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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Dedication
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents—Summary
Contents—Detailed
Table of Cases
International
Australia
France
Ghana
India
Netherlands
Nigeria
Russia
South Africa
Sweden
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Table of National Legislation
Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bolivia
Cameroon
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Columbia
Congo
Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste
Ecuador
Egypt
France
Germany
Ghana
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Italy
Iran
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kurdistan Region
Kuwait
Liberia
Libya
Malaysia
Mexico
Mozambique
Netherlands
Nigeria
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Qatar
Russian Federation
South Africa
South Sudan
Spain
Sudan
Tanzania
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Table of Treaties and Other International Instruments
Multilateral Treaties and Other International Instruments
Bilateral Treaties
Bilateral Agreements
Regional Trade Agreements
Abbreviations
Glossary
Introduction to the Second Edition
Main Text
Part I
1 Energy Investment Law
Preliminary Material
A Energy Investment Law
1.01
1.02
1.03
(1) Energy investments
1.04
(a) International
1.05
1.06
(b) Scale
1.07
1.08
1.09
(c) Long-term
1.10
(d) The State
1.11
(e) Price volatility
1.12
1.13
1.14
(f) Complexity
1.15
(2) Context-based features
(a) Transformation
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
(b) The legacy factor
1.20
1.21
The outcome is a high-risk profile
1.22
(3) Frameworks as a legal response
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
(4) The offer of stability
1.32
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
1.40
1.41
B Overview of the Book
(1) Aims
1.42
1.43
1.44
(2) Approach
1.45
1.46
Case studies
1.47
Energy and international investment law
1.48
(3) Scope
Energy
1.49
1.50
Law
1.51
Arbitral awards
1.52
Environment and human rights
1.53
1.54
(4) Structure
1.55
1.56
1.57
2 States, Investors, and Energy Agreements
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
B The Foundations of Partnership
(1) Host states
2.05
2.06
2.07
Who offers stability guarantees?
2.08
2.09
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
Complexity: states with federal structures
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
(2) Energy investors
2.21
2.22
2.23
(a) A typology
2.24
Investor Type 1
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
Investor Type 2
2.29
2.30
2.31
Investor Type 3
2.32
2.33
Investor Type 4: joint ventures
2.34
Investor Type 5: the mining company
2.35
2.36
(b) The investor: common issues
Indirect claims
2.37
2.38
Restructuring to benefit from treaty protection
2.39
2.40
2.41
Corporate nationality
2.42
2.43
2.44
(c) The ECT approach
2.45
2.46
(3) The investment
2.47
(a) The ECT approach
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
Low carbon
2.52
2.53
2.54
2.55
(b) NAFTA
2.56
2.57
2.58
2.59
(c) ICSID
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
2.64
C Governance
2.65
2.66
(1) Energy contracts
2.67
2.68
2.69
2.70
(2) Sovereignty over energy
2.71
Permanent sovereignty
2.72
The UN declarations
2.73
2.74
2.75
2.76
2.77
2.78
2.79
2.80
2.81
2.82
2.83
(3) Arbitration
2.84
Arbitration and the global system
2.85
Arbitration: key issues
2.86
Institutional or ad hoc
2.87
2.88
2.89
2.90
Alternatives to arbitration
2.91
Expert determination
2.92
Challenges to expert determinations
2.93
D Energy Investment Agreements
2.94
2.95
2.96
2.97
2.98
2.99
2.100
(1) Hydrocarbons
2.101
(a) The PSC
2.102
2.103
2.104
(i) Azerbaijan
2.105
(ii) Kurdistan
2.106
(iii) Mozambique
2.107
2.108
Advantages
2.109
Disadvantages
2.110
(b) The licence or tax-royalty approach
2.111
2.112
Disadvantages
2.113
2.114
Comparing PSAs and concessions
2.115
2.116
2.117
(c) The risk service agreement
2.118
2.119
(d) Stability and petroleum agreements
2.120
2.121
(e) The Joint Operating Agreement
2.122
2.123
2.124
(2) Natural gas
2.125
(a) Contract adjustment
2.126
2.127
(b) Pricing and price review
2.128
2.129
2.130
2.131
2.132
2.133
(c) Disputes over gas supplies
2.134
2.135
2.136
2.137
(d) LNG contract variations
2.138
