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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Dedication
Foreword to the First Edition
Foreword to the Second Edition
Acknowledgements
Contents
Table of Cases
International
National
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Egypt
European Union
France
Germany
India
Ireland
Netherlands
Poland
Russia
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
International Legislation
Conventions, Treaties and Statutes
Draft Conventions
United Nations Resolutions
Rules and Regulations
Guidelines, Codes and Statutory Instruments
Multilateral Treaties and Trade Agreements
Bilateral Treaties and Trade Agreements
National Legislation
Argentina
Australia
Canada
Ecuador
Egypt
Georgia
Germany
Hong Kong SAR
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Mongolia
Netherlands
Philippines
Russia
Singapore
South Africa
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
List of Contributors
Main Text
Part I Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment Disputes: The Framework
1 Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements: Recent Developments in Investment Rule-making
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
II BITs and Investment Provisions in PTAs: The Gradual Shift from Investment Protection to the Promotion of Liberalization of Investment Flows
A The Investment Protection Rationale of BITs
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
B Investment Protection and Liberalization in ‘New Generation’ BITs and Investment Chapters of RTAs
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
C Impact of Investor-state Dispute Settlement Experience on Investment Rule-making: A New Generation of IIAs
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1 Greater precision in the scope of the definition of investment
1.38
1.39
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.43
2 Clarification of the meaning of several key obligations
1.44
(a) International minimum standard of treatment
1.45
1.46
1.47
1.48
1.49
1.50
1.51
1.52
1.53
1.54
1.55
(b) Expropriation
1.56
1.57
1.58
1.59
1.60
1.61
1.62
(c) National treatment
1.63
1.64
(d) Clarification that investment protection should not be pursued at the expense of other public policy objectives
1.65
1.66
1.67
1.68
1.69
1.70
1.71
1.72
1.73
(e) Promotion of greater transparency between the contracting parties and in the process of domestic rule-making
1.74
1.75
1.76
1.77
1.78
1.79
3 Innovations in ISDS procedures
1.80
1.81
1.82
(a) Greater control of the contracting parties over arbitration procedures
1.83
1.84
1.85
1.86
1.87
1.88
1.89
1.90
1.91
1.92
1.93
(b) Promotion of judicial economy
1.94
1.95
(c) Mechanism to avoid ‘frivolous claims’
1.96
1.97
1.98
1.99
1.100
(d) Consolidation of claims
1.101
1.102
(e) Mechanism to avoid a dispute being submitted to more than one dispute settlement forum: improving the ‘fork in the road’
1.103
1.104
1.105
1.106
1.107
1.108
4 Promotion of a consistent and sound jurisprudence on international investment law
1.109
1.110
1.111
1.112
1.113
1.114
1.115
5 Promotion of legitimacy of investor-state arbitration within civil society
1.116
1.117
1.118
1.119
III Conclusion
1.120
1.121
1.122
1.123
1.124
1.125
1.126
1.127
1.128
1.129
1.130
1.131
1.132
1.133
1.134
1.135
2 The Energy Charter Treaty
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
II The Making of the Energy Charter Treaty
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
III ‘Investments’ and ‘Investors’ Covered by the Energy Charter Treaty
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
IV Denial of Benefits
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
2.29
2.30
V Substantive Investment Protections
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
2.46
VI Dispute Settlement
2.47
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
2.52
VII Fork in the Road
2.53
2.54
2.55
2.56
2.57
VIII Provisional Application
2.58
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
2.64
2.65
2.66
2.67
2.68
2.69
2.70
2.71
2.72
2.73
2.74
2.75
2.76
2.77
2.78
2.79
2.80
2.81
2.82
2.83
2.84
IX Taxation Carve-out
2.85
2.86
2.87
2.88
X Conclusion
2.89
3 International Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
3.01
3.02
II Institutionally Supported Arbitration
A Overview
3.03
3.04
3.05
B International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
3.06
3.07
3.08
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
C International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
D The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
III Selected Procedural Issues
A Commencement of Proceedings and the Role of the Institution in the Initial Determination of Jurisdiction
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.27
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
B Appointment and Disqualification of Arbitrators
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
C Interim Measures
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
D Seat/Place of Arbitration, Language of Proceedings, and Applicable Law
3.42
3.43
E Tribunal’s Experts
3.44
F Transparency and Third-party Participation
3.45
3.46
G The Award and Post-award Remedies
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
H Costs
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
3.60
3.61
IV Ad Hoc Dispute Settlement: UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
A Overview of UNCITRAL
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.65
B Commencement of Proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
3.66
C Appointment and Disqualification of Arbitrators
3.67
3.68
3.69
D Proceedings
3.70
3.71
E Transparency
3.72
3.73
3.74
3.75
F Other Provisions
3.76
3.77
3.78
3.79
3.80
G Other UNCITRAL Texts
3.81
3.82
V Conclusion
3.83
3.84
3.85
3.86
4 The Role of Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
4.12
II The Anti-arbitrariness Vaccine
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
III Limitations
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21
IV The Legal Status of Precedents
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
4.31
4.32
4.33
V The Core Concepts
4.34
4.35
4.36
4.37
4.38
4.39
4.40
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
4.46
4.47
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
VI Life and Death of Precedent in a Decentralized System
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
VII Reconsidering the Value of Precedents
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.61
4.62
VIII Towards More Rigorous Reasoning by Precedent
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.78
4.79
4.80
4.81
IX Concluding Thoughts: Is a Synthesis Possible?
