’s participation, declared the Loans settled and ordered Lion to cancel the Mortgages and return the Notes474. In mid-December 2012, Lion learned about the existence, but not the details, of the Cancellation Judgment475.

463.  Within the 15-day deadline to file an Amparo, the only available effective remedy, Lion filed its Amparo Lawsuit on December 19, 2012476, to challenge the cancellation of the Mortgages. Lion did not include any reference to the Forged Settlement Agreement, because it did not know of its existence: the Forged Agreement was only made known to Lion when the Juez de lo Mercantil filed an informe (report) in January 2013477.

464.  Thus, Lion’s initial Amparo claim was for improper emplazamiento, a broad category encompassing different causes, rather than the precise allegation of forgery.

465.  Having obtained access to the Forged Settlement Agreement and the file of the Cancellation Proceeding, on January 28, 2013478, Lion filed an ampliación de la demanda, alleging the illegality of the service performed by the actuario on the basis of the newly acquired information on the Forged Settlement Agreement479:

La falta de emplazamiento legal a la hoy quejosa [i.e. Lion] […] debido a que el supuesto emplazamiento […] se hizo en un domicilio que no es de la hoy quejosa […]. Amén de que el supuesto domicilio donde de practicó dicho emplazamiento, fue señalado en un documento que no fue suscrito por mi mandante ni por persona alguna con facultades, ya que la firma que se advierte en el mismo es completamente falsa por no proceder del puño y letra a quien se atribuye.” [Emphasis added]

466.  Lion’s forgery claim was accompanied by, inter alia480:

  • —  a graphological expert report to prove that the signature in the Forged Agreement did not belong to Mr. Hendricks, and

  • —  emails between a broker retained by Lion and Sr. Cárdenas to demonstrate that, after the Forged Agreement was supposedly signed in November 2011, Lion and Sr. Cárdenas were still holding discussions on the terms of the repayment of the Loans.

467.  This procedural step of extending the initial claim to include the (highly relevant) inauthenticity of the Forged Agreement, would become a stumbling block hindering the progression of the Amparo Proceeding and leading to its eventual demise.

468.  The first step occurred on January 30, 2013: in a proveído the Secretario del Juzgado de Distrito in Jalisco dismissed the ampliación of the Amparo submitted by Lion, arguing that

dichos actos ya fueron precisados desde el escrito inicial de demanda”481

  • —  a plainly wrong statement. The Secretario further admitted some (rather irrelevant) evidence attached to Lion’s forgery claim, but postponed the decision on the admissibility of the expert and witness evidence482.

469.  Frustrated by this postponement, Lion brought, on February 6, 2013, an “incidente de falsedad de documento” before the Juez de Distrito, claiming again that the Forged Agreement was the result of fraud483.

470.  On April 10, 2013, the Juez de Distrito stated that he would decide in due course on the admissibility of the proposed graphological expertise on the authenticity of the Forged Settlement Agreement484. And on April 19, 2013 the Juez de Distrito once again decided to postpone his decision on the admissibility of the evidence, because of a queja proceeding which was subsequently initiated and which will be dealt with in the next section485.

Dismissal by the Tribunal de Queja

471.  While the decision on the admission of evidence was pending before the Juez de Distrito, one of the Debtors, C&C Ingeniería, filed as a tercero perjudicado two quejas486 before the Tribunal de Queja against the Dismissal Proveído issued by the Secretary of the Court487 and the April 10, 2013 decision of the Juez de Distrito. C&C Ingeniería argued that Lion’s ampliación de demanda was inadmissible, because it had not been properly signed on Lion’s behalf.

472.  Lion for its part also submitted a queja against the same decision, because it precluded Lion from claiming that the Forged Settlement Agreement was a forgery and the origin of the improper service488.

473.  The Tribunal de Queja dismissed Lion’s queja and decided in favour of C&C Ingeniería: the appeal court ruled that the ampliación de la demanda, which Lion had filed, was inadmissible, because it had not been properly signed on behalf of Lion: it should have been signed by Lion’s legal representative and not by the attorney empowered by Lion to act on its behalf in the Amparo proceedings489.

474.  Lion was not given an opportunity to cure the alleged procedural defect, although the ampliación de demanda aimed at proving that Lion, an alien company operating in Mexico, had been the victim of an elaborate fraud to avoid its proper emplazamiento. This stands in stark contrast with the treatment granted to the complainants when the False Amparo was submitted without the requisite copies. In that instance, the Juez accorded the complainants the chance to cure the formalistic deficiency.

Failure of incidente de falsedad de documento

475.  Once the queja had been resolved, the Juez de Distrito resumed his work, and in accordance with the decision of the Tribunal de Queja resolved that all evidence linked to the forgery claim should be dismissed (both the evidence already admitted and the evidence still pending admission)490.

476.  Thereafter the Juez de Distrito rendered a specific ruling on Lion’s separate motion (“incidente de falsedad de documento”). The judge dismissed it on the grounds that the allegedly false document (the Forged Settlement Agreement) was not related to the subject-matter of the Amparo Proceeding491.

477.  In so deciding, the Juez de Distrito ignored the principle fraus omnia corrumpit: an emplazamiento obtained by fraud, involving the forgery of the document which purports to provide the address for service of process and the name of the process agent, is evidently unlawful, and can never constitute a proper emplazamiento.

478.  Be that as it may, from that date on, the scope of the Amparo did not include any inquiry into the issue whether the Settlement Agreement had been forged; it was assumed that the Settlement Agreement was valid and binding, having been properly executed by Lion. The scope of the Amparo was reduced to the question whether the emplazamiento had or not been properly executed in accordance with Mexican law. And — congruently with this reduced scope of investigation — all evidence in the file seeking to prove the forgery of the Settlement Agreement was expurgated.

Failure to address forgery in Amparo‎ Judgment

479.  On December 4, 2013, the Juez de Distrito delivered the Amparo Judgment denying Lion protection against the Cancellation Judgment492.

“[…] R E S U E L V E: ÚNICO. LA JUSTICIA DE LA UNIÓN NO AMPARA NI PROTEGE A LION MEXICO CONSOLIDATED, L.P., contra los actos que reclama del JUEZ Y DEL SECRETARIO EJECUTOR, AMBOS ADSCRITOS AL JUZGADO NOVENO DE LO MERCANTIL DEL PRIMER PARTIDO JUDICIAL DEL ESTADO DE JALISCO. […]” [Capitals in the original]

480.  The Amparo Judgement is a 67-page document, which in its “Resultando” summarizes the procedure, and which then reasons the decision in seven “Considerandos”.

481.  As a preliminary question, the Juez de Distrito analyzes Lion’s allegation that on July 6, 2013 Sr. Arechederra’s signature had been forged in the false request for copy before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil — see section 5.1 supra. (The issue was relevant, because if it had been true that on July 6, 2013 Lion had been aware of the Cancellation Judgement, the Amparo would have been inadmissible due to the statute of limitations).