(e) The state role and public service
2.139
(3) Electricity and renewable energy
2.140
(a) Conventional electricity
2.141
2.142
2.143
2.144
2.145
2.146
(b) Renewable energy
2.147
2.148
2.149
2.150
(4) Coal and energy-related mining
2.151
(a) Extraction
2.152
2.153
2.154
(b) Sale and trade
2.155
2.156
(c) Uranium mining
2.157
(d) Seabed mining
2.158
(5) Unconventional energy
2.159
2.160
2.161
2.162
2.163
(6) Nuclear energy
2.164
2.165
2.166
2.167
2.168
E Conclusions
2.169
2.170
2.171
3 Stability Based on Contract
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
B Contract, Legislation, and Treaty
3.06
(1) Legislative support for contract stability
3.07
3.08
3.09
(a) Nigeria
3.10
3.11
(b) Israel
3.12
3.13
(c) Legislature–executive interaction
3.14
(2) Interplay with international law
3.15
FET standard
3.16
Umbrella clause
3.17
3.18
Good faith
3.19
(3) Choice of law
3.20
3.21
C Stabilization Clauses
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
(1) Freezing
3.26
3.27
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.33
Reflections on freezing
3.34
3.35
(2) Prohibition on unilateral changes
3.36
3.37
3.38
3.39
(3) Rebalancing of benefits
3.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
(4) Allocation of burden
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
(5) The four methods
3.56
3.57
(6) Asymmetry
3.58
3.59
3.60
3.61
3.62
3.63
How asymmetry works
3.64
3.65
3.66
Kazakhstan contrast
3.67
3.68
D Renegotiation: The Rules of Engagement
3.69
(1) Clarity about aims
3.70
3.71
3.72
3.73
(2) Triggering event
3.74
3.75
(3) Precise obligations of the parties
3.76
3.77
3.78
3.79
(4) Coercion
3.80
3.81
(5) Contrasts with hardship
3.82
3.83
E Enforcement
3.84
(1) Can a state bind itself by an investment contract?
3.85
3.86
3.87
3.88
(2) Arbitration: the powers of the tribunal
3.89
3.90
3.91
3.92
(3) Remedies
3.93
3.94
3.95
F International Pipeline Projects
3.96
Model agreements
3.97
3.98
3.99
3.100
3.101
3.102
(1) The West African Gas Pipeline project
3.103
3.104
3.105
3.106
3.107
3.108
3.109
(2) The BTC pipeline project
3.110
3.111
3.112
3.113
3.114
3.115
3.116
3.117
G Conclusions
3.118
3.119
3.120
3.121
3.122
3.123
4 The Classic Tests of Contract-Based Stability
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
B The Key Role of Arbitration
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
C Lena Goldfields
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
D Aramco
4.16
4.17
4.18
E Sapphire
4.19
4.20
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
F The Libyan Cases
4.25
4.26
(1) The concession terms
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
4.31
(2) Unilateral actions
4.32
(3) Procedure
4.33
4.34
4.35
(4) Internationalization
4.36
4.37
4.38
4.39
4.40
(5) States can bind themselves by contract
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
(6) Compensation
4.45
4.46
4.47
(7) Assessment
4.48
4.49
4.50
G Aminoil
4.51
4.52
4.53
(1) The concession terms
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.57
4.58
(2) The arguments
4.59
4.60
(3) Renegotiations: content and conduct
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
(4) The award
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
4.71
4.72
4.73
(5) Compensation
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
H The Iran–US Claims Tribunal Cases
4.78
4.79
4.80
4.81
(1) Amoco International Finance
4.82
4.83
4.84
4.85
4.86
(2) The Consortium Cases
4.87
4.88
4.89
(3) Phillips Petroleum
4.90
4.91
4.92
4.93
(4) Compensation
4.94
4.95
4.96
4.97
4.98
I AGIP v Congo
4.99
4.100
4.101
4.102
4.103
4.104
4.105
J Conclusions
4.106
4.107
4.108
4.109
4.110
4.111
4.112
5 Stability Based on Treaty
Preliminary Material
A Introduction: Expansion of Guarantees to Investors
5.01
5.02
5.03
(1) The IIA framework
5.04
5.05
5.06
(2) Scope of treaty-making and use
5.07
5.08
5.09
B BITs and the Energy Sector
5.10
(1) BITs
5.11
5.12
(2) Practicalities
5.13
C Stability and Treaty-based Standards
5.14
(1) Fair and equitable treatment
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
(2) Legitimate expectations
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
(3) Full protection and security
5.23
5.24
5.25
(4) The umbrella clause
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
D The Energy Charter Treaty
(1) Why an energy treaty?