4.82
4.83
4.84
4.85
4.86
4.87
4.88
Part II Guide to Key Preliminary and Procedural Issues
5 An Overview of Procedure in an Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
5.01
5.02
5.03
II Overview of the Overview
5.04
5.05
5.06
III Preparation of the Case
5.07
A The Beginning
5.08
5.09
5.10
B Initial Case Assessment
5.11
5.12
C The Request for Arbitration
5.13
5.14
5.15
5.16
D Selection of Arbitration Rules
5.17
1 Cost
5.18
5.19
5.20
2 Jurisdictional requirements
5.21
3 Enforcement and review mechanisms
5.22
4 Transparency
5.23
E Selection of the Arbitrators
5.24
5.25
5.26
F The First Session with the Tribunal
5.27
5.28
5.29
1 Multiple-phase cases
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
2 Disclosure of evidence
5.35
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
IV The Written Submissions
5.40
5.41
5.42
5.43
V The Hearing
5.44
5.45
5.46
5.47
5.48
A Post-hearing Activity
5.49
5.50
5.51
5.52
B The Decision or Award and Its Aftermath
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
VI Conclusion
5.59
6 Aspects of Procedure for Institution of Proceedings and Establishment of Tribunals in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
6.01
6.02
6.03
II The Initiation of Proceedings
A The Issue of Consent
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
B ‘Gate-keeping’ Provisions in Treaties
6.09
1 Cooling-off periods
6.10
2 Exhaustion or pursuit of local remedies
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
3 Temporal conditions
6.15
4 Practice of investment tribunals
6.16
C The Request for Arbitration
6.17
1 Form
6.18
6.19
2 Common requirements for content
6.20
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
3 ICSID-specific requirements
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
6.31
4 Submission of a request for arbitration
6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
6.37
6.38
6.39
5 Notification and screening of the request
6.40
6.41
6.42
6.43
6.44
6.45
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
III The Establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal
A Preliminary Remarks
6.50
6.51
B Composition of the Tribunal
6.52
6.53
1 Investment treaty provisions as party agreement prior to the institution of proceedings
6.54
6.55
6.56
6.57
2 Party agreement following the institution of proceedings under the ICSID Rules
6.58
6.59
6.60
3 Party agreement following the institution of proceedings under non-ICSID rules
6.61
4 Institutional discretion in determining the number of arbitrators
6.62
6.63
6.64
C Appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal
6.65
1 Appointment by the parties
6.66
6.67
6.68
2 Appointment by a designating appointing authority
6.69
3 ICSID’s practice
6.70
6.71
4 Appointment by institutions under default arbitration rules
6.72
(a) ICSID Rules
6.73
6.74
(b) UNCITRAL Rules
6.75
6.76
(c) SCC and ICC Rules
6.77
5 Considerations in the selection of arbitrators
(a) Nationality, impartiality, and independence requirements under arbitration rules
6.78
6.79
6.80
6.81
6.82
6.83
(b) Nationality, impartiality, and independence requirements under investment treaties
6.84
6.85
6.86
6.87
(c) Other necessary qualifications
6.88
6.89
6.90
6 Appointment formalities and constitution of the tribunal
6.91
(a) Appointment procedures
6.92
6.93
6.94
(b) Factors affecting the process of constituting the tribunal
6.95
6.96
6.97
(c) Constitution of the tribunal
6.98
6.99
IV Conclusion
6.100
7 The Fate of Frivolous and Unmeritorious Claims
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
7.01
II Treatment of Frivolous Claims under International Investment and Trade Agreements
A The United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
7.02
7.03
7.04
B The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
7.05
7.06
7.07
C Other International Investment Agreements
7.08
7.09
7.10
III Summary Disposition under Institutional Rules
A ICSID
7.11
1 The screening power of the ICSID secretariat
7.12
2 ICSID Rule 41(5)
7.13
7.14
7.15
B Other International Arbitration Rules
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
7.20
IV Investor-state Cases that Address Preliminary Objections to Frivolous Claims
7.21
A Cases under the Dominican Republic–United States–Central American Free Trade Agreement
7.22
7.23
7.24
7.25
B Cases under the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
7.26
C Cases Applying ICSID Rule 41(5)
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
V Conclusion
7.31
8 Challenges of Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration: Still Work in Progress?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
8.09
II The Role of Institutions and Professional Associations
A International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID)
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
B Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
C United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
D International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
8.34
8.35
8.36
8.37
8.38
8.39
8.40
8.41
8.42
E Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
8.43
8.44
8.45
8.46
F London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)
8.47
8.48
8.49
8.50
8.51
G Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC)
8.52
8.53
8.54
8.55
H The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines)
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
III Innovations in International Investment Agreements
8.60
8.61
8.62
8.63
8.64
8.65
8.66
8.67
8.68
8.69
8.70
8.71
8.72
8.73
8.74
8.75
8.76
8.77
8.78
8.79
8.80
IV Selected Decisions on Challenges
8.81
8.82
8.83
8.84
8.85
A ‘Issue Conflicts’
8.86
8.87
8.88
8.89
8.90
8.91
8.92
8.93
8.94
8.95
8.96
8.97
8.98
B Administrative Secretaries
8.99
8.100
8.101
8.102
8.103
8.104
8.105
8.106
8.107
8.108
C Social Media
8.109
8.110
8.111
8.112
8.113
8.114
V Conclusion
8.115
8.116
9 Piercing the Veil of Confidentiality: The Recent Trend towards Greater Public Participation and Transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
9.08
II Public Access to Documents
9.09
9.10
9.11
A The NAFTA Approach
9.12
9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
9.20
B ICSID’s Disclosure Regime
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
9.31
C The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
9.36
9.37
D The Mauritius Convention
9.38
9.39
9.40
E Mandating Disclosure Through Investment Treaty Provisions
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
9.51
III Third-party Written Submissions
9.52
9.53
A NAFTA Chapter 11: The Beginning of Modern Third-party Participation in Investment Arbitration
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
9.62
9.63
9.64
B The NAFTA Free Trade Commission Interpretation and Guidelines and Subsequent NAFTA Practice
9.65
9.66
9.67
9.68
9.69
9.70
9.71
9.72
9.73
9.74
9.75
9.76
C Third-party Submissions in ICSID Cases
9.77
9.78
9.79
9.80
9.81
9.82
9.83
9.84
9.85
9.86
9.87
9.88
9.89
9.90
9.91
9.92
9.93
9.94
9.95
9.96
9.97
9.98
9.99
9.100
9.101
9.102
9.103
9.104
9.105
9.106
9.107