482.  The Amparo Judgement, after weighing the expert and other evidence marshalled by the parties, concludes that Sr. Arechederra’s signature indeed had been forged, that the request for copy had indeed been false, and that consequently Lion’s request for Amparo was not time barred493.

483.  The Amparo Judgement also acknowledges that Sr. Arechederra and Lion had filed a criminal action against Sr. Cárdenas, accusing him of having forged his signature on various documents, and that on 26 September 2013 the criminal judge had ordered the imprisonment of Sr. Cárdenas for this crime. But the Amparo Judge accorded little weight to this piece of evidence494:

[El auto de formal prisión] únicamente constituye un indicio que unido a otras pruebas, puede coadyuvar a la formación de prueba plena con las que se acrediten, en un momento dado, hechos diversos a los aquí demostrados

484.  Notwithstanding the finding that at least on one occasion Sr. Arechederra’s signature had been forged, and that Sr. Cárdenas was in prison for alleged forgeries of documents, the Amparo judgement does not even discuss Lion’s argument that the Settlement Agreement was also forged: since the ampliación de demanda had been dismissed (because it had been signed by Lion’s attorney, but not by a legal representative), any issue relating to the falsehood of the Settlement Agreement was off limits in the Amparo procedure.

485.  The Amparo Judgement consequently assumes that the Settlement Agreement was validly executed on Lion’s behalf. There being a valid Settlement Agreement with a designation of process agent and an address for service of process, the Juez de Distrito dismisses Lion’s argument that the emplazamiento should have been made in Dallas, Texas, USA, and in accordance with the applicable international treaties495.

486.  Instead, the Juez de Distrito discusses at length a minor incident in the way the fraudulent emplazamiento had taken place: in accordance with the Settlement Agreement the notification should have been made at Calle Tomás V. Gómez 95, despacho 7. But in reality, the actuario went to the same address, but to a different office: despacho 5.

487.  The Juez de Distrito finds that this “minor defect” does not invalidate the emplazamiento, because the actuario was able to locate Lic. López Medina, who, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, was the person designated by Lion as process agent496. The Judge’s very words are the following497:

De ahí que, aun y cuando aparece que el emplazamiento a juicio de la ahora quejosa [Lion], se practicó en un domicilio diverso al pactado […], ello de ninguna manera acarrea la consecuencia que [Lion] no estuviera enterada [del juicio], en razón que la diligencia de llamamiento a juicio se entendió personalmente con uno de sus autorizados para recibir cualquier tipo de comunicación […]”. [Emphasis added]

488.  The argument is straightforward: since the Settlement Agreement must be deemed valid and binding and Lic. López Medina is Lion’s process agent, the emplazamiento made to Lic. López Medina, even if at the wrong address, is also valid and binding.

Failure to address forgery in recurso de revisión

489.  Lion was not satisfied with the Amparo Judgement. On December 19, 2013 Lion filed the recurso de revisión, seeking its revocation, the granting of protection to Lion’s constitutional rights and the finding that the Cancellation Lawsuit and related acts were null and void498.

490.  Among other reasons, Lion explicitly challenged the Amparo Judgment, arguing that the Juez de Distrito had disregarded Lion’s claim that the Settlement Agreement had been forged, with the erroneous argument that the falsehood was unrelated to the dispute and that the defendants in the Amparo had not participated in the alleged forgery. Lion explained that the falsehood of the Settlement Agreement was indeed relevant for the Amparo, because Lion’s emplazamiento had been delivered to Lic. López Medina, Lion’s purported process agent designated in the Settlement Agreement. If the Settlement Agreement was a forgery, the designation of Lic. López Medina was false, and the emplazamiento had not been properly made499.

Summary of Lion’s efforts to introduce evidence

491.  As outlined above, Lion attempted on multiple occasions to present evidence regarding the fraudulent character of the Forged Settlement Agreement and was denied at every attempt.

492.  Lion filed a total of four petitions to submit evidence on the forgery and was denied the opportunity every single time. It did so in all possible instances:

  • —  On January 28, 2013 Lion filed its ampliación de la demanda, explaining that the service made by the Juez de lo Mercantil was based on a forged document and should thus be deemed inexistent500;

  • —  On February 6, 2013, Lion brought an “incidente de falsedad de documento” before the Juez de Distrito, claiming again that the Forged Agreement was the result of fraud501;

  • —  Separately, on February 8, 2013, Lion also submitted a queja against Dismissal Proveído as precluding it from claiming that the Forged Settlement Agreement was a forgery502, and

  • —  On December 19, 2013 as part of its recurso de revisión, Lion once again tried to claim the forgery of the Términos document503. However, it was barred from doing so by the express order of the Tribunal de Queja which forbade the Juez de Distrito to look into the issue in the Remand Proceeding.

c.  The law

493.  The Tribunal has already established that the third type of denial of justice occurs when municipal Courts prevent an alien from producing evidence to support its case504.

494.  In Cotesworth & Powell the tribunal confirmed that

“[…] refusing to hear the party interested, or to allow him [an] opportunity to produce proofs, amounts to the same thing as an absolute denial of justice”. [Emphasis added]

495.  The right to present relevant and material evidence in the context of denial of justice has also been recognized by academia505:

“[When discussing procedural guarantees whose violation amounts to denial of justice] One strand of procedural improprieties related to equality of arms, in particular regarding the right of aliens to be notified about procedural developments, the right to be heard, the right to counsel, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right to produce evidence, and the right to public proceedings in criminal cases. […]

[Equality of arms] may also apply regarding matters such as attendance of hearings, neutrality of the expert, the right to call witnesses, submit evidence, have the evidence considered by the court, comment on observations, and be informed about the reasons of challenged decisions.”

d.  Discussion

496.  The Juez de Distrito saw fit to decide on the correctness of the emplazamiento without first addressing whether the Settlement Agreement was in fact a forgery, which led to rulings that are, in the Tribunal’s view, contradictory506. On July 5, 2013 the Juez de Distrito decided that the issue of the forgery of the Forged Settlement Agreement was not related to the subject-matter of the Amparo Proceeding507 and on December 4, 2013 the same Juez de Distrito decided, based on the Forged Settlement Agreement, that the emplazamiento was performed correctly. The Tribunal finds it logically apparent that the correctness of the emplazamiento hinges upon the truthfulness of the Settlement Agreement.

497.  In Cotesworth & Powell the international tribunal found multiple denials of justice to claimants, including an instance of contradictory rulings by the same tribunal:

“That between the sentence of the superior tribunal of March 8, 1861, and that of April 2, 1862, by the same tribunal, there is a direct and irreconcilable contradiction. One recognized the authority of the claimant’s attorney to bring action; the other expressly denied it508”.

498.  The Tribunal also finds it surprising that the Juez de Distrito, while explicitly acknowledging that on September 26, 2013 a criminal judge had ordered the imprisonment of Sr. Cárdenas precisely for the alleged forgery, did not find sufficient reason to scrutinize the veracity of the Forged Settlement Agreement509.