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
(2) Investment: definitions
5.43
5.44
5.45
5.46
(3) Denial of benefits
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
(4) Substantive protections
5.52
5.53
5.54
Fair and equitable treatment
5.55
Legitimate expectations
5.56
5.57
Constant protection and security
5.58
Umbrella clause
5.59
5.60
5.61
National treatment and MFN
5.62
5.63
Compensation for losses
5.64
Expropriation
5.65
5.66
5.67
Transfers related to investments
5.68
(5) Transit
5.69
5.70
The transit obligation
5.71
5.72
5.73
5.74
5.75
(6) Dispute settlement
5.76
5.77
5.78
5.79
5.80
5.81
5.82
5.83
5.84
(7) The tax carve-out
5.85
5.86
5.87
5.88
5.89
5.90
5.91
(8) Fork in the road
5.92
5.93
5.94
5.95
5.96
5.97
(9) Provisional application
5.98
5.99
5.100
5.101
(10) The ECT in practice
5.102
5.103
5.104
5.105
5.106
5.107
5.108
5.109
E USMCA & NAFTA Chapter 11
5.110
(1) The USMCA
5.111
Five key differences between the USMCA and NAFTA
5.112
5.113
5.114
(2) The legacy of NAFTA
5.115
5.116
Scope of protection
5.117
5.118
Structure
5.119
5.120
5.121
Dispute settlement
5.122
5.123
5.124
5.125
5.126
5.127
F Treaties with Investment Provisions
5.128
(1) ASEAN Investment Agreement
5.129
5.130
(2) The Comprehensive Progress Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
5.131
5.132
5.133
(3) DR-CAFTA
5.134
5.135
G The Paramount Role of ICSID
5.136
5.137
5.138
5.139
5.140
(1) The grand bargain
5.141
5.142
(2) Arbitration procedures
5.143
5.144
5.145
5.146
5.147
5.148
5.149
Consistency
5.150
5.151
5.152
(3) The additional facility
5.153
5.154
(4) Outcomes
5.155
Annulment
5.156
5.157
5.158
5.159
5.160
5.161
H Conclusions
5.162
5.163
Part II
6 Meeting Challenges to Investment Stability—Across the Energy Spectrum
Preliminary Material
A Introduction: Rethinking Stability
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
B Five Challenges
6.09
(1) Regulatory acts
6.10
6.11
6.12
Contract revocation
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
6.17
6.18
(2) Taxation measures
6.19
6.20
6.21
Capital gains tax
6.22
(a) Retroactivity: Cairn Energy v India
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
(b) Exclusion from treaty scope
6.28
6.29
6.30
Leverage
6.31
(3) States of necessity
6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
6.37
6.38
6.39
6.40
6.41
6.42
6.43
6.44
(4) Procedural complexity
6.45
Jurisdiction
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
Counterclaims
6.50
6.51
6.52
(5) The energy transition
6.53
6.54
6.55
(a) Renewable energy promotion
6.56
6.57
6.58
6.59
6.60
6.61
(b) Mandatory closures and phase-outs
6.62
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
(c) New energies and treaty disputes
6.67
6.68
6.69
C Expropriation, Direct and Indirect
6.70
6.71
6.72
6.73
6.74
6.75
(1) The tests
6.76
(a) The sole effect test
6.77
6.78
6.79
6.80
6.81
6.82
6.83
6.84
6.85
(b) Effects on the investor: legitimate expectations
6.86
6.87
6.88
(c) The purpose test
6.89
6.90
6.91
(d) The proportionality test
6.92
6.93
6.94
(2) Restrictive interpretations
6.95
6.96
6.97
6.98
(3) Expropriation of contractual rights
6.99
D Stability and Legitimate Expectations
6.100
6.101
(1) The broad scope of FET
6.102
6.103
6.104
6.105
6.106
6.107
(2) What is a stable and predictable framework?
6.108
6.109
6.110
6.111
6.112
6.113
6.114
6.115
6.116
6.117
6.118
6.119
6.120
6.121
(3) The main questions
6.122
(a) Are the investor’s expectations of stability based on contractual commitments?
6.123
6.124
6.125
(b) Are the investor’s expectations based on the host state’s legal order?
6.126
6.127
6.128
6.129
(c) Are the investor’s expectations based on representations?
6.130
(d) Are the investor’s expectations based on circumstances or context?
6.131
6.132
6.133
(e) If the ECT is applicable, what expectations about stability are legitimate?