D Treatment of Third-party Submissions by Other Arbitral Rules
9.108
9.109
9.110
9.111
9.112
E Treatment of Third-party Submissions by Other Investment Treaties
9.113
9.114
9.115
9.116
9.117
9.118
9.119
9.120
IV Public Access to Arbitral Hearings
9.121
A The NAFTA Experience: The First Open Hearings
9.122
9.123
9.124
9.125
9.126
9.127
9.128
9.129
9.130
9.131
9.132
9.133
9.134
9.135
B Open Hearings Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules: Still Subject to the Parties’ Consent
9.136
9.137
9.138
9.139
9.140
9.141
9.142
9.143
C Open Hearings: Recent Developments
9.144
9.145
9.146
9.147
9.148
9.149
9.150
9.151
9.152
9.153
9.154
9.155
9.156
V Conclusion
9.157
9.158
9.159
Part III Guide to Key Jurisdictional Issues
10 Who is Entitled to Claim?: The Definition of Nationality in Investment Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
10.01
10.02
II Natural Persons as Investors
10.03
A Customary International Law
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
B State Practice/Investment Agreements
10.08
10.09
10.10
C Jurisprudence under the ICSID Convention
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
III Legal Persons as Investors
10.22
10.23
A Customary International Law
10.24
10.25
10.26
10.27
10.28
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
B State Practice/Investment Agreements
10.34
10.35
10.36
10.37
10.38
1 Incorporation
10.39
10.40
10.41
10.42
10.43
10.44
10.45
2 Siège social
10.46
3 Control
10.47
10.48
10.49
10.50
10.51
C Jurisprudence
10.52
10.53
10.54
10.55
10.56
1 Incorporation as the defining element—the relevance (or irrelevance) of the origin of capital and control
10.57
(a) When the legal person is controlled by nationals of the host state
10.58
10.59
10.60
10.61
10.62
10.63
10.64
(b) When the legal person is a national of the host state but is controlled by nationals of the other contracting state—ICSID Article 25(2)(b)
10.65
10.66
10.67
10.68
10.69
10.70
(c) When the legal person is controlled by nationals of a non-contracting state—corporate restructuring/abuse of process and denial of benefits
10.71
(i) Corporate structure/restructuring/abuse of process
10.72
10.73
10.74
10.75
10.76
10.77
10.78
10.79
(ii) Denial of benefits
10.80
10.81
10.82
10.83
10.84
10.85
2 The Definition of the Company’s Seat (siège social)
10.86
10.87
10.88
10.89
10.90
10.91
3 Nature of the company—public entities as investors
10.92
10.93
10.94
10.95
10.96
10.97
10.98
4 Rights of shareholders to bring claims
10.99
10.100
(a) Minority shareholders
10.101
10.102
10.103
10.104
10.105
(b) Indirect shareholders
10.106
10.107
10.108
10.109
10.110
10.111
10.112
10.113
(c) Risks associated with claims by multiple shareholders
10.114
10.115
10.116
10.117
(d) Tools to address parallel and multiple proceedings
10.118
(i) Waivers and limitations of investor’s rights
10.119
10.120
10.121
(ii) Consolidation of claims
10.122
10.123
10.124
(iii) Lis pendens
10.125
10.126
10.127
10.128
IV Conclusion
10.129
10.130
10.131
10.132
11 The Meaning of ‘Investment’ in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
II The Definition of ‘Investment’ in International Agreements
A The Definition of ‘Investment’ in Investment Treaties
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
11.11
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
B The Notion of ‘Investment’ in the ICSID Convention
11.16
11.17
11.18
11.19
11.20
11.21
11.22
III Arbitral Jurisprudence on the Definition of ‘Investment’
A Types of Assets Constituting an ‘Investment’
11.23
11.24
11.25
1 Trade agreements
11.26
11.27
11.28
2 Loans
11.29
11.30
11.31
11.32
3 Bonds
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.36
4 Awards and settlement agreements
11.37
11.38
11.39
5 Real property, chattels, and intellectual property
11.40
11.41
6 Contractual rights
11.42
11.43
7 Pre-investment expenditures
11.44
11.45
11.46
B The Interpretation of ‘Investment’ by Arbitral Tribunals
11.47
11.48
11.49
1 The different approaches
(a) The objectivist approach
11.50
11.51
11.52
11.53
11.54
11.55
11.56
11.57
11.58
(b) The subjectivist approach
11.59
11.60
11.61
11.62
11.63
2 The criteria of an ‘investment’
11.64
11.65
11.66
11.67
11.68
11.69
(a) Contribution
11.70
11.71
11.72
11.73
(b) Risk
11.74
11.75
11.76
11.77
11.78
11.79
(c) Duration
11.80
11.81
11.82
11.83
11.84
11.85
11.86
11.87
11.88
(d) Additional criteria?
11.89
(i) Contribution to the host state’s economic development
11.90
11.91
(ii) Origin of capital
11.92
(iii) Regularity of profits and returns
11.93
(iv) Good faith
11.94
(v) Legality
11.95
C The Requirement that an Investment Be Made ‘In Accordance with the Host State’s Law’
11.96
11.97
11.98
11.99
11.100
D The Requirement that an Investment Be ‘In the Territory of the Host State’
11.101
11.102
11.103
11.104
11.105
1 Tangible property
11.106
11.107
2 Intangible property
11.108
(a) Contracts for the provision of services
11.109
11.110
11.111
(b) Financial instruments and products
11.112
11.113
11.114
11.115
IV Conclusion
11.116
11.117
11.118
12 Bifurcation of Investment Disputes
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
12.01
12.02
II The Framework under Major Arbitral Rules
A ICSID Convention/Rules
12.03
12.04
12.05
B ICSID Additional Facility Rules
12.06
C UNCITRAL Rules
12.07
12.08
D ICC Rules
12.09
12.10
E SCC Rules
12.11
III The Standard
12.12
12.13
A Procedural Economy
12.14
12.15
12.16
12.17
12.18
12.19
B Likelihood of Dismissal/Reduction in the Scope of Case
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
C Overlapping Issues
12.24
12.25
12.26
12.27
IV Bifurcation Procedure
12.28
12.29
V Conclusion
12.30
13 Burden and Standard of Proof at the Jurisdictional Stage
Preliminary Material
I General Principles Regarding Burdens of Proof
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
II Distinguishing the Burden of Proof from the Standard of Proof
13.05
III Who Bears the Burden of Proof at the Jurisdictional Phase?
A The Claimant Bears the Burden of Proving the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
13.06
13.07
13.08
13.09
13.10
13.11
13.12
13.13
B Either Party Can Bear the Burden of Proving or Disproving the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
13.14
13.15
13.16
13.17
13.18
13.19
13.20
13.21
13.22
13.23
13.24
C The Respondent Bears the Burden of Proof
13.25
13.26
13.27
13.28
D The Centrist Position: Neither Party Bears the Burden of Proving the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
13.33
13.34
IV Who Bears the Burden of Proof Regarding Specific Jurisdictional Objections?
13.35
A The National Identity of the Natural Person Claimant is in Dispute
13.36
B The Claim Does Not Arise out of an ‘Investment’
13.37
13.38
C The Claimant is Not an ‘Investor’ Within the Meaning of the BIT/Treaty
13.39
D Consent to Arbitrate
13.40
E Case Already Litigated Through Domestic Courts
13.41
13.42
13.43
F Dispute Arose Prior to the Entry of the BIT into Force
13.44
G Dispute Barred by a Provision of the BIT/Treaty
13.45
V Once the Tribunal Determines Who Has the Burden of Proof, What Standard of Proof Is Applicable at the Jurisdictional Phase?