499.  The reasoning behind the refusals to examine the Forged Settlement Agreement was always purely procedural and concerned minor mistakes by Lion which were curable — but Lion was never given the opportunity to correct them. The continuing rejections of Lion’s motions to present evidence on the false character of the Forged Settlement Agreement were based on dubious formalistic nuances of local procedural law.

500.  Lion was blamed for not having alleged forgery in its initial Amparo claim, since Mexico avers that Lion was aware, as of December 17, 2012, that “[a] lawsuit was simulated, signatures were forged, et cetera510”. But it has been proven that Lion did not have access to the relevant files, which included a copy of the Forged Settlement Agreement, until mid-January 2013511 and was pressured by the 15-day time limit to bring an Amparo from the date of taking notice of the Cancellation Judgment, which occurred on December 17, 2012512. At the moment of filing of the Amparo, Lion simply knew that a Cancellation Judgment had been rendered in a proceeding of which it was not aware. The Tribunal finds no error on Claimant’s side.

501.  The Tribunal is further persuaded by Lion’s supported arguments that any formalistic errors in the filing of submissions were curable and that the Juez de Distrito should have provided Lion the opportunity to amend them513. The failure to grant Lion a period to cure the formal deficiency stands in stark contrast not only to basic principles of due process under Mexican law514, but also the actions of the Juez del Primer Distrito, who in the case of the False Amparo allowed a three-day period for the plaintiff to provide the requires six additional copies of the False Amparo515.

502.  Lion further avers that lack of service amounts to a fundamental breach under Mexican law and that the Mexican Supreme Court has established that, in such cases, the amparo court should offer protection to the aggrieved party, even if its arguments were insufficient or incomplete, through the institution of the so-called suplencia de la deficiencia de la queja (supplement of the deficiency of the complaint)516. According to Lion’s expert, the suplencia de la deficiencia de la queja gives the Juez de amparo the power to ex officio complement the amparo claim with any evidence that may be relevant to the case in furtherance of an aggrieved party’s fundamental rights517. Thus, the Juez de Distrito could have not only admitted the evidence proposed by Lion but also requested any other relevant evidence, given the gravity of the claim of lack of service. Respondent does not directly oppose Claimant’s analysis of the suplencia de la deficiencia de la queja.

Case law

503.  The Tribunal observes the similarity of the facts with those in Idler, where the respondent State invoked a seemingly valid legal basis (an ancient remedy inherited from a codification by Spanish Kings) to circumvent granting the claimant the execution of a judgment he should have been accorded under the law. Mexico was using a similar formalistic excuse — procedural requirements that were very minor in their nature and which did not apply in other circumstances — to bar Lion from exercising its right to defense before a court.

504.  The Tribunal also takes note of the similarities of the situation affecting Lion with that of the French individual in the Fabiani arbitration, where a denial of justice was found because Mr. Fabiani was unable to obtain a decision granting exequatur by Venezuelan courts to a judgment in his favour against local defendants518. Similarly, Lion was unable to obtain a decision on the false character of the Forged Settlement Agreement from the local Courts, despite multiple diligent attempts to obtain such a ruling.

505.  Having been refused the opportunity to produce evidence of the forgery, Lion had no means to prove that the emplazamiento was wrong. Lion was disarmed and unable to properly exercise its right to defense. Like in Ballistini, where the French-Venezuelan Commission made a finding of denial of justice

“[b]ecause the local authorities deprived Ballistini of the legal means of instituting before the competent tribunals the actions which the laws would authorize him” 519,

Lion was deprived by the local authorities of the legal means in the form of presenting relevant and material evidence, to defend its case.

D.  Conclusion

506.  In conclusion, coming back to Paulsson’s definition that “[d]enial of justice arises when proceedings are so faulty as to exclude all reasonable expectation of a fair decision […]”, the Tribunal finds that Lion, after three years of fighting within the municipal judicial system, could not expect a fair decision within a reasonable timeframe.

507.  Similarly, using the Mondev test proposed by Respondent, the Tribunal is convinced that Claimant suffered “a wilful disregard of due process of law, … which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”: first, when Lion was not properly notified of the Cancellation Proceeding and was judged in absentia, and later when it was barred from effectively making its case that it had been the victim of fraud and from presenting relevant and material evidence, necessary to support its argument.

508.  The Mexican Courts had four opportunities to address the question of the forgery of the Settlement Agreement. They did not do so for reasons which were unclear, contradictory within the same process, or purely formalistic. The Tribunal finds that the decisions of the Mexican Courts repeatedly denying Lion the right to present relevant and material evidence to defend its case, amount to an improper and egregious procedural conduct, which does not meet the basic internationally accepted standard of administration of justice and due process, and which shocks or surprises the sense of judicial propriety.

509.  Having established that Mexico’s Courts denied Lion justice by restricting its access to justice and its right to defend itself and present evidence to support its case, the Tribunal does not need to look into whether Lion also suffered undue delay.

VI.2.  Exhaustion of Local Remedies

510.  Mexico presents a major counterargument to refute Lion’s claim for denial of justice: that Claimant decided to withdraw the Amparo claim, and that as a consequence of such withdrawal, it failed to exhaust local remedies — a requirement for a finding of denial of justice520.

511.  Claimant does not deny that it withdrew the Amparo Proceeding, but argues that Lion pursued all adequate and effective remedies available to it, within the limits of reasonableness521.

512.  The Tribunal will first summarize the Parties’ positions (1.), then the relevant facts (2.), then the law regarding exhaustion of legal remedies, including its exceptions (3.), and finally discuss and dismiss Mexico’s counterargument (4.).

1.  Position of the Parties

A.  Claimant’s position

513.  Claimant acknowledges that under international law a finding of denial of justice is premised on the claimant having exhausted local remedies, i.e. judicial measures which could result in the Mortgages being reinstated522. Claimant adds that the exhaustion rule has to be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism523.

514.  Claimant explains that it pursued the Amparo proceedings, the only avenue which was open to it: it was forced to choose between either filing an Amparo claim or a nulidad de juicio concluido [also “nullity proceeding”] action. According to Lion, it was impossible for it to bring both an Amparo claim and a nullity proceeding in the same matter524. It further argues that the criminal proceedings are not adequate to deal with contractual issues, and pursuing the case further in criminal courts would not have led to binding findings for civil courts525.

515.  Claimant adds that it filed and pursued the Amparo Proceedings, until it became obvious that continuation was futile, whereupon it decided to withdraw such Proceedings.