6.134
6.135
6.136
E Making Claims: Treaty versus Contract
6.137
6.138
6.139
6.140
6.141
6.142
6.143
F Investor Responsibilities
6.144
6.145
Due diligence
6.146
6.147
6.148
6.149
6.150
6.151
Unconscionable conduct
6.152
6.153
6.154
6.155
6.156
6.157
G System Reform and Energy Investment
6.158
6.159
6.160
6.161
6.162
6.163
6.164
6.165
6.166
H Conclusions
6.167
6.168
6.169
7 Latin America: Treaty and Contract Stability in the Face of Policy Realignment and Crisis
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
7.09
7.10
B The Pendulum Swings
7.11
7.12
7.13
(1) Venezuela
7.14
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
(2) Bolivia
7.20
7.21
7.22
7.23
(3) Ecuador
7.24
7.25
7.26
(4) Argentina
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
C The Legal Stability Agreement
7.31
7.32
(1) Peru
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
7.39
(2) Venezuela
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
(3) Colombia
7.45
7.46
D Testing LSAs: Peru and Ecuador
7.47
(1) Duke Energy v Peru
7.48
The facts
7.49
7.50
7.51
7.52
Applicable law
7.53
Stabilization
7.54
7.55
7.56
7.57
7.58
Good faith
7.59
7.60
7.61
7.62
The award
7.63
7.64
Annulment
7.65
7.66
7.67
7.68
7.69
(2) Aguaytia v Peru
7.70
7.71
7.72
7.73
7.74
7.75
(3) Noble Energy and Machalapower v Ecuador
7.76
7.77
The stability framework
7.78
7.79
7.80
7.81
7.82
E Treaty v Contract: Forced Renegotiations & Outcomes (Venezuela)
7.83
7.84
A two-stage process
7.85
7.86
7.87
7.88
7.89
7.90
7.91
The IOC response
7.92
7.93
7.94
(1) Recourse to international arbitration
7.95
7.96
7.97
7.98
7.99
(2) The use of worldwide freezing orders
7.100
7.101
7.102
7.103
7.104
7.105
(3) Further nationalization
7.106
7.107
(4) Arbitration and remedies
7.108
7.109
(a) ConocoPhillips
7.110
7.111
7.112
7.113
7.114
7.115
7.116
(b) ExxonMobil
7.117
7.118
(5) Assessment
7.119
7.120
7.121
F Testing the International Investment Regime: Rejectionism (Bolivia)
7.122
7.123
7.124
7.125
7.126
7.127
7.128
7.129
G Treaty-based Protection: Ecuador
7.130
(1) The VAT cases
7.131
7.132
7.133
(a) Occidental
7.134
7.135
7.136
7.137
7.138
7.139
(b) EnCana
7.140
7.141
7.142
7.143
7.144
7.145
7.146
Stabilization
7.147
(2) The Law 42 cases
7.148
7.149
7.150
(a) Common features of the Arbitrations
7.151
7.152
7.153
(b) Use of provisional measures
7.154
7.155
7.156
Three tests
7.157
Test 1: Preservation of the petitioner’s rights
7.158
Test 2: Urgency
7.159
Test 3: Time for raising observations
7.160
7.161
7.162
7.163
7.164
7.165
7.166
(c) Occidental II
7.167
7.168
7.169
7.170
7.171
Analysis of Law 42 and stability
7.172
7.173
7.174
7.175
(d) Burlington
7.176
7.177
7.178
7.179
7.180
7.181
7.182
7.183
7.184
(e) Murphy
7.185
7.186
7.187
7.188
(f) Perenco
7.189
7.190
7.191
7.192
7.193
7.194
7.195
(g) Assessment
7.196
(3) Electricity reform impacts
7.197
(a) Duke Energy
7.198
7.199
7.200
7.201
7.202
7.203
7.204
(b) MCI Power
7.205
7.206
(c) Ulysseas Inc
7.207
7.208
(4) Pipelines
7.209
H FET, Stability, and Legitimate Expectations: Argentina
7.210
Economic reform
7.211
Guarantees of stability
7.212
7.213
(1) CMS
7.214
(2) LG&E Energy
7.215
7.216
7.217
(3) Enron and National Grid
7.218
7.219
7.220
(4) Sempra
7.221
7.222
7.223
7.224
(5) Total
7.225
The TGN claim
7.226
7.227
7.228
7.229
7.230
7.231
7.232
(6) Assessment
7.233
I Conclusions
7.234
Arbitration plus renegotiation
7.235
7.236
Stabilization clauses
7.237
7.238
ICSID role
7.239
BITs and stability
7.240
7.241
7.242
8 Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia: Treaty and Contract Stability in the Post-Soviet Space
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
8.09
8.10
8.11
8.12
B The Pendulum Swings
8.13
(1) Russia
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