A Prima Facie Standard
13.46
13.47
13.48
13.49
13.50
13.51
13.52
13.53
13.54
13.55
13.56
13.57
13.58
13.59
13.60
B The Standard Depends on the Facts
13.61
13.62
13.63
13.64
13.65
C Establishing a Prima Facie Case
13.66
13.67
13.68
13.69
13.70
13.71
VI Conclusion
13.72
13.73
14 Attribution: State Organs and Entities Exercising Elements of Governmental Authority
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.04
14.05
14.06
14.07
14.08
14.09
II What Are State Organs?
14.10
14.11
14.12
14.13
14.14
14.15
A Internal Law is the Source of Legal Data, Not Classifications
14.16
14.17
14.18
14.19
14.20
B Institutional Separateness or Lack Thereof
14.21
14.22
14.23
14.24
14.25
14.26
14.27
14.28
14.29
14.30
14.31
III Para-statal Entities
14.32
14.33
14.34
14.35
14.36
A ‘Governmental Authority’
14.37
14.38
14.39
14.40
14.41
14.42
14.43
B Acts in Exercise of Governmental Authority
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
14.49
14.50
14.51
14.52
14.53
14.54
14.55
14.56
14.57
IV Inexistence of ‘Non-justiciable’ Acts of State Organs
14.58
14.59
14.60
14.61
14.62
14.63
14.64
14.65
14.66
V Attribution of Representations
14.67
A Representations Frustrated by Later Conduct
14.68
14.69
14.70
14.71
14.72
14.73
14.74
14.75
14.76
14.77
B Contractual breaches actionable under umbrella Clauses
14.78
14.79
14.80
14.81
14.82
14.83
14.84
14.85
14.86
14.87
14.88
14.89
14.90
14.91
VI Conclusion
14.92
15 Breach of Treaty Claims and Breach of Contract Claims: When Can an International Tribunal Exercise Jurisdiction?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
15.01
15.02
15.03
II Treaty-based Tribunals’ Jurisdiction over Treaty Claims Arising out of an Underlying Contract
15.04
15.05
A Contract Protection under Customary International Law
15.06
15.07
15.08
15.09
15.10
B Contract Protection under Investment Treaties
15.11
1 Expropriation
15.12
2 Fair and equitable treatment
15.13
15.14
15.15
3 Other treaty protections
15.16
C Investment Treaty Claims Arising out of Contracts
15.17
15.18
15.19
III Treaty-based Tribunals’ Jurisdiction over ‘Purely’ Contractual Claims
15.20
15.21
15.22
A Umbrella Clause Provisions as a Basis for Jurisdiction over Contract Claims
15.23
B Provisions Granting Jurisdiction over ‘Any Disputes’
15.24
15.25
15.26
15.27
15.28
15.29
15.30
15.31
1 Principle of Attribution Distinguished.
15.32
15.33
15.34
C Provisions Granting Jurisdiction over Disputes Relating to ‘Investment Agreements’
15.35
15.36
15.37
IV Distinguishing Between Breach of Treaty Claims and Breach of Contract Claims
15.38
15.39
15.40
15.41
15.42
15.43
A The Power of Treaty-based Tribunals to Interpret Contracts
15.44
15.45
15.46
15.47
B The Difficulty (and Irrelevance) of Attempting to Identify Contract Claims ‘Dressed’ as Treaty Claims
15.48
15.49
15.50
15.51
15.52
15.53
15.54
15.55
15.56
C The Impact of Contractual Forum Selection Clauses on the Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Tribunals
15.57
1 Jurisdiction over treaty claims
15.58
15.59
15.60
15.61
15.62
15.63
15.64
15.65
15.66
15.67
2 Jurisdiction over Contract Claims
15.68
15.69
15.70
15.71
D The Role and Significance of ‘Fork-in-the-Road’ Provisions
15.72
15.73
15.74
15.75
15.76
15.77
15.78
15.79
V Conclusion
15.80
16 The Umbrella Clause: Is the Umbrella Closing?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
16.05
II History of the Umbrella Clause and State Practice
16.06
16.07
16.08
16.09
16.10
16.11
16.12
16.13
16.14
16.15
III Significance of the Umbrella Clause in Treaties
16.16
16.17
16.18
16.19
16.20
16.21
16.22
IV Effects, Scope, and Conditions of Application of the Umbrella Clause
16.23
16.24
16.25
A The Effects of the Umbrella Clause
16.26
16.27
16.28
16.29
16.30
16.31
16.32
1 A narrow interpretation
16.33
16.34
16.35
16.36
16.37
2 A wide interpretation—‘effet utile’
16.38
16.39
16.40
16.41
16.42
16.43
16.44
16.45
16.46
3 Umbrella clause and forum selection clause
16.47
16.48
16.49
16.50
16.51
B The Scope of the Umbrella Clause or the Conditions of Its Application
16.52
1 Jure imperii versus jure gestionis
16.53
16.54
16.55
16.56
16.57
16.58
16.59
16.60
2 Contractual commitments versus legislative and administrative acts
16.61
16.62
16.63
16.64
16.65
16.66
16.67
16.68
3 Does the umbrella clause apply if the party to the investment contract is an entity distinct from the host state?
16.69
16.70
16.71
16.72
16.73
16.74
16.75
16.76
4 Shareholders’ and parent companies’ rights
16.77
16.78
16.79
16.80
16.81
16.82
16.83
V Conclusion
16.84
16.85
16.86
16.87
17 Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
17.01
17.02
17.03
17.04
17.05
II Milestone Cases
17.06
17.07
17.08
17.09
17.10
17.11
17.12
17.13
17.14
17.15
17.16
17.17
17.18
III Counterclaims under the ICSID Convention
17.19
A Introduction to Article 46
17.20
17.21
17.22
17.23
17.24
B Counterclaims Arising Directly out of the Subject Matter of the Dispute
17.25
17.26
17.27
17.28
17.29
17.30
17.31
17.32
17.33
17.34
17.35
17.36
C Counterclaims Within the Scope of the Parties’ Consent
17.37
1 Source of consent: two schools of thought
17.38
17.39
17.40
17.41
17.42
17.43
17.44
17.45
2 Relevant factors in establishing the parties’ consent in the IIA
17.46
(a) References to counterclaims
17.47
17.48
(b) Scope of jurisdiction ratione materiae
(i) Scope of arbitrable disputes
17.49
17.50
17.51
17.52
(ii) Law applicable to the merits of an investment dispute
17.53
17.54
17.55
17.56
17.57
17.58
17.59
(c) Standing to initiate proceedings
17.60
17.61
(d) Inviolability of the state’s standing offer in a BIT to arbitrate
17.62
17.63
17.64
D Counterclaims Otherwise Within ICSID’s Jurisdiction
17.65
17.66
E Conclusion
17.67
IV Counterclaims Under the UNCITRAL Rules
A Introduction
17.68
17.69
17.70
17.71
17.72
B Ipso Facto Importation of Consent
17.73
17.74
17.75
17.76
17.77
17.78
17.79
17.80
17.81
C The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules: Implied Modification by State Parties
17.82
17.83
17.84
17.85
17.86
17.87
D The Connection Requirement under the New and Old UNCITRAL Rules
17.88
17.89
17.90
17.91
17.92
17.93
E Conclusion
17.94
V Moving Forward: Greater Expectations in Counterclaim Practice
17.95
17.96
18 The State’s Corruption Defence, Prosecutorial Efforts, and Anti-corruption Norms in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
18.01
18.02
18.03
18.04
18.05
18.06
18.07
18.08
18.09
18.10
18.11
II Binary Outcomes of the Corruption Defence—Can the Playing Field be Levelled?