516.  Claimant’s arguments are the following:

a.  Undue delay

517.  Claimant says that, as codified by the International Law Commission, local remedies do not need to be exhausted when there is undue delay in the remedial process, attributable to the State. And in this case, the Amparo Proceedings were excessively and unreasonably long and continuation of the Amparo Proceeding would have extended that unreasonable delay at least by 2.5 years526.

b.  Mexico’s lack of diligence

518.  Claimant avers that the withdrawal of the Amparo Proceedings became necessary due to Mexico’s own lack of diligence. The Amparo Courts could and should have raised the existence of the False Amparo much earlier, in early 2013. If the Amparo Courts would have been diligent, Lion would have had the opportunity to exhaust the Amparo Proceedings within the three-year time limit provided for by NAFTA Article 1116527.

519.  Lion did everything that was reasonable, but, despite its best efforts, Mexican Courts did not provide effective means to reverse the cancellation of the Mortgages within a reasonable period. Mexico cannot rely on the ineffectiveness of its own system to prevent a finding of denial of justice528.

c.  Continuation of the Amparo‎ Proceeding was not necessary

520.  As a second argument, Claimant says it was not required to continue with the Amparo Proceedings, because such proceedings did not meet the test (established in the Loewen decision) of being adequate, effective and reasonably available:

521.  First, as regards adequacy, Claimant says that the Amparo Proceedings were the only adequate proceedings available to undo the cancellation of the Mortgages529.

522.  Second, as regards the effectiveness criterion, Claimant adds that the most likely outcome of the Remand Amparo would have been for the Juez de Distrito to decide that the Amparo was inadmissible530. But in the most optimistic scenario, assuming that the Juez de Distrito had decided that the False Amparo indeed was a fraudulent machination, Lion would then have to re-submit its initial appeal to the Tribunal de Queja, requesting the opportunity to prove that the Forged Settlement Agreement had been falsified. However, the same Tribunal de Queja had already ruled that no hearing would be allowed; there was no reason to assume that the Tribunal de Queja would change its position, and there was no appeal to the Supreme Court531.

523.  Claimant adds a second argument: even if the Juez de Distrito and then the Tribunal de Queja had decided in its favour, the result would be a finding that Lion had not been properly served in the Cancellation Lawsuit — but not the reestablishment of the Mortgages. The Cancellation Lawsuit would be reopened before the Juez de lo Mercantil, and a new series of proceedings, taking between 18 and 36 months, would have to be started, to annul the Cancellation Judgement and reinstall the Mortgages532

524.  Third, concerning reasonableness, Claimant avers that even under the most favourable scenario, the exhaustion of the Amparo Proceedings would have lasted an additional 2.5 to 3.5 years as of December 2015, resulting in a delay of six years for a simple and straightforward Amparo533.

525.  Claimant adds that pursuing further Amparo Proceedings would have required Lion to definitively waive its judicial expropriation claim before NAFTA tribunals, due to the three-year time limits established in Art. 1116 and 1117 NAFTA — an unreasonable requirement534.

B.  Respondent’s position

526.  As a starting point, Mexico asserts that under international law, exhaustion of local remedies is a requirement for a finding of denial of justice, as acknowledged by publicists, State practice, NAFTA jurisprudence and non-NAFTA jurisprudence535.

The unavailability exception

527.  Mexico acknowledges that exhaustion of local remedies knows one exception, which is however subject to a high test: unavailability. An aggrieved alien does not have to exhaust local remedies that are not available. Respondent says that the NAFTA jurisprudence focuses on availability, not on futility. Provided that remedies are available, Claimant is required to exhaust them536. Mexico says that the threshold test of unavailability was set in Loewen and Apotex537.

528.  Turning to the facts, Mexico says Claimant did not exhaust all proceedings which in accordance with Mexican law were available:

529.  First, Respondent says that Lion failed to exhaust other avenues under Mexican law to avoiding the cancellation of the Mortgages, like a nulidad de juicio concluido action538 or the criminal proceedings already initiated by Lion539.

530.  Second, Mexico disagrees with Claimant’s argument that continuing with the Amparo Proceedings would have been ineffective. In Respondent’s view, Claimant essentially is arguing that the Tribunal de Queja and the Supreme Court were unlikely to render any decision in its favour. However, as the Apotex tribunal announced, what matters is not the likelihood that the higher judicial authority would have granted the relief the Claimant sought, but simply the availability of further remedies. In this case a multitude of remedies existed540. Respondent also denies that the Mexican Courts incurred in unreasonable delay, or that the expected duration of the remedy procedures would be unreasonable541.

531.  Third, as regards Claimant’s argument that it was obliged to withdraw the Amparo Proceedings, because the three-year limit established in Art. 1116 and 1117 NAFTA was approaching, Respondent says that the time limitations imposed by these provisions begins on the date on which there is “knowledge of the alleged breach”. Since local remedies must be exhausted before it can be determined if justice has been denied, the limitation period had not started to run at the time the Amparo Proceedings were abandoned. Thus, the entire rationale for the Claimant abandoning the proceeding was unfounded542.

532.  Finally, Mexico submits that the Claimant was not required to withdraw from the Amparo Proceedings to comply with the waiver requirement established in NAFTA Art. 1121, because the Amparo Proceedings fall within the exception of NAFTA Art. 1121(1)(b) (“except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving payment of damages”)543.

2.  Facts

533.  On December 18, 2012 Lion filed an Amparo indirecto lawsuit544 before the Juez de Distrito in Jalisco. The Amparo was based on a breach of Art. 14 and 16 of Constitución Política of Mexico, and the actos reclamados included the lack of proper emplazamiento of Lion in the Cancellation Lawsuit.

534.  The development of the Amparo Proceedings has been described in section IV.7 above. Suffice it to say here that more than two years after the initial filing of the Amparo, on April 17, 2015, the Tribunal de Queja decided sua sponte to remand the case back to the Juez de Distrito, with the limited purpose to determine whether Lion’s Amparo proceeding was inadmissible, a different Amparo relating to the same facts having been filed at an earlier date and thereafter abandoned.

535.  When the Tribunal de Queja raised the issue of the False Amparo it came as a total surprise:

  • —  For the last 16 months of Amparo proceeding no party and no prior court had ever referred to this admissibility issue545;

  • —  The same Tribunal de Queja had also failed to raise the issue when it first intervened in these proceedings, to adjudicate an appeal against interlocutory decisions of the Juez de Distrito;

  • —  The Tribunal de Queja decided sua sponte, and over a year into the recurso de revisión, to raise the existence of the False Amparo; the only reason given by the Tribunal de Queja to justify its decision was that an unidentified administrative official had informed the Court of the existence of the previous Amparo546.

536.  As regards the remand procedure, the Tribunal de Queja ordered that it should be restricted to adjudicating the admissibility issue, explicitly prohibiting the parties from presenting new evidence regarding the falsehood of the Settlement Agreement547 and instructing the Juez de Distrito not to analyze Lion’s allegation that such Agreement had been forged548.

537.  After three years of judicial battling, Lion still had no decision confirming the falsehood of the Forged Settlement Agreement, and after the remand decision it was fighting to prove that it should not be deprived of the Amparo recourse — the only way to overturn the wrongful cancellation of the Mortgages.