(2) Kazakhstan
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
8.35
8.36
(3) Central Asia and the Caspian
8.37
8.38
8.39
(4) Ukraine
8.40
8.41
8.42
8.43
C Providing Legal Stability
8.44
8.45
8.46
8.47
8.48
(1) The procedural approach
8.49
8.50
8.51
8.52
8.53
(2) The multi-tiered approach
8.54
8.55
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
D Testing Stability Mechanisms
8.61
(1) Contract renegotiations: Russia
8.62
8.63
(a) Sakhalin-I
8.64
8.65
(b) Sakhalin-II
8.66
8.67
8.68
(c) Kharyaga PSA
8.69
8.70
8.71
8.72
8.73
8.74
8.75
8.76
8.77
8.78
8.79
8.80
(2) Contract renegotiations: Kazakhstan
8.81
8.82
(a) Kashagan
8.83
8.84
8.85
8.86
Renegotiation
8.87
(b) Karachaganak
8.88
8.89
8.90
8.91
8.92
8.93
8.94
E Stability and Gas Contracting
8.95
(1) Transitioning to a market-oriented framework
8.96
8.97
8.98
8.99
(2) Transit disputes
8.100
8.101
8.102
8.103
8.104
8.105
8.106
(3) Conflicts resolved
8.107
8.108
F Engaging with the Energy Charter Treaty
8.109
8.110
8.111
8.112
(1) The early awards
8.113
8.114
8.115
8.116
8.117
8.118
8.119
(2) The Yukos cases
8.120
8.121
(a) Overview
8.122
8.123
The first wave
8.124
8.125
8.126
8.127
8.128
(b) Provisional ratification
8.129
8.130
8.131
8.132
8.133
(c) Taxation and other issues
8.134
8.135
(3) Further use of the ECT
8.136
8.137
8.138
(a) Kazakhstan
8.139
8.140
8.141
8.142
8.143
8.144
8.145
8.146
8.147
8.148
(b) Ukraine
8.149
8.150
8.151
8.152
8.153
8.154
8.155
8.156
G Stability and Mining in the Region
8.157
8.158
8.159
8.160
8.161
8.162
8.163
8.164
8.165
8.166
8.167
8.168
8.169
H Conclusions
8.170
8.171
8.172
8.173
8.174
8.175
9 Africa: Treaty and Contract Stability
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
9.08
9.09
(1) Legal responses
9.10
9.11
9.12
9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
(2) Africa and BITs: South African ‘Rejectionism’
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
(3) Taxation measures
(a) Arbitrability of taxation measures
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
(b) Capital Gains Tax
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
B Energy Investment, Phase 1: Algeria, Egypt, and Nigeria
9.35
9.36
(1) Algeria
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.37
9.38
(b) Legal response to risk
(i) Law 86-14
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
(ii) The Anadarko PSA
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
9.51
9.52
(iii) A new regime is introduced
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
(c) Disputes
9.60
9.61
9.62
9.63
9.64
9.65
9.66
(d) Resolution
9.67
9.68
9.69
(2) Egypt
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.70
9.71
(b) Legal response to risk
9.72
9.73
9.74
Natural gas
9.75
9.76
(c) Disputes
9.77
(i) The Israel–Egypt gas pipeline
9.78
9.79
9.80
9.81
9.82
9.83
9.84
(ii) Unión Fenosa Gas
9.85
9.86
9.87
9.88
9.89
9.90
9.91
9.92
The Necessity Defence
9.93
9.94
9.95
Attribution
9.96
(d) Resolution
9.97
9.98
(3) Nigeria
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.99
9.100
9.101
9.102
9.103
9.104
9.105
9.106
(b) Legal response to risk
(i) Overview
9.107
9.108
9.109
9.110
(ii) Incentives for foreign investors
9.111
9.112
9.113
9.114
9.115
9.116
(iii) Legislative stability
9.117
9.118
9.119
9.120
9.121
9.122
9.123
9.124
9.125
Tax incentives
9.126
(iv) Stabilization Clauses in PSCs
9.127
9.128
9.129
9.130
9.131
(4) Disputes
9.132
9.133
(i) The overlifting cases
9.134
The problem
9.135
9.136
The response
9.137
9.138
(a) The Abo Arbitration
9.139
9.140
9.141
(b) The Erha Arbitration
9.142
9.143
9.144
9.145
9.146
9.147
(c) The Bonga Arbitration
9.148
9.149
9.150
9.151
(d) The Agbami Arbitration
9.152
9.153
9.154
9.155
9.156
(ii) The Malabu Dispute
9.157
9.158
9.159
9.160
9.161
9.162
9.163