18.12
18.13
A Preliminary Remarks Regarding Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Merits
18.14
18.15
18.16
18.17
18.18
B Illegality Where There Is a Legality Clause
18.19
18.20
18.21
18.22
18.23
C Illegality Where There Is No Legality Clause
18.24
18.25
18.26
18.27
18.28
D The State’s Obligation to Prosecute or Investigate and the Corruption Defence
18.29
1 Illegality as a jurisdictional issue
18.30
2 Illegality as a merits issue
18.31
18.32
18.33
18.34
18.35
18.36
18.37
18.38
18.39
3 Whether the respondent state can lose the right to assert the corruption defence
18.40
18.41
18.42
18.43
18.44
18.45
18.46
18.47
18.48
18.49
18.50
18.51
4 Tribunals should be circumspect with national authorities’ findings on corruption
18.52
18.53
18.54
18.55
18.56
18.57
18.58
18.59
18.60
18.61
18.62
18.63
18.64
18.65
18.66
18.67
18.68
18.69
18.70
18.71
18.72
18.73
18.74
18.75
18.76
18.77
18.78
18.79
5 Conclusion
18.80
18.81
18.82
18.83
III Anti-corruption Norms in Recent Investment Agreements
A Introduction
18.84
18.85
18.86
18.87
B Independent Anti-corruption Provisions—the Japanese Treaties
18.88
18.89
18.90
18.91
18.92
18.93
18.94
18.95
18.96
18.97
18.98
18.99
18.100
18.101
C Anti-corruption Norms as a Part of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)—the Canadian Treaties
18.102
18.103
18.104
18.105
18.106
18.107
18.108
18.109
IV Conclusion
18.110
18.111
18.112
18.113
18.114
Part IV Guide to Key Substantive Issues
19 The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
19.01
19.02
19.03
II Identification of the Law Chosen by the Parties
19.04
A Choice of Law in Context
19.05
19.06
19.07
19.08
B Variations on the Law of the Host State and International Law
19.09
19.10
19.11
19.12
19.13
III Determination of the Applicable Law by the Arbitrators in the Absence of the Parties’ Agreement
19.14
19.15
19.16
19.17
19.18
19.19
19.20
19.21
IV Implications of the Specific Nature of Investment Treaties in the Choice of Law Process
19.22
19.23
19.24
19.25
19.26
19.27
19.28
19.29
19.30
19.31
19.32
20 Fair and Equitable Treatment: Have Its Contours Fully Evolved?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
20.01
20.02
20.03
20.04
20.05
20.06
20.07
II Does FET Refer to Customary International Law or Is It an Autonomous Standard?
20.08
20.09
20.10
20.11
A The NAFTA Tribunals
20.12
20.13
20.14
20.15
20.16
20.17
20.18
20.19
B Non-NAFTA Tribunals
20.20
20.21
20.22
20.23
20.24
C What Difference Does It Make Whether Fair and Equitable Treatment Refers to the Minimum Standard of Customary Law?
20.25
20.26
20.27
III The Normative Content of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
20.28
20.29
20.30
A Denial of Justice, Due Process
20.31
20.32
20.33
20.34
20.35
20.36
20.37
20.38
20.39
20.40
20.41
20.42
20.43
20.44
B Transparency, Stability, and Legitimate Expectations
20.45
20.46
1 Transparency
20.47
20.48
20.49
20.50
20.51
2 Stability
20.52
20.53
20.54
20.55
20.56
20.57
20.58
20.59
3 Legitimate expectations
20.60
20.61
20.62
20.63
20.64
20.65
20.66
20.67
20.68
20.69
20.70
4 Proportionality and balance of interests
20.71
20.72
20.73
20.74
20.75
20.76
20.77
20.78
20.79
20.80
20.81
20.82
20.83
20.84
20.85
20.86
C Obligation of Vigilance and Protection
20.87
20.88
20.89
D Lack of Arbitrariness and Non-discrimination
20.90
20.91
20.92
20.93
20.94
20.95
20.96
20.97
IV Conclusion
20.98
20.99
20.100
20.101
20.102
20.103
20.104
20.105
21 The National Treatment Obligation
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
21.01
21.02
21.03
21.04
II Precluding Nationality-based Discrimination
21.05
21.06
21.07
21.08
21.09
21.10
21.11
21.12
21.13
21.14
21.15
21.16
III National Treatment in Practice
21.17
21.18
21.19
21.20
21.21
A The Like Circumstances Inquiry
21.22
1 Comparators in cases of de jure National Treatment Violations
21.23
21.24
21.25
21.26
21.27
2 Comparators in cases of de facto national treatment violations
21.28
21.29
21.30
21.31
21.32
21.33
21.34
21.35
21.36
21.37
21.38
21.39
21.40
21.41
21.42
21.43
21.44
21.45
21.46
21.47
3 Few versus many comparators
21.48
21.49
21.50
21.51
21.52
21.53
21.54
21.55
21.56
21.57
21.58
B Treatment Accorded the Investor
21.59
21.60
21.61
21.62
21.63
21.64
21.65
21.66
21.67
21.68
21.69
21.70
21.71
21.72
21.73
21.74
21.75
21.76
C ‘Arbitrary and Discriminatory’ Treatment
21.77
21.78
21.79
21.80
21.81
21.82
D Determining the Level of Treatment that Must Be Accorded a Foreign Investor
21.83
21.84
21.85
21.86
21.87
21.88
E Objective Justifications for Differential Treatment: The Role of Burden Shifting in National Treatment Analysis
21.89
21.90
21.91
21.92
21.93
IV Reservations and Exceptions
21.94
21.95
21.96
A State, Provincial, or Municipal Government Measures
21.97
21.98
21.99
21.100
21.101
21.102
B Measures to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment
21.103
21.104
C Measures to Protect Local Culture
21.105
V Conclusions
21.106
21.107
21.108
22 Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Has the Line Been Drawn?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
22.01
22.02
22.03
22.04
22.05
II Basic Concepts of the Obligation to Compensate for Expropriation
22.06
22.07
22.08
22.09
22.10
22.11
22.12
III The Notion of ‘Property’
22.13
22.14