The Remand Amparo

538.  The fact that the Remand Amparo was being tried by the same judge who had already dismissed evidence on the forgery, did not discourage Lion from bringing once more a petition to admit evidence on the fraudulent nature of the Forged Settlement549. And, since Lion had only acquired knowledge of the False Amparo’s existence at this point, it also provided evidence pointing to the inauthenticity of the False Amparo550.

539.  On September 23, 2015 the Juez de Distrito only accepted the graphology expert report and a brief filing on the False Amparo as evidence551. The Juez de Distrito used formalistic reasoning to reject further evidence provided by Lion552.

Lion’s withdrawal

540.  On December 11, 2015 Lion decided to withdraw the Amparo Proceedings in their entirety.

3.  The law

541.  Lion’s claim for denial of justice is based on Art. 1105 of NAFTA, which provides that Mexico shall accord to investments of protected investors treatment in accordance with international law, including FET. The FTC Interpretation Note equates the standard of protection to be applied under Art. 1105 of the NAFTA with the standard of “customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens”.

542.  This “minimum standard of treatment” incorporates denial of justice, together with its traditional requirement that the aggrieved investor, to be authorized to proceed against the State, must first have exhausted all legal remedies available in the municipal Court system and must have lodged appeals up to the highest instance (A.). The requirement is, however, subject to an exception: exhaustion is unnecessary in situations where lodging an appeal would be obviously futile (B.)

A.  The requirement

543.  The rule of exhaustion of local remedies derives from the customary international law principle that, prior to bringing an international claim, the foreign national must have first resorted to the host State’s legal remedies to obtain redress.

544.  This principle of customary international law was developed in the context of diplomatic protection in the Interhandel and ELSI cases553. In Interhandel the ICJ stated that554:

“The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law […] Before resort may be had to an international court … it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system”.

545.  The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection records this well-established principle in Article 14.

Article 14.  Exhaustion of local remedies

  1. 1.  A State may not present an international claim in respect of an injury to a national […] before the injured person has, subject to draft article 15, exhausted all local remedies”.

The exhaustion rule in investment protection cases

546.  It is unanimously accepted that the exhaustion rule is a substantial element of denial of justice and applies beyond diplomatic protection. Professor James Crawford, rapporteur on State Responsibility of the ILC, said that555:

“the exhaustion of local remedies rule is not limited to diplomatic protection”.

547.  The academic writings on investment protection support this view. Paulsson recalls that:

“[f]or a foreigner’s international grievance to proceed as a claim of denial of justice, the national system must have been tested. Its perceived failings cannot constitute an international wrong unless it has been given a chance to correct itself556”.

548.  Professor Paparinskis in turn states that:

“[i]t is accepted that denial of justice becomes internationally wrongful only after the whole system of administration of justice has been put to the test by exhaustion of local remedies557”.

549.  The Tribunal concurs: a claim for denial of justice only becomes ripe when the remedies available in the legal system of the host State to impeach the decision have been exhausted. The underlying reasons for this requirement are twofold:

  • —  It guarantees that the host State’s judicial system is provided with an opportunity to rectify errors in the decision of lower court instances, and

  • —  It guarantees that international tribunals do not become appeal Courts for dissatisfied investors.

Case law

550.  Investment tribunals in the context of NAFTA have endorsed the same conclusion558. The Tribunal in Loewen specifically stated that a claim for denial of justice within Article 1105 NAFTA, incorporated the exhaustion requirement559:

“The purpose of the requirement that a decision of a lower court be challenged through the judicial process before the State is responsible for a breach of international law constituted by judicial decision is to afford the State the opportunity of redressing through its legal system the inchoate breach of international law occasioned by the lower court decision. The requirement has application to breaches of Articles 1102 and 1110 as well as Article 1105”.

551.  The Waste Management II tribunal, for instance, stated in the context of assessing a denial of justice claim that560:

“The system must be tried and have failed, and thus in this context the notion of exhaustion of local remedies is incorporated into the substantive standard and is not only a procedural prerequisite to an international claim”.

552.  Investment tribunals in non-NAFTA cases have come to the same conclusion. For example, in OI European Group B.V. the tribunal emphasized the need to give the host State’s judicial system an opportunity to rectify its mistakes so as to avoid the use of international law as a system of appeals against judgments unfavourable to investors:

“International Law cannot become a convenient system to appeal any domestic court decision the investor disagrees with. Before it can be established under International Law that a State’s legal system has committed a wrong, it is essential to provide it with a chance to correct its own mistake”561.

Non-Disputing Parties

553.  The United States562 and Canada563 have defended the same position in their Non-Disputing Party submissions:

  • —  The USA says that the international responsibility of States may only be invoked with respect to final judicial acts, unless recourse to further domestic remedies is obviously futile or manifestly ineffective564; judicial acts only result in a breach of Article 1105(1) if the justice system as a whole, as validated by a court of the highest instance, produces a denial of justice565;

  • —  Canada also submits that a denial of justice claim must be preceded by the local court decisions reaching finality at the court of last resort of the State’s judiciary566.

B.  The exception of obvious futility

554.  The requirement that local remedies be exhausted is subject to an exception: an alien cannot be required to take a measure or lodge an appeal which will not remedy the international wrong.

a.  The position of the Parties and the Non-Disputing Parties

555.  The precise scope of the exception to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies has been much discussed by the Parties:

  • —  Lion says that the claimant must only exhaust remedies which are adequate, effective and reasonable567, while

  • —  Mexico submits that the only remedies which do not have to be exhausted are those which are unavailable, adding that NAFTA jurisprudence (Loewen, Apotex) focuses on availability, not on futility568.

556.  The Non-Disputing Parties have also presented their views on the exception to the rule of exhaustion:

  • —  The USA recognizes that the exhaustion rule does not apply whenever further recourse for a claimant is obviously futile or manifestly ineffective569; further remedies are obviously futile where there “was no justice to exhaust570”; but it is not enough for a claimant to allege the “absence of a reasonable prospect of success or the improbability of success, which are both less strict tests571”.

  • —  Canada also acknowledges that the rule gives way whenever it would be “demonstrably futile” to pursue local remedies572; whether recourse to further appeals of a domestic court judgment is futile is “a fact-specific inquiry taking into consideration the availability, adequacy and effectiveness of the remedy”573.

b.  Position of the Tribunal

557.  Mexico argues that under NAFTA the only remedies which do not have to be exhausted are those which are “unavailable”, adding that NAFTA jurisprudence equates unavailability with futility. Mexico seeks support in two NAFTA cases Loewen and Apotex.

558.  Mexico’s position is excessively restrictive. It implies that an investor is obliged to pursue all available remedies, even if there is no reasonable prospect that the request or appeal will effectively undo the international wrong.