(iii) The Total dispute
9.164
9.165
(e) Resolution
9.166
The overlifting cases
9.167
9.168
9.169
9.170
9.171
9.172
C Energy Investment, Phase 2: New Approaches to Stabilization
9.173
(1) Uganda
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.174
Attracting investment
9.175
9.176
9.177
9.178
9.179
9.180
9.181
Taxation policy
9.182
9.183
(b) Legal response to risk
9.184
9.185
9.186
9.187
Stabilization
9.188
9.189
9.190
9.191
9.192
9.193
9.194
9.195
9.196
(c) Disputes
9.197
9.198
9.199
(i) Heritage Oil & Gas
9.200
Background
9.201
The dispute
9.202
9.203
9.204
9.205
9.206
9.207
(ii) Tullow
9.208
9.209
9.210
(d) Resolution
9.211
9.212
(2) Ghana
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.213
9.214
(b) Legal response to risk
9.215
9.216
9.217
9.218
9.219
9.220
9.221
9.222
(c) Disputes
9.223
9.224
9.225
9.226
9.227
(d) Resolution
9.228
9.229
(3) Tanzania
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.230
9.231
9.232
9.233
(b) Legal response to risk
9.234
9.235
9.236
9.237
9.238
9.239
9.240
9.241
9.242
9.243
9.244
9.245
9.246
9.247
9.248
9.249
(c) Disputes
Electricity
9.250
9.251
Hydrocarbons
9.252
Mining
9.253
9.254
9.255
(d) Resolution
9.256
9.257
(4) Mozambique
(a) Political risk and attraction of capital
9.258
(b) Legal response to risk
9.259
9.260
9.261
9.262
9.263
(c) Disputes
9.264
9.265
9.266
9.267
(d) Resolution
9.268
9.269
D Other Patterns of Investment Dispute
9.270
9.271
9.272
9.273
9.274
E Conclusions
9.275
9.276
9.277
9.278
9.279
9.280
9.281
9.282
Part III
10 The Limits to Investment Stability: Environmental and Human Rights Issues
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
10.04
10.05
10.06
B How Concerns Arise—and Who Has Them
10.07
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
C Sources of Law
10.15
(1) Interrelations—with human rights law
10.16
The ECHR influence
10.17
The right to water
10.18
(2) Interrelations—with access to justice and public participation
10.19
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.23
10.24
(3) The role of standards and liability
10.25
10.26
10.27
10.28
10.29
10.30
D Raising the Standard of Environmental Protection
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
(1) Investment contracts
10.35
10.36
(a) Tanzania
10.37
10.38
10.39
10.40
(b) Kazakhstan
10.41
10.42
10.43
10.44
10.45
(2) Treaty protections
10.46
10.47
(a) Claims against states to enforce environmental law
10.48
(b) Claims by investors against takings/regulatory acts
10.49
10.50
(c) Environmental claims as counterclaims
10.51
(d) Environmental indemnities, permits
10.52
(e) The costs of a policy change: Vattenfall v Germany
10.53
10.54
10.55
(f) Responsibility for clean-up: Chevron and TexPet v Ecuador
10.56
10.57
10.58
10.59
10.60
10.61
10.62
(3) Benchmarking
10.63
10.64
10.65
10.66
10.67
10.68
(4) The Paris Agreement and Urgenda
10.69
10.70
10.71
Urgenda
10.72
10.73
(5) Case study: the Sakhalin-II gas project
10.74
10.75
10.76
10.77
10.78
10.79
E Decommissioning and Changes in Law
10.80
10.81
10.82
10.83
(1) Offshore decommissioning
10.84
10.85
10.86
10.87
(2) Asian exceptionalism
10.88
10.89
10.90
10.91
10.92
(3) A change in law
10.93
10.94
10.95
F The Human Rights Debate
10.96
(1) Energy contracts and stabilization
10.97
10.98
10.99
10.100
10.101
10.102
10.103
10.104
10.105
10.106
10.107
10.108
10.109
10.110
(2) Treaty-based protections
10.111
10.112
Human rights and non-compliance with obligations
10.113
10.114
10.115
10.116
10.117
Counterclaims
10.118
Investors and human rights claims
10.119
Arbitrators’ references
10.120
Amicus curiae
10.121
10.122
Indigenous peoples
10.123
10.124
Trends in Investor Obligations
10.125
(3) Case study: the Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline
10.126
10.127
10.128