22.15
22.16
22.17
22.18
22.19
22.20
22.21
22.22
22.23
22.24
IV Legal Instruments and Other Texts
22.25
22.26
22.27
22.28
22.29
22.30
22.31
22.32
22.33
22.34
V Main Sources of Jurisprudence
22.35
22.36
22.37
22.38
A The Iran–US Tribunal
22.39
22.40
22.41
B The European Court of Human Rights
22.42
22.43
22.44
22.45
C Investor-state Tribunals
22.46
22.47
22.48
VI Criteria Indicating Whether an Indirect Expropriation Has Occurred
22.49
22.50
A Degree of Interference with the Property Right
22.51
22.52
22.53
22.54
22.55
22.56
22.57
22.58
22.59
22.60
22.61
22.62
22.63
22.64
22.65
22.66
22.67
22.68
22.69
22.70
22.71
22.72
B Duration of the Regulation
22.73
22.74
22.75
22.76
22.77
22.78
C Economic Impact as the Exclusive Criterion
22.79
22.80
22.81
22.82
22.83
22.84
D Character of Governmental Measures and the Police Powers of the State
22.85
22.86
22.87
22.88
22.89
22.90
22.91
22.92
22.93
22.94
22.95
22.96
E Proportionality
22.97
22.98
22.99
22.100
22.101
22.102
22.103
22.104
22.105
22.106
22.107
22.108
F Interference of the Measure with Reasonable Investment-backed Expectations
22.109
22.110
22.111
22.112
22.113
22.114
22.115
22.116
22.117
22.118
VII Conclusion
22.119
22.120
22.121
22.122
23 The MFN Clause and Its Evolving Boundaries
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
23.01
23.02
23.03
II Historical Background
A Origins
23.04
23.05
23.06
23.07
B Work of the International Law Commission
1 1978 Draft Articles on MFN clauses
23.08
23.09
(a) Interpretation
23.10
23.11
(b) Definition of MFN Treatment
23.12
23.13
23.14
23.15
(c) MFN Clauses May Be Conditioned or Restricted
23.16
23.17
(d) The ejusdem generis principle
23.18
23.19
23.20
23.21
2 2015 Final Report of the Study Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause
23.22
23.23
23.24
23.25
23.26
23.27
23.28
23.29
23.30
23.31
23.32
23.33
23.34
C Early Jurisprudence
23.35
1 Anglo–Iranian Oil Company
23.36
23.37
23.38
23.39
2 Rights of US Nationals in Morocco
23.40
23.41
23.42
3 Ambatielos
23.43
23.44
23.45
23.46
23.47
III Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice
A MFN Clauses and Dispute Settlement
23.48
23.49
23.50
23.51
23.52
23.53
23.54
23.55
23.56
B The Cases
1 Maffezini v Spain
23.57
23.58
23.59
23.60
23.61
2 Siemens v Argentina
23.62
23.63
23.64
23.65
23.66
23.67
23.68
3 Other early cases in the line of Maffezini and Siemens
23.69
23.70
23.71
23.72
23.73
23.74
23.75
23.76
23.77
23.78
23.79
23.80
4 Plama v Bulgaria
23.81
23.82
23.83
23.84
23.85
23.86
5 Other cases in the line of Plama
23.87
23.88
23.89
23.90
23.91
23.92
23.93
23.94
23.95
23.96
6 Renewed focus on treaty text and intent of the parties
23.97
23.98
23.99
7 Distinguishing between matters of jurisdiction and admissibility
23.100
23.101
23.102
23.103
23.104
23.105
23.106
23.107
23.108
23.109
23.110
23.111
23.112
23.113
IV Treaty-making Practice and Investment Treaty Jurisprudence
23.114
23.115
23.116
23.117
V Conclusion
23.118
Part V Remedies and Costs
24 Interim Relief in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
24.01
24.02
II The Power to Grant Interim Relief
24.03
A Interim Relief in the ICSID System
1 ICSID Convention cases
24.04
24.05
24.06
24.07
2 Additional facility cases
24.08
24.09
24.10
B Interim Relief under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
24.11
1 The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules
24.12
24.13
2 The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules
24.14
24.15
24.16
C Other Relevant Provisions
24.17
24.18
III Purpose of the Measures: Preserving the Respective Rights of the Parties
24.19
A ICSID System
24.20
24.21
24.22
24.23
24.24
24.25
24.26
24.27
B NAFTA Proceedings
24.28
C UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
24.29
1 The 1976 UNCITRAL Rule
24.30
24.31
2 The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules
24.32
24.33
24.34
IV Types of Measures
24.35
24.36
A Preservation of a Right
24.37
1 ICSID system
24.38
24.39
24.40
24.41
24.42
24.43
24.44
24.45
24.46
B Preservation of the Status Quo/Non-aggravation of the Dispute
1 ICSID system
24.47
24.48
24.49
24.50
24.51
24.52
24.53
24.54
24.55
24.56
24.57
24.58
2 UNCITRAL Rules
24.59
24.60
24.61
C Preserving the Integrity of the Proceedings/Preventing Prejudice to the Arbitral Process Itself
1 ICSID system
24.62
2 UNCITRAL Rules
24.63
24.64
D Preserving Evidence
24.65
1 ICSID system
24.66
2 UNCITRAL Rules
24.67
24.68
24.69
E Protection of the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
24.70
1 ICSID Convention cases
24.71
24.72
24.73
24.74
24.75
24.76
24.77
24.78
24.79
2 Additional Facility cases
24.80
3 UNCITRAL Rules
24.81
24.82
24.83
F Non-frustration of the Award
24.84
1 ICSID system
24.85
24.86
24.87
2 UNCITRAL Rules
24.88
24.89
24.90
24.91
V Requirements for Interim Relief
24.92
A The Initiative to Request Interim Relief
1 ICSID system
24.93
24.94
2 UNCITRAL Rules
24.95
B Jurisdiction of the Tribunal?
24.96
1 ICSID practice
24.97
24.98
24.99
24.100
24.101
24.102
2 UNCITRAL practice
24.103
24.104
C Prima Facie Case on the Merits?
24.105
1 ICSID system
24.106
24.107
2 UNCITRAL Rules
24.108
24.109
24.110
24.111
24.112
D Urgency
24.113
1 Is urgency a requirement?
24.114
(a) ICSID system
24.115
(b) What is urgency?