559.  Scholars in the realm of investment protection, such as Paulsson, suggest that the appropriate test should be more flexible, and based on the formulation of Judge Lauterpacht in his separate opinion the Norwegian Loans case: the remedies that ought to be pursued are those which offer a “reasonable possibility of an effective remedy”574. Paulsson explains that575:

“[t]he victim of a denial of justice is not required to pursue improbable remedies. Nor is he required to contrive indirect or extravagant applications beyond the ordinary path of a frontal attempt to have the judgment by which he was unjustly treated set aside, or to be granted a trial he was denied”.

560.  Prof. Amerasinghe describes the exception as follows576:

“The test of obvious futility clearly requires more than the probability of failure or the improbability of success, but perhaps less than the absolute certainty of failure. The test may be said to require evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that the remedy would be ineffective”.

561.  The ILC has recorded this exception in its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection:

Article 15.  Exceptions to the local remedies rule

Local remedies do not need to be exhausted where:

  1. (a)  There are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress”.

562.  In the Tribunal’s opinion, the exhaustion rule is subject to two categories of exceptions: an aggrieved alien is only required to pursue remedies

  • —  which are reasonably available (i), and

  • —  which have an expectation that they will be effective, i.e. the measure or appeal has a reasonable prospect of correcting the judicial wrong committed by the lower courts (ii).

Reasonable availability

563.  (i) The first facet of the exhaustion rule is that the aggrieved alien must launch all remedies, which are not extravagant, and take them to the highest judicial instance in the land.

564.  The burden on Claimant is not to pursue all possible remedies, but only those which are reasonably available. In the words of Paulsson577:

“[t]he victim of a denial of justice is not to pursue improbable remedies. Nor is he required to contrive indirect or extravagant applications beyond the ordinary path of a frontal attempt to have the judgment by which he was unjustly treated set aside, or to be granted a trial he was denied”.

565.  Prof. Amerasinghe supports the same conclusion578:

“An aggrieved alien is bound only to exhaust those remedies that are available to him. The requirement thus postulated has been described in terms of accessibility”.

566.  In its Commentary to the ILC Draft on Diplomatic Protection, the ILC recalls that the “reasonable availability” test is supported by judicial decisions that considered that remedies need not be exhausted when579:

“[…] the local court has no jurisdiction over the dispute in question; the national legislation justifying the acts of which the alien complains will not be reviewed by local courts; the local courts are notoriously lacking in independence; there is a consistent and well-established line of precedents adverse to the alien; the local courts do not have the competence to grant an appropriate an adequate remedy to the alien; or the respondent State does not have an adequate system of judicial protection”.

Effectiveness

567.  (ii) The aggrieved alien is not under an obligation to resort to an appeal which, although available, was obviously futile. As Prof. Amerasinghe explains, this exception580

“was a compromise between the interests of the respondent state in having a fair opportunity of doing justice by its own means and those of the alien in having the most efficient justice done at the lowest cost in the quickest way”.

568.  The seminal case establishing this exception was the 1934 Finnish Vessels Arbitration, which held that a claimant is not obliged to resort to an appeal, provided that such remedy was “obviously futile”581. In the specific case the arbitrator found that where the finding of fact by a lower instance court was final, and the success of the claimant’s case depended on a different finding of fact, an appeal to a higher Court was obviously futile582.

569.  This initial threshold has been lowered by several decisions that followed. In the Ambatielos Case, the Arbitration Commission said that583:

“It is the whole system of legal protection, as provided by municipal law, which must have been put to the test […]. It is clear, however, that [the exhaustion rule] cannot be strained too far. Taken literally, it would imply that the fact of having neglected to make use of some means of procedure — even one which is not important to the defence of the action — would suffice to allow a defendant State to claim that local remedies have not been exhausted, and that, therefore, an international action cannot be brought. This would confer on the rule of the prior exhaustion of local remedies a scope which is unacceptable”.

570.  In the Norwegian Loans case, Judge Lauterpacht issued a separate opinion proposing a lower threshold with regard to effectiveness, which has gathered support in the writings of jurists584. He stated that:

“The requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is not a purely technical or rigid rule. It is a rule which international tribunals have applied with a considerable degree of elasticity […]

571.  Judge Lauterpacht suggested that the exhaustion rule should be put aside where there was no “reasonable possibility” for the complainant to obtain “an effective remedy”585.

Case law

572.  The tribunal in Apotex relied on the more rigid “obvious futility” test586. Other tribunals, such as Loewen, resorted to the standards of “effectiveness” and “reasonable availability” of the remedies. The tribunal in ATA Construction considered that the complainant has to exhaust those remedies that are “plausibly available”587; and in Jan de Nul, the tribunal said that the exception applied when “there is no effective remedy or no reasonable prospect of success”588.

573.  A less rigid approach to the exceptions has been also applied in the non-NAFTA investment cases. In Duke Energy:

“[t]he Claimants are right to point out that there is no obligation to pursue ‘improbable’ remedies.589

574.  The Ambiente Ufficio tribunal also qualified the rule as applicable only to reasonably available remedies590:

“It appears to be generally accepted in international law that obligations requiring an individual to approach a State’s local courts before a claim may be taken to the international plane do not apply unconditionally. […] only those remedies must be used which are available ‘as a matter of reasonable possibility.”

575.  In conclusion, the Tribunal finds that an investor who has suffered denial of justice is only required to exhaust remedies:

  • —  which are reasonably available, and

  • —  which have an expectation that they will be effective, i.e. the measure or the appeal have a reasonable prospect of correcting the judicial wrong suffered by the alien.

4.  Discussion

576.  Mexico argues that Claimant did not exhaust local remedies:

  • —  Claimant should have pursued other adequate remedies (and specifically the nulidad del juicio concluido), but failed to do;

  • —  Claimant wrongly withdrew the Amparo Proceedings; Claimant’s argument is simply an assumption that the Tribunal de Queja and the Supreme Court were unlikely to render any decision in its favour.

577.  Respondent also denies that the Mexican Courts incurred in unreasonable delay, or that the expected duration of the remedy procedures would be unreasonable591.

578.  Lion defends the contrary position: it avers that

  • —  Mexico incurred in undue delay592,

  • —  Mexico failed to provide effective means to reverse the cancellation of the Mortgages593,

  • —  The Amparo Proceedings were the only adequate proceedings available594.

  • —  Continuation of the Amparo Proceedings was obviously futile595,

  • —  The finalization of the Amparo Proceedings would only have resulted in a finding that the emplazamiento in the Cancellation Lawsuit had been improperly made — requiring a new procedure to reinstate the validity of the Mortgages;

  • —  Exhaustion of local remedies would in total have lasted six years — an unreasonable period of time596.

Decision

579.  The Tribunal decides in favour of Lion for three reasons:

  • —  The Amparo was the only remedy, reasonably available to the Claimant, to undo the cancellation of the Mortgages (A.);

  • —  Lion sought redress before the highest Court available within the Amparo proceeding (B.);

  • —  Claimant unsuccessfully pursued the Amparo Proceedings for three years before the two available instances, and withdrew such Proceedings at a time when continuation would have been obviously futile and no effective redress would be obtained (C.).