10.129
10.130
10.131
10.132
10.133
10.134
10.135
10.136
10.137
G A Perfect Storm: Human Rights and Environmental Issues in the BTC Transnational Oil Pipeline Project
10.138
10.139
The legal regime
10.140
10.141
10.142
The reaction
10.143
Standards
10.144
10.145
10.146
Social impacts
10.147
Benchmarking
10.148
10.149
10.150
H Conclusions
10.151
10.152
10.153
10.154
10.155
10.156
10.157
10.158
11 Damages and Enforcement of Awards
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
B Damages: A Review of Principles and Compensation Standards
11.07
(1) Compensation and damages
11.08
11.09
(2) International law applicable to damages
(a) Treaty provisions
11.10
11.11
(b) Chorzów
11.12
11.13
11.14
(c) The ILC articles
11.15
11.16
11.17
11.18
11.19
(d) Full reparation
11.20
11.21
C Valuing Energy Investments
11.22
(1) Three main categories
11.23
11.24
11.25
11.26
11.27
11.28
11.29
11.30
11.31
11.32
11.33
11.34
(2) Industry-specific aspects
11.35
(3) Energy transition
11.36
11.37
D Application of the Principles
11.38
(1) El Paso v Argentina
(a) Overview
11.39
(b) Standard of compensation
11.40
(c) Valuation
11.41
11.42
11.43
(2) CMS v Argentina
(a) Overview
11.44
(b) Standard of compensation
11.45
11.46
(c) Valuation
11.47
11.48
11.49
11.50
11.51
11.52
11.53
(3) Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v The Republic of Georgia
(a) Overview
11.54
(b) Standard of compensation
11.55
11.56
11.57
11.58
11.59
11.60
(c) Valuation
11.61
11.62
(d) Stabilization clauses and valuation
11.63
11.64
(4) Mobil v Venezuela I and II
(a) Mobil v Venezuela I
11.65
(i) Overview
11.66
(ii) Standard of compensation
11.67
11.68
(iii) Valuation
11.69
11.70
11.71
11.72
(b) Mobil v Venezuela II
11.73
11.74
11.75
11.76
11.77
(5) Tidewater v Venezuela
(a) Overview
11.78
(b) Standard of compensation
11.79
11.80
11.81
(c) Valuation
11.82
11.83
11.84
(6) Guaracachi v Bolivia
(a) Overview
11.85
(b) Standard of compensation
11.86
11.87
(c) Valuation
11.88
11.89
11.90
(7) Stati v Kazakhstan
(a) Overview
11.91
11.92
(b) Standard of compensation
11.93
(c) Valuation
11.94
11.95
11.96
11.97
(8) Yukos v The Russian Federation
(a) Overview
11.98
11.99
(b) Standard of compensation
11.100
(c) Valuation
11.101
11.102
11.103
11.104
11.105
11.106
11.107
11.108
(9) Occidental v Ecuador
(a) Overview
11.109
11.110
(b) Standard of compensation
11.111
(c) Valuation
11.112
11.113
11.114
11.115
11.116
(10) Murphy v Ecuador
(a) Overview
11.117
(b) Standard of compensation
11.118
(c) Valuation
11.119
11.120
11.121
(11) Union Fenosa v Egypt
(a) Overview
11.122
(b) Standard of compensation
11.123
(c) Valuation
11.124
11.125
11.126
11.127
(12) BayWa Renewable Energy v Spain
(a) Overview
11.128
(b) Standard of compensation
11.129
(c) Valuation
11.130
E Enforcement
11.131
11.132
11.133
(1) New York Convention
11.134
11.135
(2) The ICSID system
11.136
11.137
11.138
(3) Practice
11.139
11.140
(a) The role of the US courts
11.141
11.142
11.143
11.144
11.145
11.146
(i) ICSID energy case: how the process of enforcement works
11.147
11.148
11.149
11.150
11.151
11.152
(ii) New York Convention energy case: how the process of enforcement works
11.153
11.154
11.155
11.156
11.157
(b) US practice I: the Erha arbitration
11.158
11.159
11.160
11.161
11.162
11.163
11.164
11.165
11.166
(c) US practice 2: BG Group v Argentina
11.167
11.168
11.169
11.170
11.171
F Settlement
11.172
11.173
11.174
11.175
11.176
11.177
11.178
(1) The content of a settlement
11.179
11.180
11.181
11.182
11.183
11.184
(2) The practice of settling: Spain’s offer to investors
11.185
11.186
11.187
11.188
G Conclusions
11.189
11.190
11.191
11.192
12 Guarantees for Long-Term Energy Investments: Expectations and Realities
Preliminary Material
A What is Energy Investment?