24.116
24.117
(c) Urgency and procedural aspects of an ICSID or AF case
24.118
24.119
24.120
24.121
24.122
(d) UNCITRAL Rules
24.123
24.124
24.125
(e) Urgency and the administration of an UNCITRAL case
24.126
24.127
24.128
24.129
E Necessity or Risk of Irreparable Harm
24.130
1 International precedents
24.131
2 ICSID system
24.132
24.133
24.134
24.135
24.136
24.137
24.138
24.139
3 UNCITRAL Rules
24.140
24.141
24.142
24.143
VI Against Whom Can the Measures be Ordered?
24.144
24.145
24.146
VII Effect of Interim Measures
24.147
A ICSID Convention Cases
1 Nature of the decision
24.148
24.149
24.150
24.151
24.152
2 Modification or revocation of the measures
24.153
B Additional Facility Cases
1 Nature of the decision
24.154
24.155
2 Modification or revocation of the measures
24.156
C NAFTA Proceedings
24.157
D UNCITRAL Rules
1 Nature of the decision
24.158
24.159
24.160
2 Modification or revocation of the measures
24.161
VIII Concurrent Jurisdiction of Domestic Courts
24.162
A ICSID Convention Proceedings
24.163
24.164
B Additional Facility Rules
24.165
C UNCITRAL Rules
24.166
D NAFTA Proceedings
24.167
IX Conclusion
24.168
25 Compensation and Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
25.01
25.02
25.03
25.04
25.05
II Applicable Legal Rules and Principles
25.06
A Rules on State Responsibility
25.07
25.08
25.09
25.10
25.11
25.12
B BIT Provisions on Compensation
25.13
25.14
25.15
25.16
25.17
C Other BIT Provisions
25.18
25.19
25.20
D Contractual Obligations
25.21
25.22
25.23
25.24
25.25
III Causation
25.26
25.27
25.28
25.29
25.30
25.31
25.32
IV Valuation Date
25.33
25.34
25.35
25.36
25.37
25.38
25.39
V Limiting Circumstances
25.40
A Contributory Negligence
25.41
25.42
25.43
B Mitigation of Damages
25.44
25.45
1 Economic distress
25.46
25.47
25.48
25.49
25.50
25.51
C Country Risk
25.52
25.53
25.54
25.55
VI Valuation Methods
25.56
25.57
25.58
A Market Approach
25.59
25.60
25.61
B Income Approach
25.62
25.63
25.64
25.65
25.66
C Asset-based or Cost Approach
25.67
25.68
25.69
VII Conclusion
25.70
26 Third-party Funding in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
26.01
26.02
26.03
26.04
26.05
26.06
26.07
26.08
26.09
26.10
26.11
II Does Third-party Funding Provoke Frivolous Claims?
26.12
26.13
26.14
III The Different Forms of Funding
26.15
A Non-recourse Financing
26.16
B Financing by Lawyers
26.17
C Insurance
26.18
D Equity Financing
26.19
E Debtor in Possession Financing
26.20
F Pro Bono or Charitable Funding
26.21
G Common Interest Funding
26.22
IV Regulation of Litigation Funding
26.23
26.24
26.25
26.26
V Jurisdiction and Admissibility
26.27
26.28
26.29
26.30
26.31
26.32
26.33
VI Third-party Funding and Liability for Costs
26.34
A The Right to Recover Costs if Successful
26.35
26.36
26.37
B Recovery of Funding Costs
26.38
26.39
26.40
26.41
26.42
26.43
C Security for Costs
26.44
26.45
26.46
26.47
26.48
26.49
26.50
26.51
VII Disclosure of Third-party Funding
26.52
A Disclosure of a Third-party Funder’s Identity
26.53
26.54
26.55
26.56
26.57
26.58
B Should the Terms of Funding Agreements be Disclosed?
26.59
26.60
26.61
26.62
VIII Concluding Remarks
26.63
Part VI The Post-Award Phase
27 Annulment of ICSID Awards: Is it Enough or Is Appeal around the Corner?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
27.01
27.02
27.03
II Scope and Application of Annulment under the ICSID Convention
27.04
27.05
27.06
27.07
A Annulment: An Exceptional Recourse?
27.08
27.09
27.10
27.11
27.12
27.13
27.14
B Annulment versus Appeal: A Thin Line in ICSID Annulment Proceedings
27.15
27.16
27.17
27.18
27.19
27.20
27.21
27.22
III The Grounds for Annulment
27.23
A Improper Constitution of the Tribunal
27.24
27.25
27.26
27.27
27.28
27.29
B Manifest Excess of Powers
27.30
27.31
27.32
1 Jurisdiction
27.33
27.34
27.35
27.36
27.37
2 Applicable law
27.38
27.39
27.40
27.41
27.42
27.43
C Failure to State Reasons
27.44
27.45
27.46
27.47
27.48
27.49
D Serious Departure from a Fundamental Rule of Procedure
27.50
27.51
27.52
27.53
27.54
IV Stay of Enforcement
27.55
27.56
27.57
27.58
27.59
27.60
27.61
27.62
27.63
27.64
27.65
27.66
27.67
27.68
27.69
V The Quest for Coherence and Consistency: Proposals for an Appeal Mechanism
27.70
27.71
27.72
27.73
A Past and Current Efforts to include Provisions on the Establishment of an Appeal Mechanism in Investment Agreements
27.74
1 The first wave of International Investment Agreements including an appeal mechanism
(a) The US IIAs and CAFTA
27.75
27.76
(b) The ICSID proposed appeals facility rules
27.77
27.78
27.79
27.80
2 The second and current wave of International Investment Agreements including an appellate mechanism: the TPP and the EU agreements
27.81
27.82
27.83
27.84
27.85
27.86
27.87
3 Why an appellate mechanism in investment disputes? Advantages and disadvantages
27.88
27.89
(a) Advantages
27.90
27.91
27.92
27.93
27.94
27.95
(b) Disadvantages
27.96
27.97
27.98
27.99
27.100
B What Lies Ahead? A Multilateral Solution?