A.  The Amparo‎ was the appropriate remedy

580.  In the present case, the international wrong committed by Mexico consists in a denial of justice: Mexico’s judicial system has denied Lion access to justice by failing to correct the Cancellation Lawsuit, by denying Lion the right to appeal the Cancellation Judgement and finally has denied Lion the right to allege and prove the forgery of the Forged Settlement Agreement. As a result of the denial of justice, the Mortgages, Lion’s protected investments, have been cancelled and Claimant has lost the protection afforded by these securities.

581.  For Lion the detrimental effects of the Cancellation Proceeding were twofold:

  • —  First, the Judgement ordered the cancellation of the Mortgages — and this was quickly accomplished, because the Judge ordered specific performance of the decision and by October 2012 the Registros Públicos had cancelled the Mortgages, which were extinguished for all legal purposes;

  • —  Second, the Juez de lo Mercantil also issued a decision, declaring that the Cancellation Judgement had become res iudicata, and precluding the possibility that Lion launch a recurso de apelación.

582.  When Lion finally obtained knowledge of the existence of the Cancellation Judgement, this decision had already become res iudicata — the ordinary recurso de apelación was not any longer available. In the circumstances, Lion had, in principle, to choose between two procedures:

  • —  The recurso de Amparo; or

  • —  The recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido.

583.  Amparo proceedings are an established institution under State and Federal law of Mexico, and represent the ordinary means to obtain protection from the Courts when constitutional rights have been breached597. The recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido is an institution developed by Mexican jurisprudence, which is not codified under the law of Jalisco or at the Federal level, which can only be used in extraordinary circumstances to request the annulment of certain civil judgments which are already causa juzgada.

584.  The Parties’ experts discussed whether Lion could have had access to a recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido. Mexico’s legal expert — Dr. Ovalle — acknowledged that this type of remedy was not available to Lion under Codes of Civil Procedure of Jalisco and Nayarit598.

Recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido

585.  Dr. Ovalle, however, suggests that Lion could have initiated a recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido, based on a supplementary application of the Code for Civil Procedure of the Federal District (which regulates the nulidad del juicio concluido) and applies to supplement proceedings under the Commercial Code, pursuant to its Article 1054599. Dr. Ovalle says that the Mexican Supreme Court has established jurisprudence endorsing this possibility by allowing a party to initiate a juicio de nulidad in civil proceedings under specific circumstances600. Dr. Ovalle refers to extracts of the jurisprudence of the Mexican Supreme Court applying this doctrine, in a case of the 1960s regarding prescripción adquisitiva de dominio (the doctrine of adverse possession)601 and a case of 2001, regarding a judgement of estado civil (marital status)602.

586.  Dr. Zamora — Lion’s legal expert — does not agree: he acknowledges the general jurisprudence of the Mexican Supreme Court that allows the supplementary application of the Code for Civil Procedure of the Federal District to civil proceedings before the civil Courts of the Mexican States only in certain cases. Dr. Zamora cites additional jurisprudence that has clarified that the supplementary application of the Code for Civil Procedure of the Federal District to commercial proceedings does not include access to the remedies or appeals not governed in the Commercial Code603:

“De conformidad con el artículo 1054 del Código de Comercio, la aplicación supletoria de la legislación local en los juicios mercantiles no debe entenderse de un modo absoluto, sino con las restricciones que el propio numeral señala […] tratándose de recursos, mismos que se encuentran reglamentados adecuadamente en ese cuerpo normativo, no existe la citada supletoriedad, en virtud de que tal legislación cuenta con un sistema propio y completo de recursos, razón por la cual no puede sostenerse que deba aplicarse lo dispuesto por el referido artículo 1054 del Código de Comercio”.

587.  In particular, with respect to the suppletory application of the nulidad del juicio concluido, the jurisprudence says that it is available in civil proceedings of “materia civil”, however, it clarifies that604:

“Ahora bien, esta figura jurídica [nulidad de juicio concluido] es improcedente contra juicios mercantiles tramitados conforme al Código de Comercio, ello en razón de que no prevé dicha nulidad, ni alguna similar mediante la cual pueda dejarse insubsistente lo resuelto en un proceso anterior, aunado a que no cabe la supletoriedad del código procesal civil citado, ya que no fue voluntad del legislador hacer excepciones a la cosa juzgada en materia mercantil”.

588.  Based on the above considerations, the Tribunal is not convinced that the recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido was reasonable available to Lion in order to revert the Cancellation Judgment, which is undisputedly, materia mercantil and not materia civil.

589.  But even if Claimant could, due to a favourable interpretation, overcome the limitation that the scope of the nulidad de juicio concluido is restricted to judgments of materia civil, it would encounter an additional hurdle: as pointed by Dr. Zamora, in a judgment of 2008, the Mexican Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of a provision of the nulidad de juicio concluido regulated in Code for Civil Procedure of the Federal District605, because it violated the principle of legal certainty606. Since then, a party seeking a nulidad de juicio concluido is required to provide evidence that the judgement impugned was rendered on the basis of a document that has been declared false. Lion would have to first file a criminal complaint seeking a declaration by the criminal Courts, that the Settlement Agreement was a forged document. Only then, could Lion try to initiate the nulidad de juicio concluido, with the hope that the Mexican courts would create new jurisprudence and extend the scope of this extraordinary remedy to a case of materia mercantil.

590.  In any event, Claimant was also precluded from launching successively an Amparo and a nulidad de juicio concluido. The filing of an Amparo precludes the subsequent presentation of a recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido. Although Respondent’s expert testified at the Hearing that the nulidad de juicio concluido and the Amparo are not mutually exclusive607, the Tribunal agrees with Claimant that they are, based on Art. 73 of the Amparo law608:

“CAPITULO VIII De los casos de improcedencia

Artículo 73.— El juicio de amparo es improcedente:

[…] XIV.— Cuando se esté tramitando ante los tribunales ordinarios algún recurso o defensa legal propuesta por el quejoso que pueda tener por efecto modificar, revocar o nulificar el acto reclamado”.

591.  Claimant chose the Amparo route. That this decision was the reasonably available remedy is proven by the Debtors foresight: anticipating that Lion would eventually launch an Amparo (and not a recurso de nulidad de juicio concluido, which was not reasonably available), the Debtors prepared the False Amparo Proceedings, a machination intended to forestall (as it eventually did) Lion’s rightful Amparo.

592.  Based on the above, the Tribunal believes that Claimant resorted to the reasonable available remedy in the given circumstances.

Criminal proceedings

593.  Claimant also launched criminal proceedings, which are still ongoing. The criminal proceedings also did not constitute a viable alternative avenue for Lion to pursue its economic claims, due to the vastly different character of criminal proceedings and the impossibility of obtaining the reversal of the Cancellation Judgment and the reinstatement of the Mortgages. Thus, Claimant is not required to first reach judicial finality in their respect to bring its NAFTA Art. 1105 claim.