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
B Risk and the State
12.07
12.08
12.09
(1) Regulation
12.10
12.11
12.12
12.13
12.14
(2) Expropriation
Traditional actions
12.15
12.16
12.17
12.18
(3) Renegotiations
12.19
12.20
12.21
(4) Intervention in the arbitral process
12.22
C The Structure of Legal Stability
12.23
Structure
12.24
12.25
12.26
(1) Stability by contract
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12.32
12.33
12.34
12.35
12.36
(2) Stability and the investment law framework
12.37
12.38
12.39
12.40
12.41
12.42
12.43
12.44
12.45
12.46
(3) Stability by national law
12.47
12.48
12.49
12.50
D The Case Studies
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
12.55
(1) Outcomes
12.56
12.57
12.58
12.59
12.60
12.61
12.62
12.63
The classic contract cases
12.64
12.65
E The Energy Transition
12.66
12.67
12.68
12.69
F Summary of Findings
12.70
12.71
12.72
12.73
12.74
12.75
12.76
Further Material
Appendix
Appendix I Energy Charter Treaty (Part III: Investment Promotion and Protection, Articles 10–17)
Part III Investment Promotion and Protection
Art.10 Promotion, Protection and Treatment of Investments
Art.11 Key Personnel
Art.12 Compensation for Losses
Art.13 Expropriation
Art.14 Transfers Related to Investments
Art.15 Subrogation
Art.16 Relation to other Agreements
Art.17 Non-Application of Part III in Certain Circumstances
Members of the Energy Charter Conference
Observers to the Energy Charter Conference
Appendix II Stability Provisions—Examples from Investment Agreements
(1) Model and Negotiated Texts
Stabilization—the Model Provision
The Negotiated Supplement:
Stabilization—the Model Provision
The Negotiated Supplement:
(2) Change of Law in Stabilisation Clauses—International Petroleum Agreements: Examples
Africa
I Liberia—Model Petroleum Sharing Contract of 2000
Article 35—Stability of Conditions
II Tanzania—Model Production Sharing Contract of November 2004
Article 30—Change in Legislation
III Sudan—Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement Dated 15 January 2002 Between the Government of Sudan and Joint-Stock Oil and Gas Company Slavneft and Sudapet Ltd.
IV Algeria—Model Production Sharing Contract
V South Sudan—Production Sharing Contract Dated June 28, 2005 among Nile Petroleum Corporation, SET Energy GmbH, Industrial & Financial Group ASCOM S.A.
VI Angola—Model Production Sharing Contract Dated 31 March 2006
VII Guinea—Production Sharing Contract Dated 22 September 2006 between the Republic of Guinea and SCS Corporation
Middle East
VIII Iraq (Northern)—Model Production Sharing Agreement dated July 2002 between Interim Joint Regional Government of Northern Iraq, Sulaymaniyah Regional Governorate & Genel Elektrik A.S.
IX Qatar—Art. 34.12 Model exploration and production sharing agreement 1994, entitled: ‘Equilibrium of the Agreement’:
X Turkey—Art. 21.2. of the Host Government Agreement between the Government of Turkey and the MEP Participants governing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline (October 19, 2000):
Asia
XI Afghanistan—Draft Model Production Sharing Agreement for Hydrocarbons Exploitation, Development and Production dated 3 January 2005
XII India—Model Production Sharing Contract dated 27 December 2007 (NELP VII)
XIII Vietnam—Model Petroleum Production Sharing Contract of 2007 between Vietnam Oil & Gas Corporation and Contractor
XIV Philippines—Model Production Sharing Agreement of 11 April 2005
XV China—Production Sharing Contract of 25 January 2002 for Exploitation of Coalbed Methane Resources in Enhong & Laochang, Yunnan Province, by & between China United Coalbed Methane Corp. Ltd. & Far East Energy Corp. (Supplement 165—Asia & Australasia)
Appendix III Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act 1990, as amended in 1993
Second Schedule Guarantees and assurances to Nigeria LNG Limited and its shareholders
Appendix IV Aguaytia-Ecuador LSA and Related Legislative Decrees
Convenio de Estabilidad Jurídica con Aguaytia Energy, LLC de Estados Unidos de América, between the Republic of Peru and Aguaytia Energy LLC, 17 May 1996: Extracts
Legislative Decrees referred to in Article 1 LSA
1) Legislative Decree 662 Approving the Juridical Stability System for Foreign Investment, published on 2 September 1991
Title II Juridical Stability for Foreign Investment
2) Legislative Decree 757 of 13 November 1999, Title V (Juridical Stability of Investments), Chapter 1 (Juridical Stability Agreements), Article 39:
3) Supreme Decree 162-92 EF Approving the Regulations for Private Investment Guarantee Systems of 12 October 1992
Title III: Juridical Stability
Ch.II: Guarantees furnished by Juridical Stability
Ch.I: Investors’ Rights
Appendix V Association Agreement between Mobil and PDVSA, Article XV
Consequences of Certain Governmental Actions
Appendix VI Legal Stability Agreement: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
(1) Framework Law providing for LSAs
On the Petroleum Development of the Timor Sea (Tax Stability)
s.1: Definitions
s.2: Tax Stability Agreement
s.3: Compensation or Exemption
s.4: Exercise of Discretionary Power
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Appendix III Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act 1990, as amended in 1993
From:
International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability (2nd Edition)
Peter D Cameron
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Investment Claims [IC]
Published in print:
07 October 2021
ISBN:
9780198732471
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[35.172.165.64]
35.172.165.64