27.101
27.102
27.103
27.104
27.105
VI Conclusion
27.106
27.107
27.108
28 Review of non-ICSID Awards by National Courts
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
28.01
28.02
28.03
28.04
28.05
28.06
28.07
28.08
II The Legal Framework for Review and Challenge of Investment Treaty Awards
28.09
28.10
28.11
28.12
28.13
III Decisions by National Courts
28.14
A Republic of Poland v Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH
28.15
28.16
28.17
B Russian Federation v Sedelmayer
1 The arbitration
28.18
2 The challenge proceedings
28.19
(a) Jurisdiction of the courts of Sweden
28.20
28.21
(b) Jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
28.22
28.23
28.24
28.25
C Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Company
1 The arbitration
28.26
28.27
2 The challenge proceedings
28.28
(a) Justiciability
28.29
28.30
(b) Jurisdiction
28.31
28.32
28.33
D Petrobart Ltd v Kyrgyz Republic and Kyrgyz Republic v Pertrobart Ltd
28.34
1 Petrobart I
(a) The arbitration
28.35
(b) The Challenge Proceedings
28.36
28.37
28.38
28.39
2 Petrobart II
(a) The arbitration
28.40
28.41
28.42
(b) The challenge proceedings
28.43
28.44
E Czech Republic v Saluka Investments BV
1 The arbitration
28.45
2 The challenge proceedings
28.46
28.47
28.48
F Bayview Irrigation District 11 and Ors v Mexico
28.49
1 The arbitration
28.50
28.51
2 The challenge proceedings
28.52
28.53
28.54
28.55
28.56
G Czech Republic v European Media Ventures SA
1 The arbitration
28.57
28.58
28.59
28.60
2 The challenge proceedings
28.61
28.62
28.63
28.64
28.65
H Mexico v Cargill, Incorporated
1 The arbitration
28.66
28.67
2 The challenge proceedings
28.68
28.69
28.70
28.71
28.72
28.73
28.74
28.75
I Argentina v BG Group PLC
1 The arbitration
28.76
28.77
28.78
28.79
2 The Challenge Proceedings
28.80
28.81
28.82
J Energoalians (Currently Known as Komstroy) v Moldova
1 The arbitration
28.83
28.84
28.85
28.86
2 The challenge proceedings
28.87
K Ecuador v Chevron (USA) and Texaco
1 The arbitration
28.88
28.89
28.90
28.91
28.92
2 The challenge proceedings
28.93
28.94
28.95
28.96
28.97
L Sanum Investments Ltd v Lao People’s Republic
1 The arbitration
28.98
28.99
28.100
28.101
28.102
28.103
2 The challenge proceedings
(a) Singapore High Court
28.104
(i) Justiciability
28.105
(ii) Standard of review
28.106
(iii) Applicability of the China–Laos BIT to Macao investors
28.107
28.108
(iv) Whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction over Sanum’s expropriation claim
28.109
(b) Singapore Court of Appeal
28.110
(i) Justiciability
28.111
(ii) Standard of review
28.112
(iii) Applicability of the China–Laos BIT to Macao investors
28.113
28.114
28.115
(iv) Whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction over Sanum’s expropriation claim
28.116
M Russian Federation v Renta 4 S.V.S.A. et al.
1 The arbitration
28.117
28.118
28.119
28.120
28.121
2 The Challenge Proceedings
28.122
28.123
28.124
28.125
28.126
IV Discussion
28.127
A Do National Courts Have Jurisdiction to Determine Challenges of Investment Treaty Awards?
28.128
28.129
28.130
28.131
28.132
28.133
B Is It Appropriate for National Courts to Review Investment Treaty Awards?
28.134
28.135
28.136
28.137
28.138
28.139
28.140
28.141
28.142
28.143
28.144
C What Standards of Review Do National Courts Adopt for Reviewing Challenges to the Jurisdiction of Investment Treaty Arbitral Tribunals?
28.145
28.146
28.147
28.148
28.149
28.150
28.151
28.152
28.153
28.154
28.155
28.156
28.157
28.158
V Conclusion
28.159
28.160
28.161
28.162
28.163
29 Enforcement of Investment Treaty Awards
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
29.01
29.02
II Enforcement of Non-ICSID Awards
29.03
A Foreign Arbitral Awards
29.04
29.05
B Investment Awards as Commercial Disputes
29.06
29.07
29.08
29.09
C Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Requirement of a Written Arbitration Agreement
29.10
29.11
D Obligation of National Courts to Enforce Investment Awards
29.12
III Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of Investment Awards
29.13
29.14
29.15
A The Article V(1) Grounds for Refusing Enforcement of Investment Awards
29.16
29.17
29.18
29.19
29.20
29.21
29.22
29.23
29.24
29.25
29.26
29.27
29.28
B The Article V(2) Grounds for Refusing Enforcement of Investment Awards
29.29
1 Lack of arbitrability
29.30
29.31
29.32
29.33
29.34
29.35
2 Public policy
29.36
29.37
29.38
29.39
29.40
29.41
29.42
29.43
C State Immunity as an Additional Hurdle
29.44
29.45
29.46
29.47
29.48
29.49
1 Assets immune from enforcement
29.50
29.51
29.52
29.53
29.54
29.55
29.56
29.57
29.58
29.59
29.60
29.61
29.62
2 Waiver of enforcement immunity
29.63
IV Enforcement of ICSID Awards
29.64
29.65
A The Autonomous International Law Obligation to Comply with ICSID Awards
29.66
29.67
B Exclusivity
29.68
29.69
29.70
C The Strict Obligation to Recognize and Enforce ICSID Awards
29.71
29.72
29.73
29.74
D State Immunity Rules on Enforcement Measures as Remaining Obstacles
29.75
1 Assets immune from enforcement
29.76
29.77
29.78
29.79
29.80
2 Waiver of enforcement immunity
29.81
E Other Failed Attempts to Enforce ICSID Awards
29.82
V Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms
29.83
29.84
29.85
29.86
VI Conclusion
29.87
30 A Practical Guide: Research Tools in International Investment Law
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
30.01
30.02
30.03
30.04
30.05
30.06
30.07
II Arbitral Case Law and Public International Case Law
30.08
A Case Law
30.09
B Journal Reviews of Investment Arbitration Case Law
30.10
III International Treaties: Identification and Interpretation
30.11
A Resources to Identify Investment Treaties
30.12
B Fundamental Rules of Treaty Interpretation in Public International Law
30.13
30.14
30.15
30.16
30.17
30.18
30.19
30.20
IV Customary International Law
30.21
A What Is International Custom and How Is a Customary Norm Created?
30.22
30.23
30.24
30.25
30.26
B Means to Identify Customary Norms in Public International Law
30.27
30.28
30.29
30.30
30.31
30.32
C Applicability and Relevance of Customary Norms in International Investment Law
30.33
30.34
30.35
V Conclusion
30.36
30.37
Further Material
Index
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International Legislation
Katia Yannaca-Small
From:
Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (2nd Edition)
Edited By: Katia Yannaca-Small
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Investment Claims [IC]
Published in print:
19 July 2018
ISBN:
9780198758082
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