B.  The Tribunal de Queja‎ was the highest Court available within the Amparo‎ Proceeding

594.  The rule of exhaustion requires that the aggrieved alien obtain a ruling rendered by highest court in the host State609. Claimant says that the Tribunal de Queja was acting as the Court of highest instance in the Amparo Proceedings and that there was no possibility for Claimant to bring its case to the Supreme Court of Mexico — an allegation which has not been challenged by Mexico610.

595.  It is, thus, undisputed that Lion had taken its case to the highest available authority: the recurso de revisión brought the Amparo before the Tribunal de Queja, which was the highest authority available in the Amparo lawsuit.

C.  Claimant was entitled to withdraw from the Amparo Proceeding

596.  On December 11, 2015 Lion waived the Amparo lawsuit.

597.  At that point Claimant had spent almost three years in Amparo lawsuits before Mexican Courts, trying to undo the fraudulent cancellation of the Mortgages. It had achieved very little:

  • —  Lion had been deprived, by an idiosyncratic decision of the Juez de lo Mercantil, of filing an ordinary appeal against the Cancellation Judgement (issued by the same Juez de lo Mercantil);

  • —  The only avenue open to Lion had been an Amparo, which it filed as soon as it became aware of the Cancellation Judgement, but at a time when it still did not know that the Debtors had based their case on the Forged Settlement Agreement; Lion’s recurring attempts to extend the scope of the Amparo to cover the forgery of the Settlement Agreement and to present evidence proving such forgery, had been dismissed by the first instance Juez de Distrito and in second instance by the Tribunal de Queja, for a purely formalistic reason: the ampliación de la demanda had been signed on behalf of Lion by its attorney and not by its legal representative — a minor procedural defect Lion was never offered the opportunity to remedy;

  • —  Unable to submit that the Settlement Agreement had been forged, Lion’s Amparo had been dismissed by the first instance Juez de Distrito; in the Amparo Judgement the Juez de Distrito assumed the Settlement Agreement to be valid and binding and concluded that Lion’s emplazamiento had been properly served on Lic. López Medina, Lion’s process agent as identified in the Forged Settlement Agreement — an obscure attorney, with whom Lion had never had any relationship and who failed to inform Lion;

  • —  On appeal against the Amparo Judgement, the second instance Tribunal de Queja, whom Lion had asked to review a further time the prohibition to argue the forgery issue, did not take up this question; instead the Tribunal de Queja, in an unexpected move, made sua sponte the decision to remand the procedure back to the first instance Judge, with a strictly limited remit: to review whether the Amparo had been properly admitted, in light of the existence of a previous Amparo (the False Amparo — a decoy procedure filed fraudulently by the Debtors to derail the admissibility of the real Amparo);

  • —  Upon the instructions of the Tribunal de Queja, the Juez de Distrito again denied Lion’s request to expand the scope of the remand, so that the Amparo could encompass the forgery of the Settlement Agreement.

598.  According to Claimant’s expert611, the best-case scenario for the progression of the Amparo would have required an additional period of between 18 to 30 months to finalize; a positive outcome in favour of Lion would have resulted in the Cancellation Proceeding being held anew, which would take one to two more years612.

599.  But Claimant’s prospects for a best-case scenario were limited:

  • —  First, the Tribunal de Queja remanded the case to the Juez de Distrito with a strictly limited mandate: to only look into the admissibility of the Amparo proceedings (in view of the False Amparo), explicitly prohibiting the Juez de Distrito from discussing the issue of the forgery of the Settlement Agreement, which constituted the cornerstone of Lion’s Amparo Lawsuit;

  • —  Secondly, Lion’s case was going to be heard by the same Juez de Distrito who had already dismissed the Amparo in the first instance, and

  • —  Thirdly, in this Remand Amparo, Lion filed a motion alleging the forgery of Mr. Arechederra’s signature in the False Amparo and requested the Juez de Distrito to hear the testimony of Mr. Arechederra. The Juez de Distrito rejected the testimony and relied only on three expert reports to determine the authenticity of signature stamped in the False Amparo. Lion and one of the Debtors (Bains) appointed each an expert and the Juez de Distrito appointed a third expert. Lion’s expert certified that the signature was not of Mr. Arechederra. However, the Debtor and the Court appointed experts arrived to the opposite conclusion, considering that the signature in the False Amparo was indeed of Mr. Arechederra’s613.

600.  At this point, the fate of the Remand Amparo was in jeopardy: it is most likely that the Juez de Distrito would have ruled that the False Amparo was authentic, thereby making Lion’s real Amparo inadmissible and rendering any further legal actions obviously futile.

[Pro memoria, Lion had lodged an incident at the outset of the Amparo proceeding alleging that on July 6, 2012 Sr. Arechederra’s signature had been forged in the false request for copy before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil. In that instance, two of the three experts (Lion’s expert and the one appointed by the Juez de Distrito) had concluded that the signature had been forged614. Based on the experts’ evidence, the Juez de Distrito had accepted the falsehood of the signature stamped on the July 6, 2012 request for copy before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil 615. That the first signature of Mr. Arechederra had been forged, would seem to support the conclusion that his second signature had also been forged — the purpose of the machination was to file the False Amparo, which required two signatures.]

601.  Thus, Claimant was further away from annulling the cancellation of the Mortgages than it was at the outset of the local proceedings. Moreover, it had little prospect of success, since Lion was prohibited from presenting evidence to prove the forgery and the Juez de Distrito had already once decided against its position. And even if Lion was successful, the effect of the amparo would be limited to a declaration that the emplazamiento in the Cancellation Judgement had been improperly made. A new procedure before the Juez de lo Mercantil would be required, to annul the Cancellation Judgement, which already had the status of cosa juzgada — a process that would at least require three years for the Cancellation Judgment to be overturned.

602.  It is at this point when Lion abandoned all hope to obtain redress from the Mexican judiciary and waived the Amparo lawsuit.

603.  In sum, Lion was put in a situation where three years into the Amparo Proceeding the only point of discussion was whether such proceedings were admissible at all. In three years of litigation, Lion was unable to obtain from the Mexican judiciary a recognition that it had been subject to such a manifest fraud and identity theft, that would effectively result in the reversal of the cancellation of the Mortgages. It is difficult to accept that Lion did not exhaust all reasonable and available remedies with a reasonable prospect of reversing the denial of justice it had suffered.

Case law

604.  Case law supports the Tribunal’s finding.

605.  In the historic Montano case between the US and Peru, the Umpire rejected the US Government objection of non-exhaustion of local remedies and upheld Peru’s claim. He wrote616:

“The obligation of a stranger to exhaust the remedies which nations have for obtaining justice, before soliciting the protection of his government, ought to be understood in a rational manner, that such obligation does not make delusive the rights of the foreigner”.